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DISTRIBUTIVE  AND  PATERNALIST  MOTIVES IN
CONTRACT  AND  TORT LAW,  WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO COMPULSORY  TERMS
AND  UNEQUAL  BARGAINING
POWER
DUNCAN  KENNEDY*
INTRODUCTION
The goal of this article is to get at two generally unacknowledged
motives that lie  behind legislative, judicial and administrative  choices
about what kind of law of agreements  we  should have.  These  are my
most important points: First, distributive and paternalist motives play a
central role in explaining the rules of the contract and tort systems with
respect  to agreements.  Second,  these  motives  explain far better than
any notion of rectifying unequal bargaining power  the widespread  le-
gal institution of compulsory contract terms in areas such as the alloca-
tion  of risk.  Third,  the  notion  that  paternalist  intervention  can  be
justified  only by the  "incapacity"  of the person the  decision maker is
trying  to protect  is wrong  - the  basis of paternalism  is empathy  or
love, and its legitimate  operation cannot  be constricted to situations in
which its object  lacks "free  will."
My  approach  will  be capacious  in  some  respects,  and  in  others
quite narrow.  I want to discuss contract, tort, and statutory rules about
agreements together, hoping thereby to overcome some of the parochi-
alism of scholarship  in each field.'  I plan  to try to integrate doctrinal
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*  Professor  of Law,  Harvard  Law  School.  I presented  a part  of this  article  as the
Sobeloff Lecture  at the University  of Maryland  Law School on  April  27,  1982.  Thanks to
Jerry  Frug and  Steve  Shavell.
1. The  main  base of materials  I  used in writing this  article  consists  of the  following
books: E.  CLARK,  L.  LUSKY  &  A. MURPHY,  CASES  &  MATERIALS  ON  GRATUITOUS  TRANS-MARYLAND  LAW  REVIEW
discussion  with  economic  and  "policy"  analysis,2  and  all  three  with
"fancy theory,"  by which  I mean a melange of critical Marxism, struc-
turalism, and  phenomenology.3  But I  will have nothing  to say  about
the impact of "institutional competence"  considerations on the motives
for  lawmaking  I  discuss.  I  assume  that  the  only grounds  for distin-
FERS:  WILLS,  INTESTATE  SUCCESSION,  TRUSTS,  GIFTS  &  FUTURE INTERESTS  (2d ed.  1977);
C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN,  CASES & MATERIALS  ON TORTS  (2d ed. 1969);  C. GREGORY, H.
KALVEN & R. EPSTEIN,  CASES  & MATERIALS  ON  TORTS (3d ed.  1977); C. HAAR  & L.  LIEB-
MAN,  PROPERTY & LAW (1977);  F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE,  CONTRACTS,  CASES &  MATERI-
ALS  (2d  ed.  1970);  I.  MACNEIL,  CASES  &  MATERIALS  ON  CONTRACTS:  EXCHANGE
TRANSACTIONS  & RELATIONSHIPS  (1971).  This article is an attempt to develop ideas sketch-
ed in Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89  HARV.  L.  REV.  1685
(1976),  and Kennedy,  The Structure of  Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV.  205
(1979).
2.  On economic and policy analysis, see G. CALABRESI,  THE COSTS  OF ACCIDENTS:  A
LEGAL  AND  ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS  (1970);  R. POSNER,  ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS  OF  LAW (2d ed.
1977);  see also Baker, The Ideology ofthe Economic  Analysis of  Law, 5  PHIL. & PUB.  AFF. 3
(1975);  Dworkin, Is  Wealth a  Value?, 9  J. LEGAL  STUD.  323  (1980);  Kelman,  Choice and
Utility,  1979  WIsc.  L.  REV.  769  (1979);  Kennedy,  Cost-Beneft Analysis of Entitlement
Problems:  A  Critique,  33  STAN.  L. REV.  387 (1981);  Kennedy and Michelman, Are Property
& Contract  Effcient?, 8  HOFSTRA  L. REV. 711  (1980);  Leff, Economic Analysis ofLaw: Some
Realism About Nominalism, 60  VA.  L.  REV.  451  (1974);  Tribe, Policy Science.- Analysis or
Ideology, 2 PHIL.  &  PUB. AFF. 66 (1972).  See generally Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal
Concern, 8  HOFSTRA  L.  REV. 485  (1980);  A  Response to the Efficiency Symposium,  8  HOF-
STRA L.  REV.  811  (1980).
3.  This article has been  strongly influenced by the work of scholars in the critical legal
studies movement.  The Conference  on Critical Legal Studies (most members are law teach-
ers, law students, lawyers, or social scientists) tries to bring together Marxist and non-Marx-
ist radical approaches to law.  For a partial survey, see Note,  'Round and 'Round  the Bramble
Bush. From Legal  Realism to Critical  Legal Scholarshp, 95 HARV.  L. REV.  1669 (1982).  For
information about the Conference and/or a copy of a Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies
(#9, 3/1/82),  write  Professor  Mark  V.  Tushnet, Georgetown  Univ.  Law  Center, 600 New
Jersey  Ave.  N.W., Washington,  D.C. 20001.
A  useful introduction to  "fancy  theory"  is  the  first two chapters  of A.  GOULDNER,
THE  Two  MARXISMS:  CONTRADICTIONS  AND  ANOMALIES  IN  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE-
ORY  (1981).  The  works  that  have  most  influenced  me  are:  M.  FOUCAULT,
POWER/KNOWLEDGE:  SELECTED  INTERVIEWS  AND  OTHER  WRITINGS  1972-1977  (Gordon
trans.  1980);  A.  GRAMSCI,  SELECTIONS  FROM  THE  PRISON  NOTEBOOKS  (Q.  Hoare  &  G.
Smith  trans.  1971);  G.  HEGEL,  THE  PHENOMENOLOGY  OF  MIND  (J. Baillie  trans.  2d  ed.
1949); G. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY  OF RIGHT (T. Knox trans. 1942);  W. KOHLER,  GESTALT
PSYCHOLOGY  (1947);  K.  KORSCH,  MARXISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY (F. Halliday trans.  1970);  C.
LEVI-STRAUSS,  THE  SAVAGE MIND (1966);  K. MANNHEIM,  IDEOLOGY  AND  UTOPIA:  AN IN-
TRODUCTION  TO  THE  SOCIOLOGY  OF  KNOWLEDGE  (1936);  H.  MARCUSE,  REASON  AND
REVOLUTION:  HEGEL AND  THE RISE OF SOCIAL THEORY (2d ed. 1963);  1 K. MARX,  CAPITAL
(B.  Fowkes  trans.  1976);  K.  MARX,  CRITIQUE  OF  THE  GOTHA  PROGRAMME  (1939);  K.
MARX,  ON THE  JEWISH QUESTION,  in EARLY  WRITINGS  211  (R. Livingstone and G. Benton
trans. 1975); J. PIAGET, PLAY,  DREAMS  AND  IMITATION IN  CHILDHOOD  (C. Gattegno and F.
Hodgson trans.  1962); J.P. SARTRE,  BEING  AND  NOTHINGNESS:  AN  ESSAY  IN  PHENOMENO-
LOGICAL  ONTOLOGY  (H.  Barnes trans.  1956);  J.P. SARTRE,  THE  PROBLEM  OF  METHOD  (H.
Barnes trans.  1963); Lukacs, Repication and  the Consciousness ofthe Proletariat,  in  HISTORY
AND  CLASS  CONSCIOUSNESS:  STUDIES  IN  MARXIST  DIALETICS  83  (R.  Livingstone  trans.
1971).
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guishing  between  courts,  legislatures  and  administrative  agencies  as
lawmakers  are (i) that the false consciousness  of the public requires  it
or (ii) that the decision maker has a quite specific theory about how his
or her particular institutional situation should modify his or her pursuit
of political objectives.
I  likewise  assume that it makes  little or no difference  whether  we
are talking  about very particular doctrines,  like the  rule that perform-
ance of a pre-existing  duty cannot  be consideration  for a  promise,  or
about general standards  such  as the invalidity of unconscionable  con-
tract terms.  Finally, I take it for granted that no one has yet developed
an account of the existing rules about agreements that relates them con-
vincingly  to  a general  moral  theory,  or to  a  general  theory  of rights.
More:  there  are extant no theories  of moral conduct or of rights  that
convincingly  indicate  even  in their  own terms  what  the  rules  about
agreements should be.
On this basis, I will proceed as follows.  The first part provides  a
descriptive and  conceptual  framework  for the discussion.  The second
explores the place of distributive and paternalist  motives in our current
discourse about the law of agreements.  The third introduces the com-
pulsory  term or nondisclaimable  duty  as an important, indeed  central
institution within that body of law.  The fourth part examines the dis-
tributive  and  efficiency  consequences  of this  institution,  and the  fifth
criticizes the unequal bargaining power rationale for its existence.  The
sixth part defends paternalism, with respect to compulsory terms and in
general, against the claim that it is inconsistent with or inappropriate to
the legal order.
I.  A  CONCEPTUAL  FRAMEWORK:  THE  SOCIAL  BACKGROUND,
FREEDOM  OF  CONTRACT,  THREE  KINDS  OF  MOTIVES
This part sets the stage  for the rest of the article by presenting the
basic assumptions and concepts I will use throughout.  First, since I will
be  talking  about  the  motives  of decision  makers  making  changes  in
legal rules, I need to give an idea of the world in which they operate -
the social background  of the analysis.  I will use a much more specified
context than is usual in economic analysis, though a much less specified
context than is typical of doctrinal work.  Second, I present the baseline
contract/tort  regime - "freedom of contract"  - which I  imagine  my
decision  maker to be  working with.  It is this  regime, rather than the
state of nature or the contract/tort regime of a socialist economy, that I
imagine  him to be  able to change.  Third,  I define  the  three  kinds  of
motives with which the analysis will deal:  distributive, paternalist, and
efficiency  motives.
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A.  The Social Background
I am going to be imputing motives to  a rather abstract  character.
He is a decision maker in a legal system - a private  law and criminal
law regime - that is at least generally similar to that of the nineteenth
and twentieth century United  States, or to  that of any Western  Euro-
pean country  during  this period.  This is  a national  legal system,  and
the  economy  of the  nation is, speaking  loosely,  capitalist  or "mixed,"
with various welfare state kinds of rules in effect.  It has been industri-
alizing for a long time.
The decision maker has the power to modify the contract  and tort
and  criminal  law groundrules  of this  system.  He  can shift  the  rights
and privileges  that  come  with ownership  of property  or with  being  a
person,  and  he  can  modify  the  rules about  what  agreements  are  en-
forceable  and on what terms.  But he can't just take large quantities  of
"stuff"  away from some specific people and give it to other specific peo-
ple (or groups or classes).  He has no power to tax, and he can't nation-
alize or collectivize  resources  by abolishing private property  in them.
The decision  maker looks out at a society that has been  operating
for some time under more or less stable rules of the game.  Using com-
mon knowledge, intuition and social science research data, he can iden-
tify  outcomes  of the  game  played  according  to  these  rules.  The
outcomes are  the experiences  of all the  people who are pursuing  their
lives as participants in the economy.  These vary greatly from person  to
person, and vary in many dimensions.  Some people have great wealth,
others  middling  wealth,  some  no wealth  at  all.  Some  have  high in-
comes,  some middling and some little or no income from employment.
Beyond monetary  measures of valued experiences,  there are other
indices of attainment and of-equality - differences in educational level
and  in skills that seem  to reflect differential  success  in  attaining  goals
everyone  agrees  are  desirable  rather  than  differences  in  taste  among
possible attainments.  Furthermore, the decision maker will have some
sense of the historical evolution  of the national economy, its prior suc-
cesses and failures in  providing large quantities  of valued experiences
- he knows  something  about  changes in the  gross  level of output as
well as  something  about its distribution.
All this is taking place in a context of class division, patriarchy and
racialism.  These  three  systems  have  several  things  in  common.
Classes, racial groups and to a lesser extent men and women live apart,
unto themselves, but are also interrelated  through a  system of division
of labor that makes them interdependent  and gives  them  all kinds of
experiences  of one another.  Second, there are differences  in capacities
and differences  in valued experiences  linked to class, race and sex, but
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mediated  by the  market - you  aren't paid  less  "because"  you are  a
woman in a formal status sense, but because of the combination of rela-
tive  lack of economic  power and  of "prejudice."  Third, members  of
groups  have  experiences  of intersubjectivity,  of shared  identity,  com-
munication, intimate mutual knowledge that set them apart from each
other, yet all groups are part of a regional and a national culture, and
so identify themselves  vis-A-vis "foreigners."
Fourth, everyone knows that race, sex and class differences are not
just  "differences."  These  terms  refer  to  hierarchical  arrangements  of
groups.  Men dominate women; whites dominate blacks and Hispanics;
upper  classes  dominate  lower classes.  In  each  case,  there is a  "tradi-
tional" interpretation of this hierarchy as natural and legitimate, and as
the appropriate basis for differential rewards. There is also a conflicting
interpretation  of hierarchy  as  illegitimate because  all are or should be
equal, and a third interpretation that emphasizes the superiority of the
previously inferior (along with the desirability of their separation from
the rest  of the nation).
People in this social world experience  their level of welfare  as in
part determined by their class, sexual and racial  identities, in  part de-
termined by intrinsic qualities of the self, but in every case as the prod-
uct of a struggle  or competition  for the  "good  things of life."  In this
perspective, people  want more or less the same things,  and they want
them in as great quantity as possible.  The groundrules  therefore  gov-
ern situations that  are both cooperative  and zero sum.  In every trans-
action between buyer and seller, there  is an issue of how well  one can
do at the expense of the other.  The relations of workers among them-
selves are  based  on competition  for jobs, for wages  and for advance-
ment, as well as on solidarity.  Capitalists have their common interests,
but they also constantly battle among themselves. Consumers of differ-
ent kinds of goods bid against one another for resources.  These lines of
conflict  and  common  interest  sometimes  correspond  and  sometimes
don't correspond to class, sexual, racial, and regional divisions.  Group
conflict  and  economic  conflict  almost  always overlap  to some  extent,
and are  almost never  fused in a single conflict.
How much the economy produces, just in terms of the raw output
of things  that just  about  everyone wants  some of, and  also  how  well
each person does in the economic struggle within civil  society  - both
of these are in part a function of the set of property, contract  and tort
rules  (with  legislative  and  administrative  elaborations)  within  which
the  struggle takes place.  These rules are by no means the only factor.
So  long  as  we're  talking  about  a  system  that's  part  of the  family  of
Western  European mixed capitalist regimes, the choice of a particular
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set of groundrules  is obviously far less important than the initial distri-
bution of wealth  within the  groundrules.  Endowments  of natural  re-
sources count for countries and regions; relatively fixed  (by adulthood)
capacities,  skills,  talents,  disabilities,  genius,  count  for  individuals.
Group spirit counts for groups.  But the groundrules exist; they are in-
voked  from time to time, and they have some influence on the level of
output, on its composition, and on its distribution.  The decision maker
decides  in this context.
B.  The Base Linefor Assessing Rule Changes.- Freedom of Contract
The  decision maker acts within a legal as well as a social  context.
He is making  changes  in a previous  regime that is not the state of na-
ture (no state, no positive law, and no system of enforced  rights).  If it
were the state of nature, the question would be how much law to add to
a background  of no law.  But  the  changes  I want  to  discuss in what
follows are  changes  in an already  existing system  which  I  will  loosely
call freedom  of contract.  Since about the  beginning of the nineteenth
century, discourse about what rules should be in force has taken some-
thing like this regime as its starting point.
1.  The Rules that Compose a Regime of Freedom of Contract -
As I will  be using the term, a regime of freedom of contract is a set of
rules about agreements within a domain of pre-existing property rights.
In other words, we presuppose  a set of decisions to the effect  that land,
for example, can be "owned"  by individuals or groups, that people can
"sell"  their labor, and  so  forth.  (I  recognize  that  the  definition  of a
domain of property rights  may require  us to refer, in circular fashion,
back to the  question of freedom of contract, but this difficulty  is irrele-
vant for the  limited purposes of this paper.)  It may  be helpful  to lay
out the rules that  make up free contract  in a schematic  way:
(a) People  are free not to make agreements to  do things that fall
within the domain.  You don't have to contract. This means there
are the  following rules:
(i)  The state  will not punish you for refusing to  enter agree-
ments within the domain, no matter how much your potential
partner wants you to and no matter how obvious  it may be to
the decision maker that you ought to.
(ii)  There are criminal  law and/or tort rules in effect that are
intended to prevent  people from using force,  stealth or fraud
to just make you do things you won't freely agree to  do.
(iii) There are a set of contract  rules in effect that reduce to a
nullity (or make "voidable")  agreements  that only appear to
[VOL.  41MOTIVES  IN  CONTRACT  AND  TORT  LAW
have been freely entered into.  In other words, in contract ac-
tions there are  defenses of fraud, duress  and incapacity.
(b) People who have legal capacity are free,  within the domain, to
bind themselves.  You  don't have to  make binding  contracts, but
you can if you want to.  This  means  that there are  the following
kinds of rules, in each case to be  enforced only where  the parties
do not indicate  to the contrary:
(i) There are rules specifying what conduct is necessary in or-
der to create a binding  obligation - to get the judges  to en-
force the agreement.
(ii) There  are  rules  about what  constitutes  a  breach  of a  le-
gally binding obligation.
(iii) There are rules about what happens to you if you breach.
(c) There is a general rule against the state requiring or prohibiting
any particular terms in contracts.  It's not just that you don't have
to contract, and can contract if you want to:  you can contract  on
any  terms you want to as  well.
2.  The Constitutive Character  of  the Exceptions to Enforcement -
We  have  freedom  of contract  if the  decision  maker  enforces  agree-
ments, one might say.  But this would be an inadequate specification of
what  must be going on if we are to "have"  this institution.  The  deci-
sion maker must, indeed, enforce  agreements,  but he must also refuse
to  enforce  agreements.  If  he  enforces  the  wrong  ones,  those  that
shouldn't  be enforced, then we are as far from freedom of contract as
we would be were  he to refuse to enforce  agreements at all.  The insti-
tution, in other words, is as much  constituted by the exceptions to  en-
forcement  as by the practice  of enforcement.  It is there so long as the
decision  maker  maintains  his  balance  between  the  two  extremes  of
non-intervention and  over-intervention  in the affairs of civil society.
The  goal  of the  balancing  act  is  two  distinct  kinds  of freedom.
First, there is the freedom of one private  actor from legally backed im-
position by the other.  If there were no defense of duress, strong parties
could bind weak parties in spite of the fact that the weak parties didn't
really want to be bound  - hadn't really agreed.  Without a defense of
fraud,  crafty  liars would  get away  with murder.  If there  were no de-
fense of incapacity,  unscrupulous people would soon separate children
and the insane  from their possessions. But the point about private im-
position applies as  well to the more general principle that you are not
bound unless you affirmatively  intended to be bound.  If other people
can force you into contracts merely by asking you, or merely by asking
you while at the same time presenting you evidence of their vulnerabil-
ity to harm  should you fail to contract,  then we  have  something  less
than  freedom of contract.
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This means that in order to be true to the institution, the decision
maker must not enforce agreements that are the product of the superior
power of one party, rather  than of the consent  of both.  And he must
not enforce  agreements that the stronger party should have but did not
enter with  the  weaker  party.  The  injunction not  to enforce  "unfree"
agreements  'protects  the strong  against  the weak,  as  well  as  the  weak
against the strong.
Freedom  of contract  is freedom  of the  parties  from  the  state  as
well as  freedom from imposition by one  another. The decision maker
must not condition contract  enforcement on the lighting of candles  for
the salvation of his soul (or the soul of the monarch).  So long  as they
have  legal capacity  he  is  also  prohibited  from  conditioning  enforce-
ment on the parties adopting his particular view of what their relation-
ship  should be  like.  He  must let  them  deal  only  for the  short  term,
though he  believes  they  should  bind  each  other for the long haul; he
must let them buy and sell at whatever price they like, and on whatever
terms,  so  long  as  the  agreement  meets  the  test of voluntariness.  He
must not use his  power to make  one party  sacrifice  or share  with the
other party beyond her willingness to  do so of her own free choice.
These substantive judgments about what acts were truly voluntary
and about which intentions were whose are simply inescapable so long
as it  is freedom of contract  the decision maker  is trying to  achieve.
C.  Three Types of Motive in Setting the Groundrules
A  decision  maker  may  change  (or  refuse  to  change)  a  rule  for
many different reasons other than like or dislike of freedom of contract.
In particular, he may believe  that his act will have desirable distribu-
tive, or paternalist,  or efficiency  consequences.  Here  I  will briefly  de-
fine these  in turn, in each case using the word motive to mean, loosely,
just goal, or purpose, or objective, rather than anything more technical
or precise.
The  decision  maker  acts  out  of distributive  motives  when  he
changes  a  rule (or refuses  to  change  a rule)  because  he  wants  to  in-
crease  the success of some group in the struggle  for welfare,  expecting
and intending that this increase will be at the expense of another group
(the  groups may overlap).  The  decision  maker  acts  out of paternalist
motives when he changes a rule in order to improve someone's welfare
by getting them to behave  in their "own  real interests,"  rather than in
the fashion they  would have adopted under the previous  legal regime.
The decision  maker acts  out of efficiency motives  when he  changes  a
rule  so  as  to  induce  people  to  reach  agreements  that  correspond  to
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those they would have reached  under the previous legal regime  had it
not been for the  existence  of transaction costs.
1.  Distributive Motives - The  first hallmark  of distributive mo-
tive  is that  the  decision  maker  accepts  the  beneficiary's  definition  of
what will  make the beneficiary  better off.  The notion is  that the deci-
sion maker finds two people engaged in a struggle over the distribution
of something that each values.  They are operating under the previous
regime.  He  changes the regime  in a  way that helps  one.  The  second
hallmark  is  that  the  decision  maker  sees  the  situation  as  zero  sum:
helping one means hurting the other.  Some examples of issues that get
discussed in distributive terms are:  should secondary boycotts by labor
unions be tortious?  Should there be a minimum wage?  Should issuers
of securities  have  to  give  potential investors  more,  or more  accurate
information than was required by the common  law of fraud as it stood
in 1929?
A  decision  maker  might  resolve  these  specific  issues  (and  any
others as  well) without  regard to  issues of distribution.  He might  be
unaware that his decision would have a cognizable distributive  impact,
or he might not care about distribution in general, or about distribution
as between the particular parties likely to be affected.  Or he might be-
lieve that it was both possible and somehow required  that the decision
be made by looking to the  fairness  or the moral character of the con-
duct involved, or to the "rights"  of one party  or the  other (or of both
parties)  to  the  dispute,  in each  case  with  the belief that  decision  by
reference  to these considerations  specifically excludes even considering
the distributive  effects  likely to  follow.
As  I  conceive  the  category,  there  are  many kinds  of distributive
motives.  The pursuit of distributive  goals, moreover, may or may not
be instrumental to the attainment of more "ultimate"  goals.  One might
modify the groundrules with the sole object of making the distribution
of income  between  two groups  more equal  or less equal.  One might
have  the idea  that everyone  has  a  "right"  to a  particular  absolute or
relative income share, or that such a distributive pattern would further
the goal of civil peace.  One might think it immoral for a person to reap
more than a particular relative share of the benefits of a transaction, or
that a particular  class of people have  a hereditary right to be twice  as
wealthy as anyone else in civil society.  What makes the motive distrib-
utive is  that the decision maker  sees changing  the rule  as a  means to
changing distributive shares, and whatever ulterior motives exist are  to
be attained  by this route.
The  decision  maker  operating  from distributive  motives  changes
the groundrules  so as to change the balance of power between the vari-
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ous  groups  in  civil  society.  The  change  in  the  rule may  operate  di-
rectly,  as in a change  in  the law of duress that allows one party to do
things to the other that were previously  illegal (e.g.,  the legalization of
picketing or lockouts), or it may be indirect, as where the prohibition of
secondary  boycotts  changes  the balance  between  a  union and  its pri-
mary  target,  or  a  law  against  monopolistic  combinations  changes  a
firm's relations  with customers.  But  the issue  is power.
2.  Paternalist  Motives - By  contrast,  where  motives  are  pater-
nalist,  the  issue  is false  consciousness.  As  in the  distributive  case, the
decision  maker changes  a rule because he believes  that under the new
regime the  objects  of his benevolence  will  end up with a  set of exper-
iences that will be "better for them" than those they would have ended
up with under the previous regime.  What makes  this change paternal-
ist  rather  than  distributive  is,  first,  that  those  who  have  supposedly
benefitted do not agree that they are better off, and would return to the
previous  regime  if given  a  choice  in  the matter.  Second, if there  are
good or bad  consequences  for  others through  the paternalist  change,
these are seen as side effects, rather than as part and parcel of the deci-
sion maker's program.
As  I  am using the term,  all paternalist interventions involve  over-
ruling the preferences of the beneficiary in his own best interest, but not
all such overrulings are paternalist.  One might, for example,  refuse to
enforce  contracts  made  under  duress,  thereby  overruling  the  prefer-
ences  (at the  time of contracting)  of both  parties,  but  do  this  in  the
belief that it would, over the long run, make the weaker party richer at
the expense of the stronger.  Weak parties, looking at the matter in the
abstract rather than at gunpoint,  might agree that over the long run a
contract  defense of duress would be a good thing for them.  So long as
there is  no disagreement  as to  the values  or moral  vision on which to
act, the decision maker is  not acting paternalistically.
Some issues that  have  often been addressed  with paternalist  mo-
tives are the legality of the possession of prohibited substances; whether
there  should be  required  terms in  various  types of contracts,  such as
marriage or consumer  sales contracts;  and the extent to which infants,
idiots and seamen  are subject to the same contract regime as "normal"
people.  As in the case of distributive motives, each  of these issues  can
be resolved through  the  application of tests that do not involve pater-
nalism.  One might try to settle each by appeal to distributive consider-
ations,  as well  as  by appeal to  fairness, morality, or rights.
3.  Efficiency Motives - A decision maker acting  from efficiency
motives accepts the rules of the previous regime as legitimate from the
[VOL.  41MOTIVES  IN  CONTRACT  AND  TORT  LAW
point of view of fairness, morality, rights, distribution or whatever.  His
goal  is to  modify  one of these  rules  so  as  to make  everyone  affected
better off, by their own criteria of better-offness,  than they would have
been under the old dispensation.  This will be possible where transac-
tion costs of one kind or another have prevented  parties under the pre-
vious  regime from making  an exchange.  If the decision maker  knows
that this exchange  would have occurred,  he may be  able to induce the
parties to perform it by the right modification of the background  rules.
Some examples of issues that decision makers often approach with
efficiency  motives  are:  whether  there should be nondisclaimable  war-
ranties attached to consumer goods in circumstances  where consumers
can't  cheaply  acquire  information  that  would  allow  them  to  assess
product safety, and sellers have  incentives not to provide  this informa-
tion;  what  should  be  the  rules  of damages  for  breach  of  contract;
whether sports arenas  should be liable for damage inflicted by one fan
on another.  Of course,  each  of these issues  can  be  approached  with
quite  different motives, or with a set of motives that lead to conflicting
resolutions.
Efficiency  motives  differ  from  paternalist  motives  because  their
premise  is that the affected parties  will prefer the new situation  to the
old,  so  they  would  not  choose  to  "waive"  the  benefits  the  decision
maker  has  attempted  to  confer  on  them.  The  decision  maker  is  not
trying to decide what is  "really"  best for them, without regard to their
own views of the matter.  On the other hand, an intervention grounded
in efficiency  concerns  will  always  involve  speculation  about  what  the
parties "would have  done" had they not been prevented  by transaction
costs.
This  is a  form of second-guessing  that goes  considerably  beyond
what is required  when  a decision maker  acting from distributive  mo-
tives tips the scales in favor of one combatant and against the other.  It
falls  short  of paternalism  because  the  decision  maker  sees  second-
guessing as an unfortunate expedient necessary only because of market
imperfections,  and will abandon an intervention  if convinced  that the
supposed  beneficiaries  don't  want  it.  By  contrast,  the  paternalist  is
identified precisely by his willingness to persist when it's clear his con-
tribution  is not wanted.
We might distinguish between  efficiency and distributive  motives
on the ground that the first involve making both parties better off, while
the second involve helping one at the expense of the other.  However, I
want to fudge this distinction, and treat as motivated by efficiency some
interventions that have negative effects  on some actors.  In particular, I
will treat  as motivated  by efficiency  the  following type of action:  the
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decision  maker  imposes  a  term  in  a  contract  in the  belief that if the
parties had full information almost  all sellers would  offer it at a price
that almost  all buyers would accept.  In this case, there are some nega-
tive  distributive impacts, on those who wouldn't have offered the  term
and  on those who wouldn't have  paid  for it had we  not changed  the
rule to make them do so.  But the motive of the intervention is to make
the great  mass of buyers  and sellers  better  off by facilitating  the  deal
they would have made absent transaction costs.  The negative distribu-
tive impact  is a side effect,  like the side  effects of paternalist  interven-
tion, rather than the whole point  of the  enterprise.
4.  A Borderline  Case (on all three borders) - It may be helpful in
clarifying what  I intend by my types of motive to consider  a case that
seems to fall at the intersection  of all three.  Suppose a decision maker
asked  to  enforce  a  contract  between  an  employer  and  an individual
worker, by which they agree that the worker  will not join a union, and
in  exchange  will  receive  a  wage  and benefit  package  superior  to that
now  offered  union  members.  The  decision  maker  might  decide  that
this agreement  was unenforceable  (or even enjoinable) and explain the
decision  by referring  to its expected  consequences.  Suppose  all agree
that prohibiting the  contract will strengthen  the hand  of the union  as
against the  employer, and increase the total  sum he pays  as wages.  It
will hurt  the particular  worker  in the  short run,  since  he  could  have
made more through his separate  deal than he can  make by bargaining
collectively,  even through  a now  stronger union.  The decision maker
believes that in the long run the strengthening of the union means that
the worker will receive more income than he would have had the deci-
sion maker allowed him to contract separately. But there is no question
that he would waive these benefits if the law permitted it, and make his
separate peace.
If we take the most capacious version of my definition of efficiency
motives,  we  can  fit this  case  under that  rubric.  Transaction  costs  in-
clude not just the cost of aggregating  interests and the costs of working
out the  details of agreements,  but also  the costs of obtaining informa-
tion.  We  could  argue  that  if the  worker  had  accurate  information
about the  consequences  of his actions, he would realize that his "free-
loading"  on the  continued  existence  of the union will  eventually  de-
stroy it, leaving him worse off than he would have been had he settled
for half a loaf in the  first place.  Looked  at from the  point of view  of
workers  as  a group,  transaction  costs  lead  to market  failure  and  the
workers  end  up  without  an  agreement  (to  act  together  through  the
union) that would have made all of them better off. Moreover, the neg-
ative distributive consequences  for the employer  that flow  from disal-
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lowing the yellow dog contract are collateral  side  effects of the goal of
efficiency.
The  first problem with this interpretation is that it strains the dis-
tinction  between  making  people  better  off  in  their  own  terms  and
choosing for them to protect them from their own false consciousness.
The  case  is  efficiency-like  in that the  decision  maker  doesn't  quarrel
with the worker's goal of maximizing his income, but it looks paternal-
ist in that the decision maker has made for the worker what looks like
an intrinsically subjective, uncertain judgment about what strategy will
best  accomplish  the  goal  of  maximization.  He  is  overruling  the
worker's  choice between short term  and long term gains.
The second trouble is that the case strains the distinction between
efficiency  and distributive motives.  Suppose we accept that the worker
is  making a  mistake  in his own  terms,  as  a  result  of the difficulty  of
obtaining accurate information about the longer term consequences  of
his  actions  (so  that  intervention  is not  paternalist).  We  still  face  the
question whether the losses the decision maker  is infficting on the em-
ployer are  mere  side effects  of greater  efficiency,  or  rather part  of the
whole  idea of the intervention.  There  is no simply  logical or  analytic
answer to this question, so long  as we  don't want to  confine the cate-
gory of efficiency  motives  to  the  desire  to  make  everyone  better  off
without  hurting anyone at all.  It's a matter of degree,  with clear polar
cases and a lot of obscure  cases  in the middle.
Finally, suppose  we  decide it just doesn't  make sense  to  describe
the  decision maker's motives  as  having to  do with efficiency.  Is what
he's  doing paternalist  or distributive?  To  my  mind, it  depends  on  a
rather subtle distinction, which may be hopelessly unclear in a particu-
lar case.  If the  decision maker  thinks workers make yellow  dog con-
tracts  because  they  have  a high  preference  for current  income,  little
concern about the "long run" in which the conduct of people like them
will destroy  the  union,  and no feelings  of solidarity  with co-workers,
then  disallowing  the  contract looks  like  paternalism.  If, on the  other
hand, the decision maker thinks most workers contract only because of
a fear that others will if they don't, believing everyone would be better
off if no one did, and with feelings of anguish at betraying their com-
rades, then the intervention looks distributive - designed to  help this
group  achieve  its goals in the competitive  struggle rather than  to im-
pose  a particular conception  of how to  live.
II.  THE THREE  MOTIVES  IN  CONTEXT
This part describes  the process by which it has gradually come to
be  expected,  if not  accepted,  within  our  social  context  that  decision
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makers  will  take  account  of  distributive  but  not  paternalist  conse-
quences  when  they  make  choices  about  the  law  of agreements.  The
first  section  describes  a  (perhaps  mythical)  earlier  situation  in  which
the idea of freedom of contract was supposed  to provide  an exhaustive
guide to  decision making, resolving  in itself all distributive  and pater-
nalist  issues.  The  second  section  describes  the  breakdown  of confi-
dence,  again,  within  this  particular  milieu,  that  implementation  of
freedom  of contract  could be  the  single  motive  for  legal action.  The
third  section  describes  the  situation  "after  the fall"  in which  we  now
live, comparing  efficiency  (proxy for the old  regime)  and paternalism
(still a pariah) with the semi-legitimate status of the distributive motive.
A.  Freedom of Contract as the Sole Motive in Decision Making4
There is a strand of social and legal theory that argues for freedom
of contract  as  a  coherent  guide to  decision  making  about  the  law  of
agreements,  and as the  sole legitimate basis  for such decision making.
The  opponents  of this  position have  tended  to represent  it  as  having
once  been  the  dominant  ideology,  to  castigate  it  as the  conventional
wisdom  of an  earlier  period.  It  is  not  important  for  our  purposes
whether such an earlier period actually existed. The position itself cer-
tainly exists,  albeit as the  view of a minority, and proponents of other
views  tend to treat it  as  polar - as  one of the  extreme  or pure  cases
with respect to which they define themselves.  (The other polar position
is that thought to be held by "communists"  who believe in the collectiv-
ization  of everything.)
The  view  I  am  talking  about  asserts that  it is possible  to  decide
cases  involving the law of agreements  by reference  to the basic princi-
ples of free  contract that I described  in Part I above.  When there  is a
gap, inconsistency,  or ambiguity in the specific  rules of agreement,  the
decision maker can refer  to the idea that people don't have to contract,
to the idea  that they  can bind  themselves  if they want  to, and  to the
idea that they can pick the terms of their contracts, and come up with a
solution that will implement  freedom of contract by applying it to these
particular  circumstances.  If, for example, the authorities  conflict  with
respect  to contract damages, we can consult the underlying notion that
people can make binding promises and come up with expectation dam-
ages as the presumptively appropriate measure, since the expectancy  is
the closest we can get to actually  carrying out the intention of the par-
ties (short of specific performance, of course).
Supposing that it is possible to resolve all disputes about the law of
4.  See generally  P.  ATIYAH,  THE  RISE & FALL  OF  FREEDOM  OF  CONTRACT  (1979).
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agreements  by applying the basic principles of free contract, there  are,
in the view I am describing, quite a number of different reasons why we
ought to. (One might accept one of these and quite emphatically  reject
the others.)  One might  believe that people have a natural  right to the
outcomes  of a  free  contract  regime  (with  or  without  a  proviso  that
someone should  make sure  the  initial distribution of property  is fair),
or  that  it is  immoral to  break promises.  One  might  believe that  free
contract is presumptively (or analytically)  efficient, and that the goal of
all  decision making should be efficiency.  Or that the people  (through
the  Constitution  or  otherwise)  have  stated their will  that  freedom  of
contract  be the rule for all decision makers.
It is common  when attacking this polar position to assert that it is
blind  to the  distributive  consequences  of letting people  agree  to any-
thing  they  want,  and  also  insensitive  to  the  need  to  protect  people
against  their natural propensities  to  error or weakness.  But  for a  be-
liever, one of the greatest strengths of the free contract position is that it
takes these objectives explicitly  into account, and claims to accomplish
them in a manner far more rational than that proposed  by the critics.
Remember that the exceptions to the enforcement of agreements  made
for cases of fraud, duress and incapacity  are constitutive of the model of
free contract.  This means that  before  we  decide  to  enforce  an agree-
ment, we have to make a judgment that neither party was overborne by
the other, nor tricked by the  other, nor  so weak or immature  in judg-
ment  that  he  lacked  free  will.  To  claim  that  freedom  of  contract
doesn't  take into  account  unequal  bargaining  power  or  possible  mo-
nopoly  of information  or  the  congenital  folly  of some  types  of con-
tracting parties is just wrong.  Allowance  for these situations  is part of
the very definition of the institution.
But it  is also part of this polar position that the judgments  about
coercion, fraud and capacity to contract that are built into the free con-
tract regime should be the only judgments on these subjects made by a
decision maker administering the law of agreements.  The test of legiti-
macy  is  voluntariness.  If the  transaction  is  voluntary,  the  decision
maker  ought not  to  bring  to  bear any further criteria  of distributive
justice  or paternalist concern.  Once he has made the distributive  and
paternalist judgments implicit in the constitutive exceptions, he  should
let well enough  alone.
B.  Critiques of Freedom of Contract
I think it is fair to say that all the critiques of freedom of contract
within our social context are motivated either by objections  to the dis-
tributive outcomes  of nineteenth and twentieth  century economic life,
1982]MARYLAND  LAW  REVIEW
or by the sense that the masses under  capitalism  have used what free-
dom they have against their own best interests.  The first idea is that the
inequalities  all  around  us,  both  between  racial,  class,  sexual  and  re-
gional groups and within those groups, are unjust, irrational  and repul-
sive.  But the  critical  intelligentsia  has  had  to  concede  a  measure  of
freedom  from  naked  coercion  in  the  choices  of the  mass  of people.
There is a sense in which there has never been a culture more the con-
scious and intelligent  product of the mass of people - a  more demo-
cratic  culture - than that of late capitalism.  It just isn't plausible  to
attribute the spiritual vacuity and desolation of that culture (or its vital-
ity, openness and heroic  quality) solely to  "the profit motive,"  or even
to the "cultural hegemony  of the ruling class."  There is as well a prob-
lem of mass error, of cultural error as judged against an asserted trans-
cendant  standard  of  the  true,  good  and  beautiful  (a  standard  that
aspires to be free of racist,  sexist and  class blindness).
While the critique of inequality and the cultural critique are at the
root of the assault on freedom of contract, the strictly legal critique has
had its own form,  a form designed  to soften or obscure the embarrass-
ing absolutism of the underlying position.  The first version of the legal
critique accepted the inner logical coherence of freedom of contract but
argued on a variety of grounds that though coherent it was undesirable.
The  second  version  rejected the  claim of coherence  itself.  Both  were
based on the emergence  toward the  end of the  nineteenth  century of a
specifically  regulatory  conception of free contract.
1.  Freedom of Contract  as a Regulatory Regime5  - One way  to
defend freedom  of contract  is to argue that  it just enforces  the will of
the parties, and that enforcing the will of the parties ensures that trans-
actions in civil society take place at  prices that reflect the "natural" or
"real"  values of commodities  (such as labor and capital). An important
beginning  in the attack  on freedom of contract  was  to assert,  with the
support of modem  economics, that there simply are  no natural or real
values  for  commodities,  including  capital  and labor.  Values  (prices)
depend  on supply and demand, which depend in turn on the contingent
variables  of taste  and technology,  and  on the  competitive  structure  of
markets.  They also depend  on the choice of a particuar set of alterna-
tives among many possible legal regimes.  No outcome is natural in the
sense of being  somehow  prior to the  legal rules in force.
Undermining the claim that there are natural economic values that
the  legal  system  should  try  to  bring  into  being  doesn't,  all  by  itself,
5.  See generally I  K.  MARX,  CAPITAL,  supra note  3,  at  163-87; Cohen,  The Basis of
Contract, 46 HARV.  L.  REV.  553  (1933).
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invalidate  freedom  of contract.  It is  still  possible  to believe  in  it for
other reasons, such as that people have natural rights, or that it is moral
to let them  make  agreements, on whatever  terms  they  want to, about
things we  have  decided are their  own.  But  undermining the  claim of
naturalness  does  open  up discussion  about  the  distributive  effects  of
legal regimes.  In so much as we  are going to be for or against freedom
of contract on account of the results it produces for the different groups
engaged in the economic struggle of civil society, we are now invited to
assess freedom of contract as one  among a set of possibilities no one of
which can  lay claim  to  the special  virtue of naturalness.  This choice
seems at  first  to be that  between  the  "logic"  of property and contract
and the opposed  "logic"  of collective  action.
2.  Freedom of Contract as 'Logical but  Wrong"'6 - There  are  a
number of different grounds on which critics have rejected  freedom of
contract while nonetheless conceding (often with relish) its internal co-
herence.  In each case, the critic  takes it for granted that the regime in
force  corresponds  to that which  was required  by the abstraction  (free
contract) and that  it is  a major factor in  determining distributive  out-
comes.  For example, there is the notion that the regime was appropri-
ate  to  the  "individualistic"  and  "agrarian"  economy  of the  United
States before  the  Civil War,  because  in that  economy the actors were
small timers  dealing in technologically  simple commodities  in a situa-
tion of relative  independence  of one  actor from another.  By contrast,
the critic is likely to assert, we now live in  a complex  urban/industrial
age of interdependence,  to which  the regime  of freedom of contract is
no longer  appropriate.
Though this argument has had a great vogue, it seems to me quite
silly.  I don't think one could show that the economy was any less "in-
terdependent,"  commodities  any less  "complex,"  or people  any more
"individualist"  in the early than in the late nineteenth or mid-twentieth
century.  To my mind, the claim that the system was good in an earlier
time but not good now was just a way for reformers to sweeten the pill
of renunciation of the rhetoric of frontier individualism. In so much as
there was  a coherent point, it was that freedom of contract produced a
set of results, in the early nineteenth century, conditioned by the degree
of equality in the distribution of wealth and the level of competition in
labor,  capital  and  product  markets.  The  very  same  set  of rules  of
agreement will produce quite different results when applied to transac-
tions  between  parties  of greatly  differing  resources  in  markets where
6.  See, e.g.,  R. ELY,  PROPERTY  AND  CONTRACT  IN  THEIR  RELATIONS TO  THE DISTRI-
BUTION  OF WEALTH  (1914).
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the richer parties tend also  to be concentrated into  a small number  of
large units by comparison with the atomization of their poorer bargain-
ing partners.
The critique  of freedom  of contract  as logical  but pernicious was
associated with a program of law reform presented either as a  "social"
regime, or as a way to replace "merely formal"  with "substantive"  free-
dom.  The  program  included  apparent  departures  from  each  of the
principles  that  supposedly  determined  the  shape  of the  law  in  a  free
contract  regime,  and  was  a part of the larger  enterprise  of creating  a
regulatory-welfare-corporate  state  in place  of the  supposedly  weaker
state of laissez-faire.  The program for the law of agreements  included
measures  that  were  overtly  distributive  in intention,  such  as  compul-
sory contracts for businesses affected with a public interest, and regula-
tion  of their  rates  as  well  as  of  the  terms  on  which  they  provided
services.  Antitrust and  labor laws  are  sometimes  described  today  as
motivated  by  the  desire  to  improve  efficiency,  but at  the  time  it was
obvious  to everyone that  they represented  attempts to  change the bal-
ance  of economic  power  among  the constitutive  groups  of a modern
industrial  society.  That  the  "social"  program  often involved  shifting
transaction  surplus among  buyers or among  sellers,  rather than  from
one  group to the other, didn't make the rule  changes any the  less  dis-
tributive  in intent.
In the  political  battles  about  these  rule  changes,  the  proponents
often denounced  freedom of contract as inhuman, for all its logic, and
the defenders  of the status quo often accused them of proposing appar-
ently  small  innovations  that,  because  they  defied  basic  principles,
would lead inevitably to the wholesale abandonment of capitalism.  In
retrospect,  it  seems  that  both  sides  misconceived  what was  going  on.
As the  combatants  grew  more  sophisticated  in  their understanding  of
the arguments,  it gradually  became  apparent  that freedom  of contract
had  never existed and never could exist in quite  the way that both its
supporters  and its opponents had been  assuming it had and could.
3.  The Critique of  Freedom of Contract as Incoherent and There-
fore Incapable of Determining Outcomes7  - The  real  problem  with
freedom of contract is that neither its principles,  nor its principles sup-
7.  See R. HALE, FREEDOM  THROUGH  LAW:  PUBLIC CONTROL  OF PRIVATE  GOVERNING
POWER  (1952);  Cook, Privileges of  Labor Unions in the Strugglefor Life,  27 YALE  L.J. 779
(1918);  Hohfeld, Fundamental  Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial  Reasoning, 26  YALE
L.J. 710  (1917);  Hohfeld,  Some Fundamental  Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial  Rea-
sonings, 23  YALE  L.J.  16  (1913);  Holmes, Privilege, Malice, & Intent, 8  HARV.  L.  REV.  1
(1894).  Seegenerall, A.  CORBIN,  CORBIN ON CONTRACTS  (1952);  G. GILMORE,  THE DEATH
OF  CONTRACT  (1974).
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plemented by common moral understanding, nor its  principles supple-
mented  by  historical  practice, are  definite enough  to  tell the  decision
maker what to do when asked  to  change or even just to elaborate  the
existing law of agreements.  This is not to say the principles  or the ac-
tual elaborated  body  of law  have  no  meaning  and  no  influence.  Of
course they have both.  But of course there are also gaps, conflicts, and
ambiguities, and in an area like that of the law of agreements the par-
ties  themselves  will  often  have  a  motive  for drafting themselves  into
these areas  of uncertainty.
Confronted with a choice, the decision maker will have  available
two  sets of stereotypical  policy arguments.  One  "altruist"  set of argu-
ments suggests that he should resolve the gap, conflict, or ambiguity by
requiring a party who injures the other to pay compensation,  and also
that  he should  allow  a  liberal  law  of excuse  when  the  injuring  party
claims to be somehow not really responsible.  The other "individualist"
set of arguments  emphasizes that the injured party should have looked
out  for himself, rather than demanding  that the other  renounce  free-
dom of action, and that  the party seeking excuse  should have  avoided
binding himself to obligations  he couldn't  fulfill.
The arguments on each side take different forms - some are utili-
tarian, others appeal to  rights or fairness, still others work by evoking
stylized images of the social  world, or by appealing to common  moral
sentiments, like self-sacrifice  and self-reliance.  Because  the arguments
are symmetrical, few in number, and repeated endlessly in different  le-
gal contexts, the legally sophisticated decision maker  is unlikely to see
them  as in themselves  powerful  determinants  of his  own  views  about
proper outcomes.
The experience of gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities within the insti-
tution of freedom  of contract, and of the availability of two rhetorical
modes  for  arguing about  proper resolution of such  situations, puts  in
question  the  whole  structure  of  rules.  Our  decisionmaker  has  the
power  to  modify the law of agreements  as well  as  to specify  it where
there  is  doubt.  The  same  problem  of being  "unmoored"  that  exists
when all agree the case is one of first impression exists as well whenever
someone  asks  him  to  look  at  a settled rule  as  open to  question  and
objection.  There will be arguments in favor of changing the status quo
in the direction of more altruism, and others  in favor of restricting  the
range of duty to give actors more  freedom.  The system  as  a whole  is
radically  underdetermined,  at  least when  viewed  as  the product  of a
rational  decision process rather than of the brute facts of economic or
social or political  power.
We have  seen already that through the constitutive  exceptions for
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fraud, duress, incapacity and  "no intent to be bound,"  the law of free-
dom of contract claimed  to resolve  basic issues of distribution and pa-
ternalism.  Yet  these  constitutive  exceptions  refer  ultimately  to  the
abstract  notion of voluntariness  or freedom, which  is among the most
manipulable  and  internally  contradictory  in  the  legal  repertoire.  The
historical  treatment  of the  issues  has produced  a  mass of conflicting
precedents  and  ambiguous  pseudo-resolutions.  The flow  of social and
technological  development  means  that new  cases  arise  regularly,  and
the  new  cases  may  be  very important  in  a practical  way  even if they
seem  to  be  about  mere  details  of the  law.  It  follows  that  even  if he
accepts  without question that he should put into effect  the distributive
and paternalist outcome mandated by freedom of contract, the decision
maker cannot  do so,  because  the mandate is just too vague.
For example, without doing violence to the notion of voluntariness
as it has been worked out in the law, the decision maker could adopt a
hard-nosed,  self-reliant, individualist  posture that shrinks the defenses
of fraud and duress  almost to nothing.  At the other extreme,  he could
require the  slightly  stronger  or slightly  better-informed  party  to  give
away  all his  advantage if he doesn't want to see the  agreement invali-
dated  when  he  tries  to enforce  it later.  If we  cut back  the  rules  far
enough, we would arrive at something like the state of nature - legal-
ized  theft.  If we extended  them  far enough, we  would jeopardize  the
enforceability  of the whole range of bargains that define a mixed capi-
talist  economy  (capital/labor,  business/consumer,  and  small/large
business  deals).  In either extreme case,  we would  have departed from
freedom  of contract  - the  concept  has  some meaning  and  imposes
some  loose  limits.  But  staying  well  within  those  limits,  the  decision
maker's choices  in the definition of voluntariness can have substantial
distributive effects.
Take the case of fraud.  When two parties  are bargaining over the
distribution of a transaction surplus, information is a crucial element of
power, particularly  information  about  the  real  properties of the com-
modity in question or about market circumstances  affecting its value to
others than the  two involved.  Suppose you know,  but the buyer does
not know, that the war has ended so that the value of your merchandise
is almost certain to fall precipitously  as peacetime trade  is restored.  Do
you have to tell the other about the peace treaty?  If so, you'll make less
from the deal, and he'll make more, than if you could keep silent. Sup-
pose the other party asks you outright if you have  any news.  Can you
keep  silent?  Evade?  Can  you put  out  an  advertisement  quoting  the
war-time price  "because of current conditions,"  when you know those
conditions have ceased  to exist?
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One way to understand  this issue is in  terms of the extent  of pri-
vate property in information.  As we push the law of fraud from caveat
emptor to liability for concealment,  then to liability for negligent fail-
ure  to  disclose,  to  liability  for  non-negligent  failure  to disclose,  and
finally to a duty to generate  the information  as well  as to share it, we
are "socializing"  a resource.  The result will be to reduce the bargaining
power of one party vis-a-vis the other, and to change the distribution of
transaction surplus between them.  This will be the case whether or not
the market is competitive.  When we make sellers, for example,  reveal
information  detrimental  to  their  position, we  reduce  the  demand  for
the product at any given price.  As a result of having the new informa-
tion, some people won't transact  at all.  Those who do transact will pay
less now that they know  more.  All buyers regard themselves  as better
off with  the  information than  they  would  be  without  it.  Their new
knowledge brings about a price reduction that directly  reduces the wel-
fare of sellers.
The decision maker might resolve issues of this kind without refer-
ence to  the  distributive consequences.  He  could try to determine,  for
example,  the intrinsic fairness or morality of withholding information,
without  looking at the division of transaction surplus between the par-
ties.  Or  he  could  do  an  analysis  of property  rights  in  information,
based  on  a  theory of the  "original  position,"  rather  than  on  concern
about the particular parties before him.  There  would  be nothing irra-
tional about such an  approach.  And it would be no more  and no  less
consistent with freedom of contract than to undertake a careful analysis
in terms of distributive  objectives each time a rule came up for consid-
eration.  The  demise  of freedom  of contract  as  a powerful,  operative
determinant  of legal outcomes  does not require  the decision maker  to
embrace distributive motives.  It merely  permits him to do  so without
appearing to violate a basic institutional arrangement.  The supposedly
basic arrangement no longer tells him what to do one way or another.
This development  has rendered  obsolete  the old  debate  between
those  who  adored  and  those  who  abhorred  the  "strict  logic"  of free
contract.  The social or collective principle that the opponents put for-
ward  as  an alternative  to contract  turns out  to  have  been well  estab-
lished  within  contract  from  the  very  beginning.  It  is  possible,  for
example,  to argue on the  most technical grounds  for strict  scrutiny  of
the voluntariness  of consumer  agreements,  and for  compulsory  terms
and set prices wherever voluntariness  is in doubt.  If one takes  this ap-
proach  seriously, there  is little of the reformers'  program that can't be
restated as  the implementation  of freedom of contract,  rather than its
displacement  by a new  regime.
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C.  The Hierarchy  of Motives 'After the Fall"
One  might  think from  the  gradual  emergence  of arguments that
sound distributive  that  the  milieu of the  decision  maker  had  become
sharply politicized, at least by contrast to the situation a hundred years
ago.  This impression  would be false.  The acceptance  of the distribu-
tive motive into the discussion of what rules of agreement should be in
force has never  been more than partial and oblique.  This will become
clearer when we  consider the limited correspondence  between an altru-
ist bias in setting the rules and an egalitarian program  for the redistri-
bution of wealth.  We will then be in a position to compare the status in
legal  discourse  of our three  "post-contractual"  motives.
1.  Altruism  Does Not Equal Egalitarianism - Over  the  whole
spectrum  of rule  changes  that  have  distributive  consequences,  advo-
cates will argue in terms of the rhetorics of individualism and altruism.
This is true for fraud and duress, for the question of how hard or easy it
should be to bind another party, for all the issues about the structure  of
combinations,  and  for compulsory  terms  and price  fixing.  Moreover,
this same  rhetoric gets  applied to lots of other contract issues that are
distributive as between the two parties to the dispute, even if they have
no  obvious  long  term  significance  for  distribution  between  social
groups.  For example, people argue about whether it should be easy or
hard  to  establish  excuses  for  performance  by  appealing  to  ideas  like
sharing, forbearance  and forgiveness,  as well  as  to ideas like  self-reli-
ance, the  right to be let alone, and  so forth.
In  all these  cases,  it  is easy  to  confuse  the  question  whether  the
decision  leads  to  a  more  equal  distribution  of income  between  two
groups with the question whether it intensifies duties of mutual regard,
sharing, and sacrifice as between contractual partners.  That the change
in the  rule is  in the  direction of greater  altruistic duty does  not mean
that  the  rule  promotes  more  equal  distribution  between  groups;  nor
does  the fact that the change  in the rule eliminates or reduces  people's
obligations  to look out for one another mean that it will make the dis-
tribution of income  less equal.  The person invoking altruistic rhetoric
may  be the  stronger party, begging the court  to make the weaker dis-
close the  few bits of "inside"  information that  allow him  to survive in
the face of an otherwise  overpowering adversary. When the court goes
ahead  and  honors  the  ideal  of altruism  by  imposing  a  duty on  the
weaker party to disclose, the weaker party may  be forced  to the wall.
Some disputes  about  the  rules  appear  to  the participants  and  to
observers to have enormous  consequences  for the system.  The parties
pour large quantities of resources into the battle, and the rhetoric of the
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advocates  suggests  the  most  exalted  principles and  the vastest  stakes.
For many participants in legal culture, these cases provide emblematic
instances  of the inescapably distributive character of law making.  Yet
they often involve questions which, when looked at in terms of the long
term  structure  of the  game,  are  close  to meaningless.  The  focus  on
these  "great"  cases  is,  paradoxically,  a  sign  that the decision  making
process is only superficially politicized.  People see law as occasionally,
if dramatically distributive, but as in the main an almost invisible neu-
tral background.
Take,  for  example, the  question  whether  a  sale  of land in  which
the seller reserves a right to a share of the profits from every future sale
of the land is void as a restraint on alienation.  It is obvious that if such
clauses are  void,  sellers who previously used  them will no longer  use
them, but will find some other way, marginally  less satisfying perhaps,
to extract a share of the long term appreciation of the value of the land.
Perhaps they will merely  lease  rather than sell.  If, on the other hand,
such clauses are upheld, it is conceivable that there will be an effect  on
the rapidity of land turnover somewhat  analogous to that of the capital
gains  tax, and equally  difficult  to assess  empirically.  Certainly  the fu-
ture  of capitalism is not at  stake.
Nonetheless,  the case in which the question  of the validity of the
lease is decided, and a series of other cases like it, may have large dis-
tributive effects, just because of their one-shot impact on the wealth of
the parties. Such decisions are retroactive.  It may be that after the deci-
sion, landlords will quickly find a new way to exploit their tenants.  But
all  those  tenants  only  bound  through  this particular  clause  are  now
free,  and the landlords  are  impoverished by legal  disaster just as they
might be by a flood.  It is little comfort that they will return to the fray
with only the most marginal legal disadvantage.  What they care about
is that a part of their capital has been handed  over to the tenants.  A
series of such decisions can have an effect on distribution not because it
"stacks"  the rules in favor of the underdog, but because it enriches un-
derdogs who  use their gains to avoid  finding  themselves  again on the
bottom.
On the other hand,  the most widely heralded  victory of this type
may do the underdogs no good at all if the actual one-shot  transfer  is
small,  or  if they  don't know  how  to  use  it  effectively  in playing  the
game  under  rules  that  are  only  marginally  different  than  they  were
before.  Even a long string of such victories  will be to no  avail if each
successive  accretion  of wealth is inadequate  to make the  subordinate
group truly independent, or if the long-run terms of trade are against it,
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or if it fails to find a way to profit  from striking innovations, or if...
there are no guarantees  of success  in the  struggles of civil society.
But what if the rules were changed in such a way as to deliberately
bring  about  an  egalitarian  outcome?  It  is  clear  that  it  is  possible  to
change  the  rules  to  such  an  extent  that  distributive  outcomes  are
changed not just casually, but decisively.  Such a set of changes would
systematically eliminate  all altruistic  duty of the weaker groups  to the
stronger,  while increasing  the  duties  of the strong  to  the  weak  to  the
point of actually impoverishing them. Where gaps, conflicts, and ambi-
guities in the rule system had  left the  relative wealth  of groups uncer-
tain, such a policy would settle the rules to enrich the poor. Where this
wasn't  enough,  systematic  imposition  of compulsory  contracts  and
price  controls  would reduce  the wealth  of the rich to meaninglessness
by depriving them of legal backing for its effective use.  The mere state-
ment of this alternative  should make it clear  how limited has been the
acceptance  of the distributive  motive.
2.  The Partial  Legitimation of the Distributive  Motive - The de-
mise  of  freedom  of contract  has  been  accompanied  by  a  distinct  in-
crease in self-consciousness  about the various kinds of consequences of
choosing  basic  rules  about  agreements.  In our  social  context,  actual
power to make decisions about the rules usually belongs either to mod-
erate  conservatives  or  to  moderate  liberals.  The  liberals  have  em-
braced,  in  a  qualified  and  ambivalent  way,  the  distributive  motive,
while  the  conservatives,  with  equal  qualifications  and  ambivalence,
tend  to  reject  it.  By  contrast,  both liberals  and  conservatives  accept
efficiency  as  a  good  reason  for  setting  a  rule  one  way  or  another
(though they argue about how to define it, and about whether and how
to "trade  it  off"  against  other goals).  Also by way of contrast, neither
liberals nor  conservatives  acknowledge  that paternalism  (beyond  that
implicit  in  the  constitutive  exceptions  to  the  enforcement  of agree-
ments)  is a legitimate goal in setting the rules.  The distributive  motive
falls between the general acceptance of efficiency and the general rejec-
tion of paternalism.  In order to understand  this hierarchy of motives,
one must relate it  to the  social context  described  in Part  I.
The  appeal  of efficiency  rhetoric  is  that  it recreates  the  aura  of
unproblematic  legitimacy that once characterized  freedom  of contract.
The goal of the decision maker is to make everyone  better off. He can
therefore  claim  that  he  is  not  taking  sides  in the  desperate  struggles
between social groups.  However things were distributed before he acts,
he has no intention of disturbing  that distribution.  Second,  the whole
basis  of his action  is  figuring  out  how people  would  have  contracted
had they not been prevented by the altogether nonpolitical impediment
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of transaction costs. The decision maker can present himself as a mere
facilitator  of what everyone  wanted  all along, like a motorist  giving  a
ride  to a hitchhiker or a neighbor helping out in a flood. No one likes
transaction  costs;  everyone  would  like to eliminate  their  effects;  if the
parties would have  made an  agreement,  there  can  be  no objection  to
the decision maker forcing them to that outcome, and the upshot is that
everyone is happier than  they were  before.
Efficiency  was  initially  a  liberal  slogan,  with  some  of the  same
"radical"  overtones  that distribution has today. But  as the liberals  de-
veloped  it and the conservatives  argued against  it in  contexts  like the
battle for workmen's compensation or for strict products liability, it be-
came  clear that it could be given a capacious definition useful to either
side.  And each side had reason to exploit it, since it allowed the propo-
nents and opponents of changes to deny that they had  any distributive
or  paternalist  motives  at  all.  One  can  formulate  efficiency  as,  say,
"wealth  maximization."  This  concept  is  so  manipulable  as to permit
the analyst complete leeway to smuggle distributive and paternalist (or
anti-paternalist) motives into the analysis without acknowledging  them.
There are some negative  overtones to its acknowledged  pursuit as
a goal.  It is associated with a preference for the "technical"  (or "quan-
titative"  or  "mechanical"  or  "material"  or  "individualist")  over  the
"human"  and the "communal."  It is  on the side of the engineers  and
against the poets in the kulturkampf of modernity.  Poetry vs. engineer-
ing easily becomes the worker vs. the factory owner, the farmer vs. the
railroad.  Nonetheless,  it is striking how little strong negative connota-
tion efficiency  carries,  at least  by contrast with distributive  and pater-
nalist motives.
Distributive  motives  are  more  or less  suspect  depending  on  how
they are put, but they are always  more suspect than efficiency  motives.
The decision maker operates against a background  of class, sexual, ra-
cial and  regional division  and hierarchy;  there  is some  (though never
perfect)  correspondence  between  economic  interests  at  stake  in  rule
changes and these  group interests;  and all groups  conceive themselves
as engaged in competitive  struggle  with all other groups. The decision
maker is tipping  the scales, when he acts distributively,  between these
groups.  But he himself is a member of groups, and has economic inter-
ests. Those who don't see him as "one of us" will suspect, the minute he
begins to speak of distribution, that he is more of a player than a refe-
ree,  and those of his group begin to worry  that he  will go over to the
enemy.
These  are not minor concerns.  In the  society of which  we speak,
the unequal distribution of rewards, with its clear though never perfect
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correspondence  to the historical system of class, sexual and racial hier-
archy, is the  subject  of passionate  dispute.  Peace  and happiness  seem
to require that most of the time we not think at all about the justice of
distributive shares.  Otherwise, we risk falling into depression, or into a
rage,  and, in either case, out  of sympathy  with one another.  Or worse
yet,  we may  fall into  the kind of sympathy - intense but selective  -
that leads to civil  war.  There  is therefore  a taboo  on the explicit con-
sideration  of  distributive  consequences,  let  alone  distributive  goals.
Law  students blush if asked to discuss these matters in the publicity  of
the  classroom.
While these implications of open discussion of distribution make it
seem  more prudent to put one's decisions on grounds of efficiency  (or
fairness, or rights, or morality), they also influence the manner in which
distribution  is mentioned when there's no way to avoid it.  On the one
hand, the distributive motive is always egalitarian, at least so far as one
can tell from the overt discussion.  No one  advocates  a change on the
ground  that  it's  regressive.  On  the  other  hand,  no  one  advocates  a
change just because it takes money away from one group and gives it to
another less  well  off.  It  is  much preferable  to find  a way  to  describe
what  one is doing that refers  to formal legal equality, or to equality of
bargaining  power  between  people  identified  in  terms  of their  market
roles  (buyer  vs.  seller),  rather  than  to  the  concrete  facts  of group
membership.
My sense is that paternalism is if anything more taboo than distri-
bution  as  a  subject  for open  discussion  in the  literature  of decisions
about  rules.  And again this is rooted in the  realities of group identity
and hierarchy.  It is not hard to imagine a society in which everybody
agreed  that there were particular  classes  of people who  were likely to
make  choices  not  in  their  best  interests,  and  that  the  legal  system
should protect them  from themselves.  Indeed, with respect  to children
and the insane, this is the condition of our society (though the consen-
sus is  beginning to break  down).  The  objects of this protection might
be in complete agreement that it was necessary.  Or imagine a society in
which  everyone  agreed that in particular  situations  or states of mind,
everyone was likely to make mistakes and needed  to be protected from
themselves.  The category  of paternalism might  come up mainly with
strong positive  connotations  of loving care for others.
What makes  it  such a  hot issue  for us  is that the  system of class,
sexual and racial hierarchy derives from an earlier historical experience
in  which it  was  not only  material  rewards  but also knowledge,  honor
and virtue that seemed to be distributed according to the hierarchy.  In
this earlier  system, upper  class males  believed (and so did most every-
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one else) that they had superior  knowledge, honor and virtue to those
below them.  They also believed they had a duty to educate those below
them to accept the hierarchical  system.  There was apparently a hierar-
chical distribution of true consciousness as well as of material  welfare,
and an element in true consciousness  was acceptance  of the legitimacy
of hierarchy.  Upper class  males  designed  the legal order  to preserve
both the hierarchy of wealth and power, and that of true consciousness,
all the  while  claiming  that  they  acted  in the  true  interests  of those
subordinated.
The decision maker operates in a state of society in which the sub-
merged  groups  have  achieved juridical  equality  as citizens  of the  na-
tion, and  in which the  official ideology  proclaims  moral equality  as a
fact, political  equality  as a  goal attained,  and economic  equality  as a
possibility  open to  all.  But  the  situation  with  respect  to  knowledge,
honor, and virtue  is  much more complex.  Formerly  subordinate  and
still hierarchically inferior groups  have  asserted  through the course of
their struggles that the claim of the old elites to true consciousness was
a lie.  They  (or their self-appointed  representatives  among the intelli-
gentsia) have argued that all groups have equal access to the enlighten-
ment once claimed  exclusively by the elite.  Or that there are different
forms of enlightenment, corresponding to the consciousnesses of differ-
ent groups, and that  all are equally true.  Or that the whole  notion of
true consciousness is wrong, so that there just isn't any way to compare
the relative levels of enlightenment of groups.  Running  throughout is
the theme that the consciousness of the old elites was in fact particular
to them, rather than universal, and at least as distorted, at least as false,
as the  modes of consciousness they once  rejected  (and perhaps  still si-
lently reject)  as  worthless.
When a decision maker explains his action by pointing to the false
consciousness  of a purported  beneficiary,  who  needs her choices  con-
trolled in her own best interests, many people who identify with histori-
cally  oppressed  groups  will  feel  a  chill,  likely  to be  followed  with  a
flush of rage,  at what  looks  at least potentially  like the  repetition  of
historic injustice.  The  injustice  was  (is)  twofold, consisting  at once of
denying practical freedom to the  members of the supposedly  benefici-
ary group and denying the validity of their psychic being, their particu-
lar  experience  of  intersubjectivity.  The  word  paternalism  directly
evokes  patriarchy,  but  calling  this  kind of intervention  "parental"  or
"maternal"  wouldn't make anything  but a  cosmetic difference.
Should the  decision maker turn to those who identify with earlier
elites, or who see themselves as the elites of the moment, he will find no
support at all for paternalist rhetoric.  Modern  elites rest their claim to
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an  unequal  share of wealth  and power  on the supposed  neutrality  as
between groups  of the groundrules  of economic  struggle.  They  would
doubly undermine that claim were they to applaud the introduction  of
paternalist  motives into legal justification.  Paternalism would  suggest
that  they  lacked  a  proper  respect  for those  they  dominate.  And  the
rhetoric of paternalism, while focussed on the true interests of the bene-
ficiary,  is,  in  the  context  of agreements,  a rhetoric  of the  restraint  of
power - the power of the contractual partner of the beneficiary  to ex-
ploit the beneficiary's  incapacity for his own advantage.  It suggests the
validity  of interventions  with distributive consequences  that would be
directly  contrary to the  interests of the elites.
Everyone in our world is aware that there is another world - that
of the communist countries of Eastern Europe - in which the concept
of true consciousness  has been  asserted  with particular vehemence.  It
is  the  ideological  basis  for  a  bureaucratic,  state  socialist,  oligarchic
form of society that denies  the pluralist expressive  values of the West.
The communist elites have justified their power with the claim that or-
thodox or scientific Marxism is the true consciousness of the proletariat,
in whose  name the party rules society in the interests of all humanity.
They denounce  the institutions on which Western elites base their une-
qual shares of wealth and power as the products of bourgeois class in-
terest  misrepresented  by  bourgeois  ideology  so  as  to  produce  false
consciousness  in the masses.  The rhetoric of paternalism  thus smacks
today of communism  as well  as of feudalism.  It is small wonder that,
except in the cases of children and the mentally incompetent, it is never
an  acknowledged  motive for changing the rules about agreement.
III.  COMPULSORY  TERMS:  DEFINITION  AND  TYPOLOGY
This part presents a description and analysis of a particular type of
rule change - the imposition of compulsory terms or nondisclaimable
duties - which is far more prevalent and more central to contract/tort
ideology than any of the  types of changes  discussed thus far.
A.  Contract  vs.  Tort Duties
Compulsory terms are  duties (or sometimes exposures8) that come
into existence for a legal actor as a consequence  of entering some kind
of relationship  with another legal actor.  The other legal actor cannot
8.  For example, courts  have struck  down  lawyers'  attempts to limit  by contract  a cli-
ent's right to discharge without cause.  The parties to a marriage contract were not, tradition-
ally,  allowed  to  modify  the  regime  of  inter-spousal  tort  immunity.  These  are
nondisclaimable  exposures.
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waive the benefit of these duties.  Some examples  are the duty of good
faith performance  that  arises  in every  contract under  section  1-203  of
the Uniform Commercial Code.  Section 1-102 specifies that this obliga-
tion cannot be disclaimed,  although the parties can specify what  shall
constitute  compliance,  so  long  as  the  specification  is  "reasonable."
Common  law  courts  have,  on  occasion,  refused  to  allow  parties  to
waive  their right to sue  for fraud, and declared  their unwillingness  to
permit the parties to "work a forfeiture"  even by the most explicit con-
tractual  language.  Another  example  is  the  seller's  warranty  against
physical injury from product defects.  Section 2-719 makes a disclaimer
of this warranty prima facie  unconscionable - i.e.,  it is  not waivable.
Compulsory terms also get imposed through tort law, without  ex-
plicit relation to the provisions of a contract,  i.e., without  any pretense
that the court  is merely interpreting  the will of the parties or engaging
in the mysterious operation of making "necessary  implications."  Five
areas  of recent  rapid development  of nondisclaimable  duties are war-
ranties  arising  independent  of contract  (including warranties  on serv-
ices not covered by the Code), landlord duties to tenants with respect to
the maintenance and repair of residential property, the duties of physi-
cians, doctors, and other professionals  to avoid malpractice, the duties
of insurance  companies  to insureds,  and  the  duties  of employers  to
avoid wrongful discharge  of workers  hired at will.
It  may  make  a  lot of difference  in  a given  lawsuit  whether the
nondisclaimable  duty is thought of as "in  tort" or "in  contract,"  since
the two causes of action have somewhat different rules about the statute
of limitations  and  about  damages.  For example,  it  seems likely  that
abusive  discharge  sometimes  gives rise to a tort rather than  to  a con-
tract  action  (on an implied  promise not  to  discharge  in  bad faith)  at
least  in part  because  damages  for  emotional  harm have  recently  be-
come  a  respectable  item  in  tort  law, but are  still  suspect in  contract.
Moreover,  the tort  cause  of action  is  associated  with  "the will  of the
state" rather than the will of the parties, so it is somewhat more plausi-
ble that tort duties should be nondisclaimable  than is the case for con-
tract  duties.  For  several  decades  now,  tort  has  been  a  domain  of
intense  innovative  activity  openly  based  on  "social  policy,"  whereas
contract law has come over the same period to stand for "rigor,"  "ana-
lytic  precision"  and individualist  bias in much  the way real property
law  did  in  the  nineteenth  and  early  twentieth  centuries.  There  are
doubtless other differences  as well.  From our point of view, they are all
mere anachronisms,  relics of an earlier  form of legal false conscious-
ness.  If one  thing is clear it is that whether the  action is called tort or
contract should have no impact whatever  on the outcome.
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This situation of total overlap of contract and tort - to the extent
that the judge nowadays  has a practically  completely free choice  as to
which way to characterize  a new compulsory  term - is a  recent phe-
nomenon.  It was apparently  once so obvious when a duty was in tort
and when in contract that it was  rarely necessary to go into the matter
(though even in the mid-nineteenth century some analytic jurists recog-
nized the  existence of a puzzle).  The general notion was that tort and
quasi-contractual duties were created by the state,  and ought to be suf-
ficiently general so that they would exist between strangers.  Allfurther
duties than those that exist between strangers could come into existence
only through the will of the parties, binding  themselves  to obligations
one to one, or through the law of status. Status obligations  were state-
imposed.  Indeed,  they  were  the  prototypical  nondisclaimable  duties.
For example,  the  parties to  a  marriage  contract  cannot  set  their  own
terms  for its  dissolution, nor modify  their obligations  to  one another.
But status was a field apart.  This conceptual  scheme didn't require any
particular  outcomes,  since the  contract and status notions  were highly
manipulable, and  in practice there were  tort obligations that didn't fit
into it.  But the  substantive  state of the law was in fact that there were
relatively few of these tort duties, and the courts seemed to assume that
they shouldn't create  new ones.
The  course  of the  law has been  to fill  in this gap between highly
abstract  tort duties  applicable  between  strangers  and  the very  specific
duties  formally  adopted  by  parties  to a  contract.  From  the  contract
side, the courts have used  the device of "implication"  of terms to  give
content to  the  informal  agreements  they  are now more willing to  en-
force. From the tort side, it has been a matter quite simply of creating
duties tailored (under the overarching negligence rubric, or the general
injunction against intentional injury to temporal interests) to a series of
particular  situations that "just happen" to arise only in contractual  re-
lationships. Rather than interpreting the  lease as a conveyance  accom-
panied by a minimal implied contractual covenant of quiet enjoyment,
the  courts  can  imply  a  warranty  of habitability  with  consequential
damages for breach. Or they can declare that a landlord breaches a tort
law duty of care in so maintaining the building as to create unreasona-
ble  danger of injury to the tenant.
There  is  no  obvious  stopping  place.  A  court  holds  a  diamond
merchant liable for the death by suicide of another merchant when the
defendant  got possession  of a diamond under  an oral agreement,  and
then  converted  the  stone,  informing  the  decedent  that  he  would  not
return it and would deny having possession  of it.  The  court held that
the conversion directly caused the suicide (Hadley v. Baxendale doesn't
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apply to intentional torts), and just ignored the breach of contract.9  In
another case, a court held that when  an insurance  company  refused, in
bad faith,  to pay  on  a  disability  policy,  it committed  the  tort of bad
faith refusal to settle a valid claim, thereby laying itself open to liability
for  unforeseeable  consequential  damages,  and  also  the  tort  of inten-
tional  infliction  of emotional  harm.' °  In  each  case,  the  plaintiff ob-
tained  redress  that  would  not  have  been  available  in  a  conventional
contract  action,  unless,  of course,  the  court  had  decided  to make  its
innovations using contract language  instead of tort language.
The creation of a new tort duty in a contractual situation can have
three distinct kinds of consequences.  It may merely add new remedies
in  situations  where  previously  there  would  have  been  a  finding  of
breach of contract but little or no basis for a damage recovery.  It may
add  a  new  "implied"  term,  for  example  giving new  specificity  to the
general duty of good faith in  the absence  of party specification  to the
contrary.  Or it may add to the number of situations in which the par-
ties cannot  control the  substantive  content  of their  relationship  - it
may create  a nondisclaimable  tort duty.
The imposed  duty may be to do or not  do something on purpose,
as, for example, not to discharge  "in bad faith," or not to sexually har-
ass.  In these cases, the nondisclaimable  duty is analogous to more ab-
stract tort  duties  not  to  commit  intentional  wrongs,  such  as  trespass.
But the duty may also be defined in terms of negligence or strict liabil-
ity.  For example,  early warranty law made the sellers' nondisclaimable
duty that of due care in manufacture, whereas  developed warranty law
imposes  strict  liability  for  "defects,"  whether  or  not  the  product  of
negligence.
There is  generally  a choice  as  to how far to go:  in the  insurance
cases, it seems  sensible  to  start  with what  amounts  to  a "malice"  re-
quirement in cases of refusal to settle a valid claim, but the courts may
well move step-by-step to a duty not to refuse to settle "knowing"  that
the  claim  is  valid,  from  there  to  a  duty  of due  care  in  determining
whether or not the claim is valid before  refusing to settle, and finally to
a duty in strict liability to compensate  a beneficiary who is emotionally
or materially injured by a non-negligent failure to settle.  Each of these
solutions will have a  different set of effects."
There are odd  results of the allocation  to tort law of the labor  of
expanding contract law.  Most contracts teachers seem to have the im-
9.  Cauverien  v.  DeMetz, 20  Misc. 2d  144,  188  N.Y.S.2d  627  (1959).
10.  Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life  Ins. Co.,  10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78  (1970).
11.  See Appendix A for a discussion of the choice between  strict liability and negligence
in compulsory  terms.
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pression  that their  field  is  undergoing  a  loosening  of formation doc-
trines,  along  with  controversy  about  the  undefined  doctrine  of
unconscionability,  but that  the general  framework  of freedom  of con-
tract remains firmly in place.  From the point of view of a torts teacher,
what is happening looks more like the invasion of the territory of cove-
nant  and  debt  by the  tort  action  of assumpsit.  There is no  reason  in
legal logic  why  tort law  shouldn't  displace  the  action on the contract
altogether, substituting  a new vision of the significance for people's du-
ties to  one another  of the fact  that there was some kind of agreement
between them.
B.  Statutory Schemes
There is a body of legislation going back to the progressive period,
and  now undergoing  a  revival,  that  imposes  all kinds  of compulsory
terms  in  all kinds of specific  contracts.  The following  list  is meant  to
show that the general idea of fixing terms and conditions (while leaving
parties free to adjust the price any way they want to) is as fundamental
to legislative  as it  is to judicial policy.
Legislatures  have regulated  the safety  features of food and drugs,
airplanes, railroads and boats, automobiles, fabrics for children's cloth-
ing, and building materials.  They have regulated  the design of residen-
tial  buildings,  and  of  public  buildings,  in  each  case  indirectly
controlling what arrangements the owners of property could make with
willing paying customers.  They have  regulated  interest  rates, the sale
of securities, the structure of financial intermediaries  and the contracts
between corporations and their shareholders (both in and out of bank-
ruptcy).  They have  developed  whole  panoplies of required  terms for
insurance contracts, the wages and hours of employment, occupational
safety and health, occupational licensing,  conditions of rental housing,
terms  of payment  and non-payment  of rent, consumer credit  (truth in
lending),  security  arrangements,  door-to-door  sales,  franchising,  sales
of condominiums, condominium  conversion, mine  safety, pension  and
annuity  contracts,  union pension  funds.  They have required  workers,
as a condition of employment, to lay aside money for their old age, and
required  employers  to join  workmen's  compensation  schemes.  This
isn't meant to  be an  all-inclusive  list; it's just what  comes to  mind by
free  association.
These regulatory schemes are similar, for our purposes, to the con-
tract and  tort schemes  I  discussed above.  (Sometimes there is a direct
overlap,  as  where  an  activist judiciary has  reformed  landlord/tenant
law  in  partnership  with  the  legislature.)  The crucial  similar  features
are:  (i) the transaction  is regulated rather than prohibited,  (ii) the du-
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ties imposed are nondisclaimable,  (iii) either party remains free  not to
contract, and (iv) the parties are free  to fix the price at which the regu-
lated transaction will  occur.
The differences are likely to be the following.  Legislative schemes
sometimes look to a public agency using mild criminal sanctions to en-
force the compulsory  terms, rather than relying  on the sanction  of pri-
vate  lawsuits  for  damages,  or  on  the  sanction  of  nullification  of
contracts containing illegal terms.  Legislative schemes  are  more likely
to fix  quantitatively specific solutions  (forty-eight hours to renege  on a
door-to-door purchase) rather than rely on ad hoc tests of "reasonable-
ness."  Legislative  schemes are often  restricted  to a particular  transac-
tion  type,  whereas  judicial  schemes  supposedly  have  as  much
analogical  scope  as  they  have  analogical  validity.  For  our  purposes,
the  similarities  are  all-important  and  the  differences  inconsequential,
and I will hereafter take examples indiscriminately  from the two bodies
of law.' 2
C.  Nondisclaimability  as a Relative Concept'3
Nondisclaimability  is  not  an  all-or-nothing  matter.  The decision
maker may do no more than adopt a rule that form contracts are to be
construed  contra  proferentem, that  is,  against  the drafter, and thereby
achieve some  measure of control of terms.  Or there may be a judicial
rule of "clear statement"  required if the parties are to waive a particu-
lar protective arrangement, and the requirement can be beefed up until
it is very difficult indeed to make the statement clear enough.  It may be
that the requirement of clear statement solves the problem without the
decision  maker having to declare the term compulsory, if a clear state-
ment would be embarrassing  to ask for (e.g., do you waive your rights
against sexual harassment when you  take this job with only an at-will
contract?).  Or  it may just be too expensive  to hire  lawyers  to draft a
12.  There  is a  further interesting  area of nondisclaimable duties that  I will  not discuss
here.  When a legislature creates a welfare program or a scheme governing the status of state
employees,  it must  comply  with the constitutional  requirement  of procedural  due  process
before deprivation of a property right.  When, as in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397  U.S. 254  (1970).
the U.S.  Supreme Court holds that you can't grant a particular benefit  without providing a
particular  set of protections,  it is  doing to the  relationship  between  state  and citizen  some-
thing  very like what  the courts and  legislatures have  done to  the relationship  between  one
citizen and another.  It is interesting to note,  among the common  features, the  frequent am-
biguity as  to whether  the courts will permit an explicit waiver, the  emphasis on protecting
the weaker party's procedural, as opposed  to his substantive contract  rights, and the preva-
lence of the policy argument - against the imposition of constitutional requirements - that
judicial meddling  will  simply reduce  the  supply of benefits  and therefore  hurt  those  it  is
supposed to help.
13.  H. HART & A.  SACKS,  THE  LEGAL  PRocEss  251-56  (tent. ed.  1958).
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disclaimer  that will have a chance of standing up in court,  so the party
may revert to a standard form which will  be largely within the control
of the adjudicator if it ever comes into dispute.  There are many shades
between an intervention  that provides a facilitative term, truly modifia-
ble at the will  of the parties,  and outright  nondisclaimability.
The decision maker will  have choices  to make  in another dimen-
sion  as well.  He may want to single out a particular term in a particu-
lar kind  of contract  - an  acceleration  clause  in  a  conditional  sale
contract, a waiver of the equity of redemption in a mortgage agreement
- and flatly  outlaw that term, no matter  what the  particular circum-
stances  of the  contract.  Or  he  may  state that  a  given  term  - say  a
waiver of a bailee's liability for negligence  - will  be valid under some
circumstances  and  invalid in  others,  according  to  a  general  standard
(overreaching, for example, or inequality of bargaining power, or gross
disparity  of information).  Or the  clause  might  be  outlawed  for some
classes of parties but not others (lender's retaining  security  interest  in
all earlier acquired property valid as between merchants but not as be-
tween merchant and consumer).  The decision  maker can throw out a
clause only when it appears in a particular form of document - say, in
the boilerplate small print - but not when it appears in a separate box
with a line for separate  signature.  A court can reserve power to  strike
down any  clause, no matter how presumptively  valid, if it is "uncon-
scionable  as applied."
For our purposes, what counts is that the decision maker imposes
some significant  costs on parties who want to bind themselves in a par-
ticular way.  They may be costs from uncertainty about the validity of
the clause,  or costs of preparing  a particular style of document, or the
costs may consist of the sanction of nullity for the whole contract if the
party attempts to enforce  a part.  These  are  all just variants of our ar-
chetypical case in which the decision maker decrees that a contract of a
particular kind just has to have a particular provision in it, and will be
enforced  as though  it contained  such a provision  no  matter what  the
parties  try to  do  in  advance  to prevent  it.  No  matter how  mild the
sanction, if the goal is to discourage  one provision and encourage an-
other, we have the phenomenon we are trying to understand in terms of
motives and  effects.
IV.  EFFICIENCY AND  DISTRIBUTIVE  MOTIVES
FOR  COMPULSORY  TERMS
It is possible to make  sense of many regimes of compulsory terms
by reference  to efficiency and distributive motives. This part shows how
one does  this, taking up, first,  efficiency arguments  based on the pres-
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ence  of transaction  costs  and, second,  the various  ways  in which  the
distributive  consequences  of  interference  with  freedom  of  contract
might appeal to the decision maker.  The role of this Part in the paper
as  a whole  is to provide  a perspective  for assessing the "unequal  bar-
gaining power" argument which I will criticize in Part V, and to suggest
that while there are good  efficiency  and distributive reasons  for some
compulsory  terms, there  is a lot  left to explain  even when  these ratio-
nales  have  been  stretched  to  their limits.  I  hope this  will  make  Part
VI's argument for an ad  hoc paternalist explanation of this type of in-
tervention more plausible  than it would be otherwise.
A.  The Efficiency Motive for Compulsory Terms
under Transaction Costs
Assume it is costly to bargain.  Further assume that there are great
disparities  of information  among  parties,  and  that it costs  money  to
disseminate  information.  Assume that it  is possible in any given bar-
gaining situation for holdouts and freeloaders,  each acting in their nar-
row self-interest, to cause negotiations  to collapse  altogether, so a deal
that would have benefitted  everyone  doesn't  come off. It may now  be
plausible  to  explain  particular  regimes  of nondisclaimable  duties  as
motivated by the desire to reduce the efficiency losses these costs create.
I will  illustrate  the  way such  arguments  are constructed,  suggest  that
they  depend  on easily manipulable  factual  assertions,  and then argue
that the  efficiency  rationale  is  very  often  no  more  than  a  screen  for
other motives.
1.  Two Classic  EfficiencyArguments  for Compulsory Terms - By
now you must be tired of my style, so just for variety I'll introduce the
efficiency  argument with excerpts from other peoples' treatments.  Per-
haps  the single most familiar argument  that the imposition  of a com-
pulsory  term  can  lead  the  parties  to  the  outcome  they  would  have
achieved  in the absence of transaction  costs is the following:
[C]onsumers may lack knowledge of product safety.  Criticisms of
market processes  based on the consumer's  lack of information are
often  superficial,  because  they  ignore  the  fact  that  competition
among  sellers  generates  information  about  the  products  sold.
There  is however  a  special consideration  in  the case  of safety  in-
formation:  the firm that advertises that its product is  safer than a
competitor's  may plant fears  in the  minds of potential  consumers
where  none  existed  before.  If a  product hazard  is  small,  or per-
haps great but for some reason not widely  known (e.g.,  cigarettes,
for a long time), consumers  may  not be aware of it.  In these cir-
cumstances a seller may be reluctant to advertise a safety improve-
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ment,  because  the  advertisement  will  contain  an  implicit
representation  that  the  product  is  hazardous  (otherwise,  the  im-
provement  would be without  value).  He must balance  the  addi-
tional  sales  that  he  may  gain  from  his  rivals  by  convincing
consumers  that  his product  is  safer than  theirs  against  the  sales
that he may lose by disclosing to consumers that the product con-
tains  hazards  of which  they  may  not  have  been  aware,  or  may
have been only dimly aware.  If advertising and marketing a safety
improvement are thus discouraged, the incentive to adopt such im-
provements is reduced.  But make the producer liable for the con-
sequences of a hazardous product,  and no question of advertising
safety improvements  to consumers  will arise.  He will adopt cost-
justified precautions  not  to  divert  sales  from  competitors  but  to
minimize  liability to injured consumers.
14
This argument  is so familiar in the products liability context  that  it
seems obvious.  But it is trickier than it seems.  In order for it to make
sense, we have to assume the following.  First, we must be able to deter-
mine that the reason  for the failure to  offer a  safety feature is  indeed
fear of loss of sales to competitors rather than that buyers won't pay the
cost of the precaution.  This would make out the type of market failure
associated with "freeloading":  all sellers, and also all buyers, would be
better off if they all together added the precaution, but no seller will do
so for fear that none of the others will, so that if one goes ahead he will
lose sales to the others.  Second, we have to decide  how we feel about
the  differential  impact  on buyers  of the compulsory  term.  Some  of
them  might  have  preferred  the  product  without the  precaution  even
under conditions of perfect information.  These buyers  will now either
stop  buying,  or  find  themselves  forced  to  take  something  they  really
and truly don't want.  Moreover, there may be some  sellers who could
have  stayed  in  business just  by selling  to  those  buyers,  but  who  are
forced out when the decision maker in effect outlaws sale of this prod-
uct  without the precaution.  Third, there are distributive  consequences
for buyers  and sellers  who stay in the market:  it is very possible that
sellers will be able to pass along only part of the new cost, so that buy-
ers get the improvement  for less than it costs sellers.
It is in the nature of the efficiency motive as I have been defining it
that it  will require  the  making  of these judgments  about  the  factual
situation (what the parties "would have done absent transaction costs")
and about the significance  of the  distributive  side effects of the initia-
tive. To get  an idea of how much  leeway  they create  for the decision
14.  Posner, Strict Liability.- 4  Comment,  2 J. LEG.  STUD.  205,  211  (1973).
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maker, consider the following extension of the argument from products
liability to the law  of wrongful discharge  of an at-will  employee:
[H]igh information costs may be responsible for the failure of par-
ties to establish job security terms.  Employees may for a variety of
reasons misperceive their best interests at the outset of the employ-
ment  relationship.  For example,  employees  may tend to discount
substantially the risk of wrongful discharge, and as a result system-
atically undervalue job security.  This reflects  a common  psycho-
logical  response;  since  most people prefer  not to think about the
possibility of disaster, employees understandably tend to disregard
the possibility of job loss.  In addition, most employees have  only
limited access  to  information  about personnel  relations  in  a  firm
and are unable to "shop  around" by comparing  the firm's relative
turnover rate and firing histories.  Companies further contribute to
the employee's predicament by promoting an image of job security
that is not completely accurate.  Either a false sense of security or a
failure to realize the risks  involved may therefore lead  employees
to seek wage increases  rather than forgo some immediate benefits
in return for an appropriate  level of job protection.  Thus, the em-
ployees'  situation is comparable to the situation of consumers fac-
ing  a  complex  product  market  without  adequate  information
about  safety hazards from defective products.  In that context, be-
cause  consumers  systematically  fail  to  obtain  protection  against
these risks, products liability law provides them the protection they
would purchase were  sufficient information available. 5
The argument here is that there should be a nondisclaimable duty not
to discharge wrongfully  an employee  hired at will, with  wrongfulness
defined in terms of "bad faith."  While a change from the current Amer-
ican law to such a rule would do no more than bring this country into
line with the rest of the industrialized  world, it seems implausible that
anyone  would  make  such  a  momentous  intervention  on the  basis  of
speculation  about what workers  "would  have"  bargained  for if better
informed.  The author's  flat denial of distributive  or paternalist  intent
seems implausible if not downright disingenuous.  Nonetheless, there is
no formal problem with the argument.  It is a matter of empirical and
normative judgment whether  it is valid  in this case.
2.  Extending the Efficiency Argument - The bargain-that-would-
have-been  depends on  what kind of relationship  we  imagine between
buyers  and sellers.  The following examples illustrate  how positing the
right attitudinal background can  help to produce formally  correct effi-
15.  Note, Protecting  At  Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge- The Duty to Termi-
nate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV.  L.  REV.  1816,  1831-32  (1980)  (footnotes  omitted).
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ciency  arguments  that  could justify  almost anything.'6  In each  situa-
tion, assume  that  a  few  sellers  face  a  large  number  of middle-class,
well-educated  consumers.  Sellers are specialists in providing the com-
modity in question, and engage in many transactions.  Consumers en-
gage in  few  transactions of this  kind.  The deal  is  a  complicated  one:
there are  lots of things that  can go  wrong  with  the product, and  it is
being  sold  on credit.  It  pays  sellers  to  invest  a  little  in  lawyers  who
master this complexity, but a rational  consumer  might conclude that it
is just not worth it to do  likewise.
The  term  we  are  concerned  with would  make  sellers  liable  if a
particular  event occurred with respect  to the product.  This  event will
not happen to all consumers;  consumers have  only limited knowledge
of the probabilities  that apply to them at the time of making the con-
tract. There are many other unexpected  disasters that might  also afflict
them, and they may rationally decide that spending even a little time on
the terms of legal protection from each would be a waste of effort.  As-
sume that  buyers  also suspect  that  sellers  in general  tend to lie  about
the contract terms they offer, and that even  when they have  legally as-
sumed an obligation to buyers, they tend to resist honoring it if it falls
due, so that the consumer  may have to pay more in legal fees than the
value  of the  injury if he  wants  to  enforce  a  contract  clause  covering
anything  less than a major catastrophe.
Given  all of the  above,  well-educated  middle-class  consumers  in
this  market  have  decided  that  the  risk  of being  cheated,  injured  or
abused by sellers  is one of the inevitable  risks of life  in our economy,
and that it is not worth it to invest time or money in the obviously futile
enterprise of fighting over contract language.  It is more rational simply
to ignore  the  terms  and  hope that  you  have  happened  on an  honest
seller who is  more interested  in building  a  reputation  for fair dealing
than  in  extracting  the  maximum  possible  gain  from  each  individual
transaction.
Here are three ways in which, under these circumstances, we may
16.  See Kennedy, supra note 2 for an  argument that  the efficiency  motive will be rele-
vant and also highly manipulable in any situation where there is a class of people affected by
a contract, but not parties to it, and transaction  costs prevent these people from bribing the
parties to adopt some particular set of terms.  Suppose there was no transaction cost obstacle
to each member of the television  audience watching the aftermath of a mine disaster instan-
taneously  making a tiny bid to the employer  for better mine safety precautions.  Since trans-
action  costs  do  unquestionably  block  this  kind  of deal,  there  will  always  be  a  formally
correct  efficiency argument  that  the  decision  maker should  impose  nondisclaimable  safety
precautions  in order to  bring  about the  result that would  have occurred  in a  costless uni-
verse.  What  makes  this  kind of argument  so  easy  to manipulate  is that our view  of the
bargain that "would have happened"  depends in a major way on what kind of general char-
acter we attribute to large numbers of people of whom we have  little concrete  knowledge.
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end up with  an outcome  that might be made more efficient  by the  im-
position of a compulsory  term:
(a) The Simple Information Cost  Case - All sellers  are  honest.
Moreover,  they  know  that  if buyers  fully  understood  the  benefits  to
them of the term in question, they would willingly pay a price premium
that would make  it worth the seller's while  to write the term  into all
contracts.  Sellers  also know that if they band together  to carry out an
educational  drive, they can  convince  buyers  to pay the  premium. But
this campaign  will be expensive,  given  the consumer  attitudes just de-
scribed, with consumer distrust likely to be intensified by outrage  that
the sellers have all along been selling the product without a "necessary"
protection.  Once  buyers  are  persuaded,  the  payoff on  providing  the
term will be more than its cost, but that payoff is not great enough  to
give  a  reasonable  return  on  the  capital  investment  for  a joint  seller
campaign  of information.  So  no  one  provides  the  term.  The  occa-
sional buyer  who asks  for it is told to take  or leave the standard con-
tract that omits it,  since' it is uneconomical  to settle these matters case
by  case.
(b) Simple Freeloader Case - This  situation  is  like  the  "simple
information  cost"  case,  except  that  the cost  of the  educational  cam-
paign is small enough so that it would be well worth undertaking bf the
firm that did it  could get all the new business  it would  generate.  But
the seller who does  the educating finds that other sellers,  who have in-
vested nothing, are able to jump on the bandwagon, offer the new con-
tract term, and retain their old customers plus their proportional share
of the new business.  Although undertaking the campaign  makes sense
from the point of view of the industry as a whole, it makes sense from
the point  of view of each  seller to sit tight and let someone else  do it,
hoping to move in to reap unearned benefits when they do. As a result,
no one undertakes  the campaign.
(c) The Case of "Competitive Pathology"  - Thus far, we have two
cases  in which sellers do not assume added obligations in spite of their
belief  that  consumers  would  pay  more  than  they  cost,  if consumers
were  better  informed.  Now suppose  that the practice in  the industry
has been  to sell under  a contract that does  offer the  term in question,
although buyers  know nothing about  it (until disaster strikes) because
they make no attempt to understand their contracts. One seller discov-
ers that  he  can  disclaim  this  liability  (or simply  eliminate  the  term)
without losing any customers.  He also discovers that when the disaster
at which  the term is directed occurs, he can stand on his new right not
to compensate  the particular  affected  buyer, without buyers  as  a class
finding out about it or changing their attitude toward him as a seller of
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the product.  Since he can charge the old price and sell the old quantity
of a newly degraded  product (degraded  by subtraction  of the contract
term),  he makes more money.
Whether he decides to reduce prices and increase his market share,
or just  increase  salaries  or  dividends,  his  course  of conduct  will put
pressure on his competitors.  They, too, have market shares,  employees
and stockholders to protect, and he is threatening  all three.  They may
believe that his disclaimer policy  is immoral,  or that in the long run it
will reduce industry revenue, but it may well be the case that there is no
way  for them  to persuade  buyers that there is  any difference  between
the contract they offer and the one the "chisler" offers at a lower price.
To preserve their market  shares, employees and stock prices, they may
find themselves "forced" to disclaim as well.  If the industry is competi-
tive, there will then be a flurry of price cutting until all the gains from
disclaimer have been  passed on to consumers.
Perhaps the seller who began the cycle  will try to preserve his ill-
gotten gains by further devaluing the contract, eliminating what duties
remain.  Maybe  his competitors  try briefly  to  expose him  through  an
advertising campaign, but no one believes them, and soon all sellers are
forced to offer the worst contract permissible  under the law.  Consum-
ers congratulate  themselves on across the board cuts in the price of the
commodity;  the  sellers  as  a  group  are  slightly  worse  off than  before,
since they are selling less product.  The seller who started it all may be
much better off, if he has held on to his initial gains from each devalua-
tion of the contract, and his success is a lesson to knowing businessmen
in other fields.
(d) False Case of Competitive Pathology - When people make  a
case to the decision  maker  for compulsory  terms,  using the efficiency
analysis  of competitive  pathology,  the  supposed  chisler  or bad  apple
sometimes appears to argue against the change.  He will typically admit
that if things were  as  the  proponents  say,  there  would  be  a  case  for
nondisclaimable  duties.  But,  he  will protest,  his ability  to cut  prices
and increase his market share had nothing at all to do  in fact with the
degradation of the consumer contract. He will claim either that the con-
sumer waiver is fully knowledgeable or that the term was not cost-justi-
fied - it  raised prices by an amount greater  than the amount  it saved
its  eventual  beneficiaries,  supposing  one  accurately  valued  the  sup-
posed benefits.  He  will  argue that  he charges  less than his rivals  be-
cause  he  is  a  more  efficient  producer  and  operates  on a  lower  profit
margin  per  unit  than they.  He  will point out  that those  arguing  for
compulsory  terms have argued  in the  past  for occupational  licensing,
that they are the least efficient, highest-priced sellers, and that their real
[VOL.  41MOTIVES  IN  CONTRACT  AND  TORT  LAW
goal is to drive him and others like him out of business by driving up
their costs.
Who  is right?  It all depends  on empirical  data that no  one ever
seems to have ready to hand.
3.  146eneral Reflections on the Appeal of Efficiency Arguments -
Once  they  have  at least  somewhat  mastered  the  technical  apparatus,
people  just  love  to  argue  for  their  favorite  proposals  on  efficiency
grounds.  For years, it was mainly a  liberal fad, then it fell  into favor
with the conservatives,  and the liberals are now trying to reappropriate
it.  Given  a choice,  almost everyone  seems  to prefer  to cast a difficult
rule change proposal in these terms rather than in those of paternalism
or redistribution.  The paradox  is that the standard objection to pater-
nalism and distribution as motives is that they are intrinsically "subjec-
tive,"  "uncertain,"  and therefore political and controversial.  What this
means  is  that  they  evoke  the  unresolved  conflicts  between  groups
within civil society  about who deserves how much and what is the na-
ture  of true  consciousness.  Regimes  of compulsory terms  are part of
that battle, no matter  how carefully  we refer  to efficiency  as the  only
motive  for imposing  them, and  efficiency  arguments  are, if anything,
even more subjective, uncertain, and therefore potentially controversial
than the  other kinds.  Why is it that the patent manipulability  of effi-
ciency  arguments  does  not impair  their  attractiveness, while  distribu-
tive and paternalist arguments, which  are actually  easier to grasp and
to apply,  seem excessively fuzzy?
At least part of the  answer,  I think, is that the move to efficiency
transposes  a conflict  between groups in civil society from the level of a
dispute about justice and truth to a dispute aboutfacts - about proba-
bly unknowable social science data that no one will ever actually try to
collect but  which provides  ample  room for fanciful  hypotheses.
Such a  transposition  from one  level to  another  makes  everyone,
just about,  feel better about the dispute.  The move from a conflict of
interests or consciousnesses  to a conflict  about facts makes  it seem -
quite falsely - that the whole thing is less  intense and less explosive.
That it is imaginable that someone  could one day actually produce the
factual data makes it seem irrelevant that no one is practically engaged
in that task, or ever will be.  In this sense, the transposition to the cogni-
tive level allows efficiency  to act as a mediator of the  intensely contra-
dictory feelings aroused by disputes about the shares of groups and the
validity of their choices - a mediator that defuses rather than resolves
conflict.
It seems obvious to me, but maybe I'm just wrong, that efficiency is
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also attractive because  it legitimates the pretensions to power of a par-
ticular subset of the ruling class - the  liberal and conservative policy
analysts, most of whom are lawyers, economists  or "planners"  by pro-
fession.  Efficiency  analysis,  like  many  another  mode  of professional
discourse,  is an obscure  mix of the  normative  and the merely descrip-
tive;  it requires training  to  master;  it provides  a  basis  for  an internal
hierarchy of the profession that crosscuts political alignments.  Its high
value  in  legitimating  the  outcomes of group  conflict  in  "nonideologi-
cal"  terms is the basis  for the professional  group's claim to special  re-
wards  and a secure  niche  in  the  good  graces  of the  ruling  class  as a
whole.
B.  The Effects of the Imposition of Compulsory Terms
When  one  first  begins  to  think  about  what  difference  it  would
make if the decision maker imposed a compulsory term in some type of
contract  (say,  a  nondisclaimable  tenant  right  to  withhold  rent  if the
landlord  breached  a  nondisclaimable  warranty  of habitability),  it  is
tempting to take  at face  value  the  rhetoric  of altruism in  which  such
duties are almost always justified.  The duty runs  from the landlord  to
the tenant; the law has imposed it in order to benefit the tenant, and the
expense will fall on the landlord.  It seems to follow that the imposition
of the  duty helps the tenant and hurts the landlord.
For many years, this initial, oversimplified picture of what's going
on  has  been  countered  by  an equally  oversimplified  response,  often
called by the shorthand  tag, "the landlord  will raise the rent and evict
the grandmother."  By this it is  meant that in  our case of compulsory
duty, the parties remain  free not  to deal, and free  to  deal at any price
they choose.  The critic of compulsory  terms will likely claim that their
only effects will  be (a) to raise the price of the commodity as the seller
"passes  along" his increased cost (from having to fulfill the new duty)
to  buyers,  and  (b) a  reduction  in supply  as  sellers  realize  that  it has
become  more costly  and therefore  less  profitable to  provide the com-
modity in  question.
Neither the position that the compulsory  term benefits the benefi-
ciary  at  the  expense of the  obligor, nor  the  position  that compulsory
terms simply raise the price to the beneficiary and reduce the supply, is
correct.  Each  is  far too broad.  In  fact, it  is not possible  to predict  a
priori what consequences will follow when the decision maker imposes
a nondisclaimable  duty.  It all depends on the particular  conditions  of
the market for the commodity in  question, and its relation to other re-
lated  markets.  The  most one can  do, while  remaining  at the level  of
abstraction of this paper, is to give a kind of typology of the factors that
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will influence  the course  of events  after the decision maker  acts.  This
discussion aims to abstract to the level of compulsory terms in general a
number of more particular  discussions. 7  I will begin  with what hap-
pens when there  are no costs of transacting  in the  market  in question
(by which I mean that bargaining is costless, that there is perfect infor-
mation, and that we don't need to worry  about market failure through
"freeloading").
1.  The Analogy to a  Tax on the Transaction - As  a  first  step,
imagine  that the compulsory  term  is one that buyers  - all buyers  -
would pay absolutely nothing for (the lighting of candles for the salva-
tion of the monarch, say).  From the point of view of buyers and sellers,
having  to have  this term  as part of the transaction  is a  pure  loss: it  is
loosely analogous to having to pay the state a tax for each transaction.
From the point of view of the seller, the term is an added cost of doing
business.  He adds it to his cost per unit, and sellers as a group incorpo-
rate it  into the  industry supply curve  (which is  moved  upward by the
amount of the  cost).
What happens  next depends  most significantly  on two  aspects  of
the  situation, each  of which  is  difficult to describe  otherwise  than  in
technical  economic  terms.  The  first  is  the  degree  of elasticity  of the
supply  and  demand  curves  for the  commodity.  I  will  illustrate  with
two extreme cases.  Suppose  that even  a very  small price increase will
cause  a very sharp drop  in demand  for the product, while  even a large
fall in price  will cause  only  a small reduction  in the supply.  In other
words, sellers  press  forward  to transact  even  as what  they receive  de-
clines, and  buyers  desert in droves  at even the  slightest hint of an in-
crease.  Under these  conditions, the  compulsory  term  (analogous  to a
tax) will lead to a small increase in the price - an increase less than the
duty  costs  the  sellers  - but will  lead  to  a  sharp  reduction  in  sales.
Many buyers will reduce their quantity of purchase or stop buying alto-
gether:  they have been priced out of the market.  Sellers will either go
out of business or lose  a lot of volume,  and their profits will  decline.
The buyers who  stay in the market have gotten sellers to "eat"  most  of
the duty/tax, but a lot  of them have  left.
Now  imagine that  buyers  will  not  reduce  their purchases  even  if
17.  Eg., Leff, Injury, Ignorance  and Spite, The Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80 YALE
L.J.  1 (1970);  Markovits, The Distributive  Impact, A/locative Efficiency, and  Overall Desirabil-
ity of Ideal Housing Codes.-  Some Theoretical Clarfiocations,  89 HARV.  L.  REV.  1815  (1976);
Shavell,  Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9  J.  LEGAL  STUD.  (1980);  see also  S.  Kelman,
Prohibiting Unconscionable  Contract  Terms: The  Poor May  Pay  Less  (1981)  (unpublished
paper) (on file at Univ. of Md. L.  Rev.).
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prices rise dramatically (the item is a "necessity,"  or just something that
has previously  been  a great bargain),  while  sellers will  cut  back  sup-
plies  dramatically if the price  declines  only a little (there is  little fixed
capital involved;  it is easy to vary supply as prices shift).  Under these
circumstances,  it  is  likely  that  the  price  will  rise  by  almost  the  full
amount of the cost to  sellers of the new duty,  and that  relatively few
buyers  will leave  the market.  They have  had to eat the duty/tax, and
sellers  find themselves  not much worse off than  they were before.
In  between  these  extreme  cases,  there  will  be  some  increase  in
price  and  some reduction  in volume.  Just how much  depends  on the
particular circumstances.
The  second  important factor  in  determining  what  happens  is  the
structure of the market - that is, the degree  to which buyers or sellers
are few enough  in number to be able to exert some conscious influence
on price.  Again, I'll illustrate  with extreme  cases.  First, suppose  that
there are many sellers and many buyers, and that each seller is making
just exactly enough  to stay in business.  When the duty/tax is imposed,
every  one of these  sellers will  have to  add the whole  cost to his price,
since he  has  no margin  that can  absorb  even part  of it.  But this will
cause some  decline  in  industry  sales, as  buyers  are  priced  out of the
market.  The decline in sales will put some sellers out of business, leav-
ing  fewer, but still a lot, each  still making just enough  to stay in busi-
ness.  Those buyers who  buy absorb the whole  cost of the duty/tax.
Oddly enough, the situation may be somewhat more favorable to a
numerous  buyer group  if they are  dealing with a monopoly.  The mo-
nopolist looks as though he has total power to set the price, since he has
no  competitors,  but in fact he  has to deal with  "substitutes"  and with
the income constraint on his buyers.  In other words, even a monopolist
of a necessity  cannot charge an infinitely great price.  He faces a down-
ward  sloping demand  curve,  and at  some  point raising  his price  will
cause  him to  lose total profits, as lost sales more  than counterbalance
increased profits on each unit sold. Under these circumstances, the mo-
nopolist who  has to provide a compulsory  term will make a conscious
decision  about how  much of the price  to pass  along.  He could pass it
all  along,  but  the  result  might  be  that  he  would  lose  more  profits,
through lost sales, than he would if he absorbed  some of the costs of the
duty,  raised his price less, and hung on to more of his customers.  Ex-
actly where  he ends up, between  passing it all  along and eating  it all,
will  depend  on the  elasticity  of demand,  discussed  above.  The  more
likely it is that sales will fall drastically, the less of the price he will pass
along.
In  the more  common  cases arising  in  our  social  context, there  is
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some  degree  of market  power  on  the  side  of sellers,  falling  short of
monopoly, so that the outcome is altogether a matter of degree between
the possible  extremes.  The one thing one can say with great assurance
is the following:  no flat, a priori judgments about the price and quanti-
ty effects  of compulsory  terms  are  possible  - it  all  depends  on  the
shapes of the curves  and the  structure  of the market.
2.  Why Don't Buyers Bargain  for the Duty? - A  basic objection
people raise to the tax analogy is that compulsory terms directly benefit
buyers, whereas a tax on a transaction benefits them indirectly if at all.
The  decision  maker  is  likely  imposing  a  duty  that  all  buyers  would
happily accept  if it were  free.  But  if the compulsory  term was worth
more to buyers as a group than it would cost sellers to provide it, why
didn't the market produce the desired outcome without the help of co-
ercion by the decision maker?  The tax analogy highlights that the com-
pulsory term  is worth  less  to  the  buyer  than  it costs  the  seller.  The
extent of this difference  is the  extent of the analogy to a tax.
People  often object  at this point that the reason why the term was
not included  in contracts prior to its imposition by the decision maker
was that buyers  as  a  group  lacked  enough  bargaining  power  to  force
sellers to agree  to it. This kind of argument is  particularly frequent in
the area of landlord/tenant:  isn't it obvious  that the reason landlords
didn't provide  a warranty  of habitability  was that they  controlled  the
housing  market  and tenants  were helpless  to  impose  the warranty  on
them?  Or  in the  case  of products  liability,  it may  seem  obvious that
consumers  have always  wanted strict products liability, but lacked the
bargaining  power necessary  to impose it on oligopolistic  sellers.
At least in the form stated, this argument is just wrong.  If tenants
were willing to pay the cost to landlords of a warranty  of habitability,
why would landlords, operating in a capitalist economy in which profit
is supposedly  the motive of economic activity, refuse  to provide it?  It
seems  clear  that in  the  actual  housing  market, some  tenants,  in  ex-
change for very high, luxury rents, obtain levels of landlord service far
in excess of those required by any nondisclaimable warranties.  If land-
lords are just perversely, or cruelly, or irrationally unwilling to provide
these terms even though tenants will pay for them, how can the luxury
rental  market  exist?  I  think the conclusion  is inescapable  that under
the  assumption  that  there  are  no  problems  of information  or  other
transaction  costs,  the  beneficiaries  of compulsory  duties  could  have
those duties written into contracts, if they were willing to pay the obli-
gors  what  they  cost  (plus  a  "normal"  profit).  Under  these  circum-
stances,  the  decision  maker  makes  the  duties  compulsory  or  non-
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waivable  precisely because  he believes that people value them so little
they won't buy them of their own accord.
It is  no answer to protest  that  landlords or  automobile  manufac-
turers  have  market  power,  or even  that  the  industry  in  question  is  a
monopoly.  It is no answer to protest that a single buyer of a product, or
a  single  worker  dealing with  a large  employer,  can't haggle  over the
terms and will be told simply to take it or leave  it.  It is no answer that
the  seller's lawyers  write the  contracts.  These  points  are all true, but
they are simply irrelevant to the only question here:  is it or is it not the
case  that  consumers  (under  the  assumptions)  would  get  the  terms  if
they were willing to pay for them?  To take the hardest point first, even
a monopolist has an interest in providing  contract terms if buyers will
pay him their cost, plus as much in profit as he can make for alternate
uses of his capital.  The  presence  of a monopoly  will  generally  mean
that  consumers  get  less of the  product  and must pay more for it than
would be the case under competition, and this will be true for contract
duties as well as for the underlying commodity.  But this is not an argu-
ment that the unavailability of the term  reflects any peculiar unwilling-
ness  of sellers to  give  buyers  what they want.
The  basic  point  is  that  if both  sides  have  good  information,  it
makes  no difference  that consumers  can't haggle in particular transac-
tions, and it makes no difference that the sellers'  lawyers draft the con-
tracts.  The  profit  motive will  induce  them  to  provide any legal  duty
consumers  will pay  for.  Consumers exercise  power  in the market not
through their conduct  during individual transactions,  but through the
mechanism of demand, backed by dollars.  They can control according
to their desires what is offered for sale even if each of them is individu-
ally powerless  in every  single transaction.
But demand, of course, is limited  by income.  If buyers  had a lot
more income, they might well demand all the duties the decision maker
is now  requiring  them  to purchase.  Buyers  as  a group  may  regard  a
transaction without these duties as a moral horror.  They may buy only
with  deep  regret,  believing  that they  have  a  right  to the commodity-
plus-the-duty rather than just the commodity.  They may believe that a
just  society would  allocate  them enough  purchasing  power  so  that  it
was open to them to buy the  commodity-plus-the-duty  without having
to  sacrifice  some  other good  they regard  as  a  necessity.  In all  these
senses, it is true that consumers  lack the bargaining  power to make the
sellers  provide  the  duty.  Consumers  are  too poor, given  the  other
things they want to do or have to do with their money, to induce sellers
to provide  something that, under the free contract  model, sellers don't
have to provide unless the price  is right.
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3.  Weakness of the Analogy - While  it  is  true that  under  our
assumptions  the compulsory  term must be worth less to buyers than it
costs sellers (or sellers would provide it without compulsion),  it is also
true  that  the  term  will  almost  certainly  be  worth something.  Buyers
would,  in a  free  market, pay more for the  commodity  with the duties
attached than for the commodity alone, though not enough to make  it
worth  while  to  add them. This  means  that the  compulsory  term  will
cause more of an increase in price and less of a reduction in sales than
would  a tax of the same amount.  These  effects make the factual analy-
sis of any particular  case of nondisclaimable  duty much more  compli-
cated  than they are for a tax.  They  also make  it possible  to argue  for
and against particular regimes of nondisclaimable  duty on distributive
grounds that are  irrelevant when discussing  a tax that is of no (direct)
benefit either  to buyers or sellers.
C.  Compulsory Terms and the Rectification of Inequality
The imposition of a regime of nondisclaimable  duties on contrac-
tual parties will have a host of distributive effects.  For example, to the
extent that the term is unwanted, its cost will be distributed between the
parties, impoverishing  sellers and buyers differentially according to the
elasticities of supply and demand curves and according to the competi-
tive  structure  of the market.  There  will also be  distributive  effects on
third  parties.  There  are  third  party  strangers,  for example,  who  are
better  off as a  consequence  of compulsory  safety  precautions  because
those precautions  reduce  the  risk of injury  to bystanders  as well  as  to
buyers.
Then there  are third parties  who pay into  social  insurance  funds
that  would  compensate  injured  buyers  had  the  decision  maker  not
forced buyers to insure against injury through the sales contract.  There
are  those  dependent  on  the  beneficiaries  of nondisclaimable  duties,
such  as  children  whose  housing  situation  is  determined  by  parents.
When sales of the regulated commodity  fall, there will be workers (and
their dependents)  in  the  industry  who will  lose their jobs or take pay
cuts, as well as owners who lose profits. When buyers  are priced out of
the  market,  they spend  their money on other  things,  and owners  and
workers  in those industries benefit at the  expense of those in the regu-
lated industry.
At least as a general matter, people don't favor or oppose compul-
sory  terms  because  of these  tax-like  or  third-party  effects.  What  the
decision maker really  cares  about, probably, is  the possibility that the
class of buyers will get something they want without having to pay the
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full price, with the difference made up by sellers who are impoverished
for their benefit.
A  first  case  in  which it  is intuitively plausible that a compulsory
term  can  work such  a  real  redistribution  is that in which the  benefi-
ciaries  are so desperately impoverished that they cannot - simply can-
not - pay more for the commodity with the term than they did for the
commodity without the term, and sellers have some significant  surplus
from transacting with this impoverished group.  Suppose the seller is an
employer  offering a starvation wage and  that the decision maker com-
pels him to improve working  conditions  or go out  of business.  If  the
business is profitable, he may not fire many  (or any) workers, and they
may end up substantially  better off.
A second case is that  in which sellers pass along no price increase
at  all  because  they  are  able  to modify  their  own  or their employees'
behavior, in response to the term, in a way that has no impact on their
costs.  Take  the case  of the firing of at-will employees  for refusal of a
supervisor's  sexual  advances.  The employer  who  is liable  in tort for
"abusive  discharge"  or "bad  faith"  is unlikely  to increase  the price  of
his product, or demand that workers take a wage cut, to compensate for
a  lost  privilege.  He  is  much  more  likely just  to  order  supervisors  to
desist.
In  this case,  the  redistribution  is between  two  classes  of workers.
But  in  other cases,  there may  be a  weakening  of the  sellers'  position,
but  one  that they  can  correct by  changes  that end  up not increasing
costs.  Where there is periodic product redesign, the addition of a safety
feature  may have  a  negligible  impact  on price.  The  reason  why the
feature was not included  before was not that  it was expensive but that
the  seller simply didn't care about safety, and had no motive  to figure
out how it could be incorporated at minimal cost.  While in pure theory
the seller has devised the minimum-cost way to produce his product, so
any modification  must increase his costs, in fact there is always a large
element of the random and the sloppy in production. This means that
even quite large benefits for the buyer may be effected at minimal cost.
These cases  are only barely  redistributive under our definition.
My fourth case is the most important and most interesting because
most clearly at odds both with the standard economists'  treatment and
with the usual formulation of inequality of bargaining power.  It is the
case in which the condition of the market is such that the imposition of
compulsory terms leaves  (most) buyers better off in their own view (so
that once it is imposed they would not waive the new regime)  and this
improvement  is directly at the expense  of sellers as a class.  This  case
was  first developed  in Bruce  Ackerman's  important  article  about en-
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forcement of housing codes.'8  Here I abstract it to compulsory terms in
general. 19
Suppose  that  a  significant  part  of  the  demand  for  the  product
comes from buyers who don't care much about it - who would switch
to other things if its price increased  only a little.  Suppose  further that
these marginal buyers don't put much value at all on the benefits of the
compulsory term.  In the housing market case, suppose that there are a
number of tenants who tend to double up or move away in response to
small variations  in  local  rents,  and  that these  tenants just  don't  care
much about housing amenity - they'll pay  close to the same rent  for
good  housing  and  bad.  Now  suppose  as  well  that  there  are  a  large
number of highly competitive sellers who have a large  fixed investment
in what they sell,  so the  supply of the  good won't  change  much  with
moderate  increases  or  decreases  in  price.  Under  these  conditions  it
may not be possible for sellers as a group to pass on much of the cost of
the compulsory  terms.
Buyers who  stay in the market after the marginal indifferent char-
acters  have  left  may put a high value  on the good  offered  and also  a
high value on the new term, and get both at a price far below what they
would be willing to pay.  In an extreme  case, everyone  who  is buying
the good  at  the  new price  feels that they  are paying  less  for  the  new
term  than it  is worth  to them.  Although buyers  as  a group wouldn't
pay what the term costs sellers, they are delighted to have it at the sub-
sidized price.  Sellers  end  up simply poorer - a part of the value  of
their business has been expropriated through a successful forced trans-
fer without price control.20
We are  dealing  here with a  true distributive  effect,  like that of a
change in the rules of duress or of fraud or of combination so as to help
18.  Ackerman,  Regulating Slum  Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing
Codes, Housing  Subsidies and Income Redistribution  Policy, 80  YALE L.J.  1093  (1971).
19.  It is  important to distinguish this redistributive  case from that in which buyers gain
at the expense of other buyers, rather than of sellers.  For example, suppose there were some
buyers willing to pay  $10  apiece for a term that, if provided only to them, would  cost sellers
$15  per buyer.  But suppose that if they were providing  the term for all buyers, it would  cost
sellers only $9 per buyer.  Sellers  still might  not provide  it without  compulsion,  if 90% of
buyers would only pay $5 apiece for it, given a free choice.  If the decision  maker imposes
the term,  90% of buyers are paying $9 apiece for something they think is  worth only $5, but
the group of buyers  who would have  paid  $10  are getting a  bargain.
Now you are free  to change these figures around any way you want - or, rather, the
particular  fact situation  may yield,  on careful  social scientific  investigation, any  particular
constellation of figures.  If there were  a lot of buyers who would be made better off, by quite
a bit,  by the imposition of the term, and those buyers  were people you wanted to help, and
the losers, both among sellers and among buyers, were  people you didn't mind impoverish-
ing  to help the others, you  might  favor the compulsory term on  distributive grounds.
20.  See Appendix  B(I)  for a graphical treatment.
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one  side  and  hurt the  other. However,  it is  crucial to  understand  the
peculiar  mechanism  by  which  the  decision  maker  has  been  able  to
bring it off. First, in order for the effect to run in favor of buyers and at
the expense  of sellers,  there must exist  this touchy marginal class who
flee  at the slightest  price increase and hold the compulsory  term to be
of little  value.  Second,  on  the  other  side  we  must  have  a  marginal
group  of  sellers  who  are,  by  comparison,  locked  into  providing  the
commodity in question, and who are unable to combine with other sell-
ers to form a coalition with market power.  Though it is all a matter of
degree,  it  is  only  when  there  is  some  combination  of these  circum-
stances that the strategy  will work.
If  we  reverse  the  circumstances,  imposition  of  the  regime  of
nondisclaimable  duties  will  impoverish  buyers,  and  in  the  most  ex-
treme  case will  enrich  sellers at the  expense  of buyers.  The  way this
works is that buyers  at the  margin like the new term a lot, so much so
that they would have purchased it on the open market had transaction
costs or some other factor not prevented  them.  But most  buyers value
the term at less than it costs.  Marginal  sellers are fly-by-night and will
get out if their profits  fall at all. When the decision maker imposes the
new  term, marginal  sellers  raise the  price  the full  amount of its  cost,
and marginal buyers actually increase their purchases.  Most buyers are
now close  to indifferent to the product - ready to flee - but they still
get just enough  out of it to stay in the market.  Sellers are  now selling
more product, and making more on each unit.  Transaction  surplus has
been  redistributed  in their direction.  If buyers  as  a group  were  asked
whether they would like a  repeal of the compulsory  term, they would
answer  yes,  but sellers would  answer no.2
What this means is that there is a fundamental difference  between
changing fraud or duress rules and changing the regime of compulsory
terms.  In the  fraud and duress case,  we  can be quite sure  who we're
helping and who we're hurting by a given change.  At least in the short
run, there  is no probability  that employers  gain by the legalization  of
secondary  boycotts.  But  in  the case  of compulsory  terms,  we  need  a
sophisticated  economic  analysis before  we can  be sure we are helping
the purported beneficiaries  (those to whom the nondisclaimable  duties
run - buyers, in our cases).  If we get this analysis wrong, then it may
well  be that an initiative that is supposed to redistribute  from rich sell-
ers to poor buyers  does exactly the opposite  (or hurts both).
There  are  three  further  complexities  that  will  make  the  factual
judgment a hard one.  The first arises from the fact  that our marginal
21.  See  Appendix  B(2)  for a graphical treatment.
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buyers  or sellers who flee  the market have thus far been  portrayed  as
"indifferent"  or  "fly-by-night."  But  what  if this  subclass  of buyers,
whose willingness to leave the market keeps sellers from raising prices,
are the most impoverished, the most desperate  of the buyer group?  In
every  case,  the  ability  to  redistribute  between  buyers  as a  group  and
sellers as a group depends on actually hurting a subcategory of buyers,
and that  subcategory  may  be  exactly those the  decision maker  would
most like to help.  Thus the question whether the marginal buyers  are
the  richest  or  the  poorest  may  reverse  our  view  of the  distributive
outcome.
If there are transaction costs,  and in particular if buyers have  lim-
ited information  about how valuable  new terms will be to them, there
will be  the further complexity  of systematic buyer  underestimating  of
the value of the compulsory  regime.  The decision  maker may impose
the  regime  in  the  belief that  it will  in fact  bring  about  a  substantial
redistribution  even  though buyers  as a group, with their imperfect  in-
formation,  wouldn't pay  voluntarily what the new  terms will  initially
cost them.  So long as he acts on the belief that after they find out how
groovy the terms are they will see the outcome as positive, the decision
maker is still distributively  motivated.
Finally, whenever it is the case that buyers with adequate informa-
tion  would  not  buy the  term  without  compulsion,  and  the  decision
maker goes ahead nonetheless, he is achieving his distributive goal less
efficiently  than he  could achieve  it had  he available the  technique  of
after-the-fact, administratively  costless taxation.  The reason for this is
that  even  if the  term  is worth  more  to buyers  than it  costs  them  in
increased  prices,  it  is not,  by hypothesis,  worth more  to  them than it
costs the sellers.  If we had some way to just pluck away from sellers the
resources  they are going to spend on providing the term,  and directly
transfer  them  to  the  buyers,  we  could  make  both buyers  and  sellers
better  off than  they  will  be  at  the  end  of  a  redistribution  through
nondisclaimable  duties.  It is,  of course,  impossible  for this  decision
maker to tax at all.  Even  if he could  tax, he could not tax by simply
plucking away  resources  after the fact, without  any impact  on the fu-
ture behavior of those enriched and impoverished.  Any real system  of
taxation will involve exactly the same kinds of waste that are involved
in imposing compulsory  terms.  There would therefore be an empirical
question of great difficulty  for a decision maker who could choose be-
tween making a given redistribution in one way rather than in another.
My  conclusion  is  that a  regime  of compulsory  terms  may  make
perfect sense  as a distributively motivated intervention, but that in or-
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der for it to do so the decision maker will have to deal (at a minimum)
with the following questions:
(1)  Are the shapes  of the curves and the competitive  structure  of
the market such that sellers  will have to absorb a large part of the
cost of the term?
(2)  Would  buyers  willingly  buy the  term  at  the price  they  will
have to pay after compulsion?
(3)  How  do  we  assess  the  negative  distributive  impact  on  the
group of buyers priced out of the market, whose loss is necessary if
the other buyers  are to gain?
(4)  Are  there  transaction/information  costs  that prevent  buyers
from  making  an  accurate  advance  judgment  about  how  much
good the term  will do them?
(5)  Could the distributive objective be accomplished more cheaply
in some other way?
My own belief is that it will often make sense for a decision maker
to make  rough  intuitive  assessments  of all these  factors  and  then  go
ahead and act  on distributive  grounds.  It is also possible  that he  will
feel that there is a good chance that he will either accomplish  a purely
efficient change, making everyone better off, or that he will bring about
a desirable redistribution  on the model of this subsection.  If he thinks
the chances  are  small that he  will actually  make  buyers worse  off, he
may  be  happy  to  proceed  on  the  ground  that  the  only  people  he  is
likely to hurt are sellers.  When we add the factor of paternalism, con-
sidered  below, there  may  be a  strong  case for intervention  even with
sketchy information and a lot of uncertainty  about just how the effects
will play themselves  out.
V.  INEQUALITY  OF  BARGAINING  POWER
The  most  common justification  for compulsory  terms - in tort
law as well as  in contract - is that there was inequality of bargaining
power between the parties.  This simple phrase has been used in dozens
(perhaps  hundreds)  of judicial  opinions  as  though  it  quite  fully  ex-
plained disallowing  contract  language so as to restore  the background
regime, or interpolating a term the parties most definitely did not agree
to.
22
There are two disparate strands to the rhetoric of unequal bargain-
ing power.  First, because the parties were not equal in power there was
no  "real"  assent  - the  terms  of the  contract  were  dictated  by  the
22.  For a representative case with elaborate citation of authorities, see Tunkl v. Board of
Regents,  60 Cal. 2d 92,  383  P.2d  441,  32 Cal. Rptr. 33  (1963).
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stronger party - and it is therefore  not legitimate to sanctify  the bar-
gain by appealing to the idea of free contract.  This point is purely neg-
ative:  now  we  know  there was  no  real assent,  but what  follows from
that?  The  decision maker  could  respond  by throwing  out  the  agree-
ment,  leaving  the  parties  to  their  non-contractual  remedies,  as  may
happen when  a  contract  is invalidated  because  of fraud  or duress  or
illegality.  But the second element  to this body of thought is that what
the  decision maker  does is to  rectify  the balance  not by  throwing  out
the  contract  as a  whole, but by throwing  out  the  offending term,  and
reading  in a  term that is  more favorable to the weaker party.
What this means is that there is an ambivalence  in the way people
assert unequal bargaining  power to justify compulsory  terms.  On the
one  hand, they usually  sound  as  though  they were  committed  to the
system of freedom  of contract, and to the market system in general.  If
the  objection  to this  contract  is  lack  of "real  assent,"  it  seems  to  be
implied that there is nothing wrong with contracts between people who
are on an equal footing.  On the other hand, the advocate  of compul-
sory terms will almost always indicate  a clear desire to help the weaker
party at the expense of the stronger. The rhetoric of unequal bargaining
power is distributionist in that it asserts the desirability of intervention
in  favor of the  weaker party  in situations  where there  is  nothing  like
common  law fraud, duress  or incapacity.
The first section below examines critically the notion that unequal
bargaining  power  is an  appropriate  test for deciding  when  to impose
compulsory terms.  The second speculates  about the ideological signifi-
cance of the rhetoric of unequal bargaining power in a society divided
by  class,  sex  and race.
A.  Inequality of Bargaining  Power in Light of the Distributive
Consequences of Compulsory Terms
There are a number of different things people seem to be referring
to  when  they  identify  a  situation  as  involving  unequal  bargaining
power.  What I will  do here  is to show in  very summary  fashion that
none  of these  subtests  is likely to help  us pick out situations  in which
compulsory  terms  will help  the weak at the expense of the strong.  In
other words, I want to show that if you just went about finding  all the
situations that, according to these subtests, represent  unequal bargain-
ing power, and in each case imposed on the stronger party the duty the
weaker party is asking for in the lawsuit, you would act more or less at
random from the point of view of the distributive interests of the bene-
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ficiary class  ("buyers").23  I will take  up the following  tests:  the indus-
try is  "public";  the  terms  were drafted  by the  seller  and offered  on a
take-it-or-leave-it  basis;  the seller is a bigger entity than the buyer; the
sellers have monopoly power in the relevant market; the commodity in
question  is a necessity;  and there is a  shortage which permits sellers to
exploit  buyers.
The public interest category  seems  to me of little  use, simply be-
cause we no longer have a viable conception of what distinguishes the
public from the private.  Everything is public from some points of view;
everything  is private  from other points of view.  The label  "public" is,
these  days, more  likely  to represent  another  name for  the conclusion
that it is OK to impose nondisclaimable duties than it is to represent an
actually  operative  element  in  the  analysis.  "Publicness"  seems  only
randomly correlated with the factors, such  as the shapes of supply and
demand  curves, that will determine  the appropriateness  of using  com-
pulsory  terms  for distributive purposes.
Neither the drafting of the terms by the seller, nor the seller's offer-
ing them on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, nor the absolute size of the seller
affects the buyer's power in any sense we should care  about.  If there is
competition among  sellers, and  good information  about buyer prefer-
ences, sellers  will  offer whatever  terms they think buyers will pay for.
We cannot test the ability of buyers to influence  the content of the bar-
gain by the ability of an individual buyer to dicker with an individual
seller.  There  may  be no  bargaining  because  bargaining  is  expensive,
and buyers as  a group are unwilling to pay the increased  cost of indi-
vidualized transactions.  Further, in a truly competitive market, no one
gets to negotiate  terms with anyone  else. You  can't argue  that market
power  skews bargains  and then object  in those  very  situations where,
because of competition,  no one gets any individualized  say at all.
The notion that size, the knowledge necessary to draft the contract,
and the  practice of imposing  take-it-or-leave-it  terms  give  sellers  the
23.  Of course, one  would not at  all be  acting  randomly  from the point of view of the
distributive  interests of the class of people who become plaintiffs in lawsuits of this kind.  In
other words, one would  be working a (perhaps) substantial redistribution  in the direction of
people who find themselves injured  and in need of the benefit of the duty that they are now
asking  the court to impose.  An  intervention  imposing compulsory  terms will  always  help
this group of successful  plaintiffs at the  expense of whoever  has to pay  the bill.  The inter-
vention  is  distributive,  in  our lingo,  only  if this help  is  at the  expense  of sellers.  If the
distributive effect of a compulsory term is merely  to force those buyers who are not injured
to contribute to compensating  those  who are  injured, or to make  those who would not  be
injured contribute  to safety precautions that prevent  harm to those who would  otherwise be
injured, then the intervention is paternalist  (or possibly motivated by efficiency).  It is inter-
ference with freedom of contract  based on the idea  that buyers don't know what's good for
them.  We'll take up  this kind of thing  in the next section.
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power to dictate to buyers is belied by recent experience  all over Amer-
ican  industry, from automobiles  to typewriters.  It is ironic that path-
breaking  cases  like  Henningsen  v.  Bloomfield  Motors2 4  justified
compulsory  terms  for  auto  warranties  by  emphasizing  that  the  cus-
tomer was helpless in the face of gigantic bargaining opponents.  Those
helpless  buyers  have  somehow  induced  a proliferation  of seller  war-
ranty  experiments,  and then more  or less destroyed  the auto industry
by their preference for foreign cars.  Detroit can no longer serve as the
textbook case of seller omnipotence.  While there is a powerful subjec-
tive experience  of impotence  for most buyers  in  the market  for most
goods, it  is irrational to translate that experience,  without more, into  a
preference  for  intervention.
But what about the distributive  effects of using a test of seller size
combined  with  seller  dictation  of contract  terms?  Would  such  a test
lead us  to impose compulsory  terms  in those  cases where they  would
redistribute wealth  from  sellers  to  buyers?  Or would the test  lead  to
higher prices, impoverishing both groups, or even to the enrichment  of
sellers at the expense of buyers?  There's no way to know. The test has
no obvious relation to the presence of marginal buyers, quick to get out
of the  market  in  response  to  price  hikes  and  also  indifferent  to  the
things the state usually offers in the way of compulsory terms.  Size and
dictation  of terms  tell  us nothing  about whether  sellers can  easily  re-
duce  supply  in  response  to an  attempt  to  stick  them with  the cost  of
nondisclaimable  duties.  Systematically  applied,  a  test  of  this  kind
would have random distributional  effects  between buyers  and  sellers.
The concept  of bargaining power  is most obviously useful in un-
derstanding markets in which there are only a small number of buyers
or sellers.  It makes  sense to say that the monopolistic  seller has more
bargaining power than the seller who is one of many, and that there is
inequality  of power  when  a  single  seller  faces  many  buyers  (or vice
versa). In these cases, the test of equality is that there should be about
the same degree of competition on each side of the transaction.  Unfor-
tunately, the case of market power on the side of sellers is one of those
where it is least likely that compulsory terms will have  a redistributive
effect.
This is intuitively obvious in the case of a monopolist facing many
buyers.  The monopolist may refrain from passing along the whole cost
of a nondisclaimable duty, since at some point he loses more on volume
than he gains on price. But the mere existence of marginal  sellers who
flee  the market  will  have little influence  on his behavior.  If there are
24.  32 N.J.  358,  161  A.2d 69 (1960).
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lots of buyers who value the product highly and also think the compul-
sory  term  would  be  a  good deal  at just  a  little  less than  it  costs,  the
monopolist  will  raise  his price  substantially,  knowing  that  these  cus-
tomers  will keep on buying.  By contrast, competitive  sellers  may find
themselves absorbing the whole cost of the term because  the departure
of a relatively small number of marginal buyers  keeps the price down.
This is  not  to  say  that  compulsory  terms  can  never  redistribute
from a monopolistic  seller to his buyers.  The point is just that there is
no guarantee  that this will be the outcome.  And there will be markets
where the strategy of redistribution is particularly  hopeful but there is
no substantial market power on the seller side.  If our concern is redis-
tribution, this  test  seems  as  random  as  that  of size/dictation.  If our
concern  is with  the  other consequences  of monopoly  power, then  the
remedy of compulsory  terms  seems  curiously inapt.  Whatever  effect
they may have on buyer income, they have no effect at all on the other
aspects of concentration.
I'm all in favor of splitting up concentrated  economic  powers, and
in favor of public control of those it seems inappropriate to split up.  If
the choice  is between having  large sellers (monopolistic or not) dictate
the  terms of contracts  and  having  the  courts  do  it,  I  don't  have  the
slightest preference  for the  sellers.  If in  a particular  case  it  looks like
the official decision maker will look after the  interests of buyers better
than the seller, then the decision  maker should go ahead and do what
he thinks will work.  My point is that the situations in which it is desira-
ble to impose compulsory terms can't be identified by looking for une-
qual  bargaining  power,  if  that  term  is  defined  either  in  terms  of
size/dictation  or in  terms of market  power.  These  factors  invalidate
the seller's free contract claim without  indicating what the appropriate
response  should be.
Neither the notion of a necessity nor that of a shortage  is any more
useful.  Both  are  likely  to  be  second-string  answers  to  the  question,
what do you  mean by unequal bargaining power?  Answers that point
to dictation of contract  language or to seller market power  undermine
the  legitimacy of almost  all  the important  bargains  people  make  in  a
modern economy.  If we took them seriously as tests, we would impose
compulsory  terms  just  about  everywhere.  By  contrast,  the  beauty  of
necessities and shortages as triggers for official action  is that they leave
most of economic life intact,  i.e.,  in the hands of sellers.
But  the fact  that  a good  is  a necessity  - say,  food or shelter -
does not mean that  sellers  have more  power to dictate  price  or terms
than sellers  of other  goods, such  as  luxury yachts.  If there are  many
sellers of a necessity, none of them will be able to charge more than the
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going package of price and terms without losing all his buyers. If there
are few sellers of a luxury  item, they will have substantial power to set
price and terms, even though there is not a single person who would be
materially  worse  off if the  industry  went  out  of business  altogether.
Moreover,  that  a good  is a necessity  does not  mean that  buyers  will
necessarily  tolerate  larger price  hikes  without  reducing  demand than
they would tolerate  in the case of a luxury.  One can go  on consuming
most necessities, and particularly  food and housing, long after one has
passed the stage at which they are "necessary."  The price of vegetables
may be determined  at the margin not by buyers  who must buy  at any
price  or  starve, but  by those who  are  deciding  between  a surfeit  and
absolute  gorging.  They will go  for a  mere surfeit if the price gets too
high.  Where the  marginal buyers are the poor, it may be  particularly
difficult  for  a monopolist  to  pass  costs  along,  because  poor  marginal
buyers may be  quick to reduce their consumption when prices rise.
In  other words,  sellers of necessities  may  have  more, less, or the
same ability to pass on costs as sellers of other commodities.  Ironically,
a regime of compulsory terms will be most likely to redistribute wealth
from sellers to buyers in those cases where  sellers have least, not most,
of this ability.  The rhetoric of necessities will therefore give the deci-
sion maker  the wrong  signal if it indicates  he should impose compul-
sory terms where  seller power  looks greatest to him.
References  to a shortage  usually mean that a  change in supply  or
demand  is  causing a  rise in the price  of a commodity,  so  that people
who had come to expect to buy it are threatened with having either to
do without it or to reduce their consumption of other things.  Shortages
often give rise to demands for price control, either to limit the ability of
sellers to make windfall profits on short term fluctuations,  or to guaran-
tee the position of those who were consuming the good at the old price
against those who now threaten to bid the good away  from them.  But
people  also  often  invoke  the  idea  of a shortage  to  explain  why  the
buyer's consent to a contract term reflected unequal bargaining power,
so that the  court should disallow the bargain  and impose a regime of
nondisclaimable  duties instead.  It should  be clear from the foregoing
analysis  that  without price control, the compulsory  terms may or may
not work to the advantage of the buyer class.  That buyers are invoking
the idea  of a shortage  suggests  that they feel  pressed to  accept terms
they would earlier have  resisted.  If this is true, sellers will pass  along
all or close to all the cost of nondisclaimable duties, rather than absorb-
ing some part themselves.  If this happens, intervention  defeats its own
purpose, just as conservatives  argue  it will.
Again, I am in favor of guaranteeing people access  to the necessi-
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ties of life, and  it strikes me as absurd to allow sellers to reap windfall
gains from temporary increases in price (just as I wouldn't put them out
of business as a sacrifice to random reductions in price).  If the question
is  whether  people  should  have  necessities,  the  answer  is  clearly yes.
But the question  here  is  whether one  gives an intelligent  explanation
for imposing compulsory terms by pointing out that the good regulated
was a necessity or was in short supply.  I've been arguing, as in the case
of market power, that necessariness  or shortage  may well delegitimate
the market solution without legitimating this form of intervention as an
alternative.
B.  The Ideological  Signofcance of the Doctrine of
Unequal Bargaining  Power
It seems a reasonable conclusion from the above that the notion of
unequal bargaining power is of little use to a person seriously commit-
ted  to  achieving  distributive  objectives  through  law.  I would  go  fur-
ther:  there is little behind the idea in the way of an intelligent analysis
of the general problem of equality, let alone the problem of the quality
of life under our form of capitalism.  It is nonetheless  the case that the
idea has great appeal.  Why?
The notion of unequal bargaining power is unintelligible except in
the  context of the perennial conflict  between  liberalism  and conserva-
tism, the center-left and center-right positions within the politics of wel-
fare-state  capitalism.  In  the  center-right  version  of  private  law,
inequality  of bargaining  power  has  no  place,  because  problems  of
power  are  adequately  dealt  with  by  the  law  of fraud  and  duress  -
power  issues  reduce  to issues of voluntariness,  and are  settled by  the
late nineteenth  century formalization  of contract law.
Liberals,  on the other hand, argue for a dual law of voluntariness.
They  agree  that fraud  and duress  should  be  treated as  a stable  back-
ground regime,  but  argue for ad hoc legislative and judicial  interven-
tion  outside  their  bounds.  The  liberal  position  is,  as  I  said  earlier,
phrased  in  terms  of freedom  of contract  (inequality  of bargaining
power vitiates consent) but quite overtly distributively intended. When,
but only when, the test is met, judges should intervene  to help the weak
against the strong.  It is understood  that "weak"  and "strong"  in terms
of bargaining  power  are  stand-ins  for  rich  and  poor, privileged  and
oppressed, within civil society.
To  understand  the  doctrine  of  unequal  bargaining  power,  one
must understand that the liberal position  is center-left, rather than left.
Its essence  is that reform of exceptional  cases and intelligent  response
to abuses  are all that is needed to meet the just demands of the disad-
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vantaged and thereby to relegitimate the overall system of distribution
and the overall quality of life.  This is a  left position in  so much  as  it
acknowledges  a problem  of justice between  groups  and a  problem  of
the quality of existence, and denies that these problems are solved sim-
ply by the neutral administration  of the free  contract  regime.  But it  is
centrist  in  that it  insists  (a)  that consent  (achieved  when  bargaining
power  is  equal)  is  the  only  criterion  of the justice  of social  arrange-
ments (as opposed, say, to actual equality, or the idea of a virtuous life
for the citizenry), and (b) that consent in fact validates the overarching
structure  of our form of capitalism.  It follows that whatever  one may
think of this or that transaction,  one sees the basic allocation of power
between  capitalists,  workers,  managers,  and government  bureaucrats,
along with the basic cultural underpinnings of family and social life, as
beyond the scope  of political action.
In this context,  the doctrine  of unequal bargaining  power has the
appeal that it presupposes  that most of the time there is equal bargain-
ing power, so that freedom of contract  is the appropriate norm.  It is an
exceptional  doctrine,  unthreatening  to  basic  arrangements,  however
critical  of particular  cases.  Indeed,  the  existence  of a  doctrine  that
courts will  impose compulsory  terms  where  bargaining  power is  une-
qual has, along with its left message,  a strong centrist message as  well.
It says that so long as the liberals don't let the idiot conservatives  exag-
gerate,  it is  possible  to  make  a  market  system  like  ours  work  well.
When judges and legislatures have corrected the abuses caused by ine-
quality of bargaining  power, everything  will be OK.
This  implicit  message  of equality  conveyed  by  appealing  to  ine-
quality is a classic example of the apologetic functions of doctrine.  The
equality  is  of "power,"  so that though  we  willingly  interpolate  terms
favoring the buyer into an insurance contract, we don't see that as com-
mitting us  in  any way to  equalizing peoples'  actual enjoyment  of the
material  things  everyone  is  struggling  over.  Eliminating inequality  of
bargaining power, as liberals conceive it, has nothing to do with elimi-
nating factual inequalities.  It has no direct reference either to equality
in the  actual division of transaction  surplus between buyer and seller,
or to the actual division of social product among the warring groups of
civil  society.  It nonetheless  gives  a very good  feeling.
In this sense, it resembles efficiency:  it transposes the deadly fights
of social  groups  to a  plane where  the issue is merely  formal (for effi-
ciency,  merely factual).  It is not that people  are trying to take  things
away from one another because they think they have been unjustly dis-
tributed,  or  that people  are  destroying  themselves  by  making  wrong
choices.  It's just  that  the  rules  of the  game  of bargaining  have  not
1982]MARYLAND  LAW  REVIEW
worked in this particular  case, and the outcome is therefore outside the
otherwise  automatic  legitimation of the  bargain principle.  Given  this
state of affairs,  liberals  can  be quite  unequivocally  on the  side of the
weaker group against the stronger, without abandoning  a stance of be-
nevolence  or tolerance  toward the  social  order as  a whole.
The  vagueness  of  the  slogan  appeals  to  two  different  currents
within  the larger stream  of liberalism.  The  first  is  the  sense of disen-
franchisement of the liberal  intelligentsia,  which  sees itself as morally
and  intellectually  superior  to  the  managerial  and  plutocratic  classes,
but relatively  impotent  by comparison  with them.  This intelligentsia
can easily identify  with similar complaints  from those less privileged.
The second is the  rhetoric of populism, which claims  that factual  ine-
quality  stems from  cheating  or biases in  the  rules of the game,  rather
than from  the game itself. Within  this strand,  people  argue  that they
and others like them would be richer and more powerful, while the rich
and powerful would be less  so, if only the  "interests"  hadn't perverted
the  system of individual effort  under freedom of contract.  Both criti-
ques respond to two fears:  the fear of degradation if one were to accept
the  outcome of the  struggle of civil  society  as  representing  one's  true
worth, and  the fear of losing to those below if the rhetoric of equality
were  to pass beyond form to substantive  proposals  for leveling.
So  understood,  the  doctrine  of unequal  bargaining  power repre-
sents  a  partial  acceptance  of distributive  motives  into the  domain  of
contract  law,  but an  acceptance  that  is  rhetorical rather  than  real -
intended to disarm.  It would fail of its purpose if the application of the
doctrine  led  to  a  substantial  change  in the  actual  distribution  of the
good things of life.  It would also fail of its purpose if it turned out to be
absolutely and totally meaningless.  But in fact it does not fail.  So long
as  the parties  remain  free  to  fix prices,  it would  be  absurd to believe
that regimes of compulsory terms, even taken to great lengths, could be
a major engine of redistribution.  On the  other hand, they  sometimes
work  quite effectively to redistribute  transaction  surplus between buy-
ers and sellers under particular conditions of supply and demand.  The
poor may benefit substantially in some of these cases, and might benefit
a  good deal  more  if liberal  decision makers  took  their  own  program
more seriously.  Seen in this way, the doctrine has a lot in common, in
its ambivalence,  with other familiar elements of liberal politics, such as
sponsorship of land reform  within oligarchic  Latin American  societies
or affirmative  action for blacks and  Chicanos  in higher education.
But it does more than directly legitimate a set of liberal initiatives.
It has a particular structural place  in the liberal vision of legal order, a
place as a mediator of contradictions  between the basic elements of that
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vision.  First, the doctrine  of unequal bargaining power  is the  "public"
element within judge-made private law.  Because it is there, it is plausi-
ble to treat the other private  law  rules - about duress  and fraud,  for
example  - as truly  neutral.  Their  application  involves the  "normal"
judicial role, while unequal bargaining power is only a semi-legitimate,
quasi-legislative excursion into "policy"  or "social engineering."  Use of
the doctrine thus admits the inescapably public aspect of the operation
of setting the  groundrules,  but places that  aspect in  a  special domain
where judges will  be  scared  of it, will  not  feel they  can  do  it whole-
heartedly.  Meanwhile,  the real  distributive  work  of the common  law
rules  is done  more  or less unconsciously through  the  true distributive
interventions of the  supposedly neutral background  regime.
Second,  the  doctrine  minimizes  conscious  recognition  of the  dis-
tributive motive in private law.  It refers only to  the "procedural"  as-
pects of the relationship  between  a buyer and seller.  Thus it points us
to facts  that  are  quite  removed  from  the real  political  motive  of the
liberal  decision maker.  He doesn't care about  "bargaining power"  or
even about  the distribution  of transaction  surplus between  buyer and
seller except  as a  way  to shift income  between  the  warring  groups  of
civil society.  But for all the doctrine tells us, it is equally applicable to
rich  and poor, white  and black,  men and women.  It  is  only in  its ad
hoc applications  that it turns out to be a way for the liberals to help the
oppressed  (a  little bit)  against their oppressors.
Third, the  doctrine justifies  compulsory  terms without  any  refer-
ence  at  all  to  paternalism.  The  squabble  within  the  center  about
whether even a tiny modicum of distributive motive  is acceptable  dis-
tracts attention  from what is probably  the most consistent  and impor-
tant effect of these regimes:  the overruling of preferences on the  basis
of a particular substantive  moral vision of how people should deal with
risk in  their  lives.  As  we  saw earlier,  the  paternalist  motive  is  even
more  difficult  to  acknowledge,  and  prima  facie  even  less  legitimate
than  the  distributive.  Inequality  of  bargaining  power  masks  it  by
presenting  as  a defense  of the weak what is  often in fact  a critique  of
their spending habits.
Finally,  I should say  something positive about the motives  of the
liberal  lawyers, judges  and legislators  who  developed the  doctrine  of
unequal bargaining  power.  The doctrine exists not in a vacuum but as
a weapon in the war against the conservative program of reinforcing all
kinds of social  hierarchy.  It may be internally incoherent, and it may
achieve only rather randomly  good  results  even when  used skillfully.
But  it  is  a weapon on  the  side  of equality,  of the left  and not  of the
right, however  imperfect.
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The  development of the doctrine  is part of the continuous  liberal
project  of working out principles  that will  tell us just how  much  ine-
quality  we  must  tolerate  in  the  name of individual autonomy.  When
the notion of voluntariness, all by itself, seemed to lead to grotesquely
hierarchical  and  degraded  social  outcomes,  the  center-left  developed
two  critiques.  First,  they  trashed  the  conservative  claim  that  the
groundrules  were merely logical deductions from  the idea of freedom.
Second, they  developed  the  notion that agreement  must be more than
voluntary:  it must  also reflect  the very limited  form of equality  they
call equality of bargaining  power.  The problem lies not in the utopian
intention behind this project, but with what seems (no one can prove it
one way or another) to be the hopelessness of trying to avoid intuitive,
immediate judgments,  based on  intersubjective  group identity  as  well
as  on  aloneness,  about  the  acceptability  of any given  social  arrange-
ment.  My belief is that we revolt because  we are revolted, not because
we have figured out that a set of outcomes can't be justified in terms of
the liberal principles.  But I honor the attempt to subject anarchic senti-
ment to the test of reason, however happy I  may be each time it fails.
VI.  PATERNALISM
This part begins by suggesting that when we take into account the
desirable paternalist effects  of compulsory terms, the case for them is a
good  deal stronger than  when we  look at them  only in  terms  of effi-
ciency  and  distribution.  The  second  section  argues  that  a  frank  ac-
knowledgement  of  paternalist  motives  in  creating  nondisclaimable
duties would not be inconsistent with the rest of the law of agreements,
which  is  full  of legal  arrangements  that seem  patently  paternalist  in
intent.  Common law institutions provide a rich typology of reasons for
paternalist  intervention,  as  well as experience  with defining  the duties
of the  obligor  toward the  beneficiary  in  ways that protect against  the
abuse of power.  The third section  argues that paternalism  is desirable
as well  as pervasive.  Its basis is intersubjectivity  rather than incompe-
tence, and its appropriate scope is limited by our capacity for empathy,
rather than by an abstract principle of the free will of the beneficiary.
A.  Paternalism  and Compulsory Terms
1.  How Compulsory Terms  Work as Paternalism - In  a  sense,
paternalism  is  the  most  obvious  of  motives  for  compulsory  terms,
though because of its pariah status it is usually mentioned last, if at all.
A compulsory  term requires people to make particular contracts  when
they would rather make different ones.  Because  the term typically cre-
ates  a  duty  for  one  party that, on its  face,  helps  the other party,  the
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situation bears at least a superficial similarity to classic protective  rela-
tionships.  And because  the seller/promisor/obligor  is allowed to raise
the price  in response  to imposition of the nondisclaimable  duty, there
may be no redistributive effects  between buyer and seller, so that a dis-
tributive motive  is not  necessarily  present.
Paternalism  involves compelling a decision on the ground that it is
in the beneficiary's best interest. Regimes of compulsory  terms typically
involve duties that  fit easily into this general  conception:  people  often
say that it is  in your best interests  to take the warranty  rather than  a
lower price; to insist on a lease with a landlord's  duty to maintain the
premises,  rather than just signing  whatever  he hands you;  to  demand
full disclosure before  consenting  to surgery;  to  get yourself some job
security  rather than working on an at-will  basis; and  so forth.
For an intervention to be paternalist,  the distributive  effects  have
to be "side effects"  rather than the purpose of the initiative.  It may not
be  obvious whether a particular  change following intervention  should
or  should  not count  as  a  side  effect.  For  example,  the  intervention
means, in the typical case where the term reduces  or insures  against  a
risk, that those who get compensated (or saved from injuries that would
otherwise have befallen them) because they were compelled to buy pro-
tection gain  at the  expense  of those who, it  turns out,  don't need the
protection  but had to pay for it anyway.  In other words, if we  analo-
gize the  term  to  insurance, those  who  wouldn't  have  self-insured  but
are  injured  gain  at the  expense  of those  compelled  to  insure  against
things that never happen to  them.  But we have  to  subtract  from this
distributive  effect  the  benefits  to the  uninjured in the  way  of psychic
security  that  come  from knowing  they  are  covered  (even  though  the
coverage  is compelled).
A second  distributive  effect  is that some  buyers are priced out  of
the  market  now  that sellers  have  raised  their price  in an  attempt  to
recoup  the cost  of the  compulsory term.  From  a paternalist  perspec-
tive, this may not be an undesirable  side effect, but a part of the pater-
nalist program.  If we really believe that those buyers were not acting in
their best interest  when they bought  the commodity without  the term,
then they  may be  better  off priced  out of the  market  than  they  were
when we  let them stay  in it.
We can distinguish in a rough way between compulsory terms that
"just allocate a risk" about whose placement the decision maker is wor-
ried, and terms that enforce  his moral notions  of appropriate  conduct.
In the first  category,  strict products  liability allocates  to the  seller the
job of insuring  through  the  price  against  injuries  from non-negligent
defects  in his  wares.  The notion  is not  to  condemn  the  existence  of
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non-negligent  defects  (after  all,  we couldn't  have  avoided  them  even
with due  care),  but to make  sure the  consumer gets  protection against
losses  they cause.  At the  other  extreme,  a  nondisclaimable  employer
duty  not  to  discharge  an at-will  employee  for refusing  sexual  favors
does more than "just allocate a risk."  The same is true of the husband's
nondisclaimable  duty to support his wife.  In the latter cases, the duty is
supposed to make the "seller" behave as a seller should behave (at least
according  to  the  decision  maker)  even  in  the  absence  of  any  legal
sanctions.
When he imposes  strict liability for product  defects, the interven-
tion is paternalist  to the extent  the decision  maker anticipates  that the
whole  cost  of insurance  will  be  passed  along  through  the  price,  or
thinks that only a little will be borne  by the seller.  It is paternalist  as
well where there  is only limited pass-along, but the decision maker re-
gards cost absorbed  by the seller as a misfortune that must be suffered
in order to bring about the benefit  to the buyer.  He might regard the
redistribution  as  an  unfortunate  side  effect  because  he  thought  the
buyer ought to have  to pay for his  own protection  against risk,  or be-
cause the effect was regressive from the point of view of his distributive
objectives.
I  think  we  should  also  regard  as  paternalist  an  intervention  in
which  the  decision  maker  actively  disapproves  seller  conduct  that  is
barred by the compulsory term.  Such a term is distributive  in that it is
supposed to put an end to bad seller behavior  and thereby improve the
buyer's  lot. But the mechanism  is the overruling of the buyer's choices
- we  force the  buyer to  protect  himself against  the  seller's  badness.
Moreover,  one  way  to  understand  what's  going  on  is  to say  that  we
force the  seller to behave in an altruistic fashion toward the buyer be-
cause the buyer is in need of the seller's protection, being too dumb to
protect himself. The issue is not power, but rather the false conscious-
ness of the buyer who doesn't think to write in the compulsory term on
his own.
There remains the case of mixed motives where imposing the term
redistributes wealth from sellers to buyers, which  is just what the deci-
sion maker wants to happen, while simultaneously  forcing them to buy
something he thinks they should have been willing to pay for without
compulsion.
2.  Varieties of  False Consciousness "Cured"  by Compulsory Terms
- To say that an intervention  is paternalist doesn't explain it, beyond
identifying  the  problem  as  a  mistake  on  the  part  of the  beneficiary
about his real  interests, or as false consciousness.  Decision makers in
our society impose  compulsory terms  because  they think buyers  suffer
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from a number of quite  specific  kinds of false consciousness.  For ex-
ample,  buyers  underestimate  the  seriousness  of risks  of injury  from
products  or  situations.  The  tendency  to  underestimate  risk  goes  far
enough  beyond  mere  misinformation  so  that when  we  intervene  we
can't claim to be achieving an efficient  outcome blocked by transaction
costs.  It amounts to a cognitive bias, a systematic tendency to misinter-
pret  or ignore  information,  to  generate  fantasies  of safety,  to  repress
unwanted  information.  It has to  do with babyishness,  not  ignorance.
When  the decision  maker makes  the buyer pay  for protection  against
the  non-negligent  injury, or makes  the  buyer  buy a  safety  precaution
that  will  prevent  injury  happening  at all, he  may  be  doing  so  in  re-
sponse  to a judgment  about  this kind  of misperception.
But it may be that he is concerned not with a misperception of risk,
but with willingness to take risks - with recklessness rather  than with
babyishness about the facts. He may decide that looking at the buyer as
a person with a continuous existence in time, as a life rather than as an
instant, he can  make the  buyer  better off by  forcing him to  give up  a
little now in order to avoid catastrophe later on. That the buyer doesn't
think so may be a  mistake that seems just a matter of character,  or it
may be possible  to  develop  an  interpretation  of the  buyer's  situation
that makes  the  mistake  easy  to  understand.  For example,  the  buyer
may appear to the decision maker to be suffering from addiction, not in
the narrower opiate sense, but in the larger sense of needing a continu-
ous flow of commodity  fixes in order  to keep at bay the pain of being
dominated  at work  or in the  family.
Buyers make a third kind of mistake when they fail to obtain guar-
antees of nonarbitrary treatment.  Take the case of consumer  remedies
and consumer defenses  waived  by contract,  or of extremely  favorable
creditor  remedies  written  into  contracts,  or of clauses  by  which  one
party determines the venue of any lawsuit favorably to himself, or sets
liquidated damages or conditions that create real risks of forfeiture. We
have  once  again the  two  distinct errors of misperceiving  the  risk that
the  terms  will  be invoked,  and of placing too  high a  discount  on the
possibility  of future  loss.  But  this  case  also involves  a  willingness  to
trust  one's present  partner  to treat  one  fairly further  down  the  road,
when what now  seem like  congruent  interests have  begun to  diverge.
The buyer allows the seller to con him - to make it seem  unlikely that
there  will  ever  be an  occasion  to which  the terms  would  be  relevant,
and that if there were, the seller can be trusted to act reasonably  in the
circumstances,  rather than standing  on a  legal right  to treat  the buyer
unfairly.
A  fourth  type  of mistake  has  to  do  with  the  long  term  conse-
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quences of choosing a particular structure for a relationship.  Recall the
example  of the buyers who agreed to give the seller a percentage of the
appreciation  any time they sold the land, a term struck down by a very
conservative New York court.25  This clause,  along with the others in a
purported "sale"  in fee simple, was designed to, and to some extent did,
bind the buyers to the land as though they had been (though, of course,
in  fact  they  were  not)  the  feudal  serfs  of the great  landlord patroon
sellers.  Or think  of the  systems  of criminal  penalties  for  violating  a
labor  contract  that the  courts have  from  time to  time struck down  as
peonage.26  And why is it that, even before the fourteenth amendment,
courts  wouldn't  enforce  a  contract  of enslavement,  though  it  met  the
most extreme tests of voluntariness?  In all these cases, the objection is
not to running  a specific  risk of loss, or to running a specific  risk that
the  seller will  treat the  buyer  unfairly.  The objection  is  to the  whole
relationship  - it  is an objection to  feudalism, a way of life, or to slav-
ery, a way of life.  It makes  no difference that if we apply  to their ac-
tions the same tests of voluntariness  we apply to our own, some people
may sometimes want to be peons.  We  won't let them  be.
The false consciousness  involved  is in part that people who  agree
to work a whole lifetime for the same  employer on an at-will contract
without  any  provision  for their  retirement  have  underestimated  how
seriously  dependent  they  will be.  Had they not  been  mistaken, they
would have risen in revolt, or they would have  scrimped and saved.  It
is no answer to say that  they just couldn't scrimp  and save.  Social  Se-
curity made them, and then it turned out that they could in fact survive
with a deduction that was  (more or less) enough  to provide for retire-
ment.  The problem was not that it was impossible to demand and win
job security  or a pension plan, but that the social world  of day labor,
for  example, was based on the unspoken assumption that these things
couldn't  be had.  It  was  based  on  a  consciousness  in  which  a higher
wage  in the short run was preferred to what  the middle-class  decision
maker saw as the slighted human need for security, which would be in
turn the necessary practical basis for the affirmation of equality with an
otherwise  all-powerful  employer.
Or take the New Jersey case of State v. Shack,27  in which the court
held  that a  legal services  worker and a federally  funded  anti-poverty
organizer were  privileged to enter a migrant labor camp to talk to mi-
grant workers.  The court neatly carved out an exception to the law of
trespass, but found it necessary to carve out another  exception as well.
25.  De Peyster  v. Michael,  2  Seld. 467  (1852).
26.  See L.  TRIBE,  AMERICAN  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW  § 5-13,  at 259 n. 11  (1978).
27.  58  N.J. 297,  277  A.2d 369  (1971).
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What if the employer/landowner got each migrant worker to waive the
right (to be "reached") that the court had just painstakingly constructed
for them?  Why, then, such a waiver would be void because of inequal-
ity  of bargaining  power, and  because  the  condition  of "isolation"  of
migrant workers  - as much  cultural as physical - was just what the
federal statutes  establishing the programs of legal aid and community
development  were  trying to  break  down.  In other  words,  supposing
that the migrant worker positively requested the owner of the camp to
keep  agitators  off the  premises,  he  couldn't  succeed.  The right to  be
agitated  is  inalienable.
Many working and middle-class people believe that employers pay
their share of Social  Security as a  deduction from their profits, so that
the creation of the program involved a big material concession by capi-
tal to labor - the imposition of a massive  duty of benevolence  on the
stronger in favor of the weaker party.  In State v. Shack, the court was
careful  to  put  the  nonwaivableness  of the  right  to  be  agitated  on
grounds of unequal bargaining power, though the discussion as a whole
made  it  clear that  it  feared  the  migrants simply wouldn't  understand
how valuable the right might be over the long run.  Especially when we
are dealing with this fourth  form of false  consciousness,  paternalist is
less acceptable  than distributive  rhetoric.  Middle-class members of the
ruling elites - decision makers - must never claim that whole classes
of people  lower  in  the  hierarchy  than  themselves  have  a just  plain
wrong understanding  of their social situation, so that their choices  are
vitiated  not by their weakness,  but  by their  false understanding.  And
the closer the beneficiaries  are to the middle class, the less permissible it
is to claim  to know their "best interests."  For example,  in the discus-
sion above, it is more permissible  to say that State v. Shack is really a
case of judicial paternalism  than to say that the whole Social Security
system is paternalist.
3.  Conclusions About  Compulsory Terms, and an Example  -
There are efficiency, distributive and paternalist rationales for regimes
of compulsory  terms.  These are not mutually exclusive.  It may be that
a given regime  will improve efficiency,  redistribute  income, and "cor-
rect" choices  all at the same time.  But the extent to which compulsory
terms accomplish any of the three objectives  can  be known (to the ex-
tent it can be known at all) only on the basis of a study of the particular
situation in question. Nondisclaimable  duties are perfectly capable  of
reducing efficiency, distributing income in just the wrong way, and cor-
recting  choices that were correct  in the first place.
In the unlikely event that I were the decision maker, I would favor
an  adventurous  and  experimental  program  of left-wing  compulsory
19821MARYLAND  LAW  REVIEW
terms.  Here  is  an example:  the case  of Steelworkers v. United States
Steel 8  was incorrectly  decided.  In that case, the workers,  represented
by  Staughton  Lynd,  argued  that  the  steelworkers  union  and  the
Youngstown City Council had acquired an "easement"  in the Youngs-
town plant,  which  the  company  had  decided  to close  because  it was
unprofitable.  The U.S.  District  Court  and then  the Court of Appeals
decided that neither  the  workers nor the  town  had  acquired,  by con-
tract or in any other way, any of the absolute  property rights the com-
pany had in the plant.
The case was wrongly decided  because the court should have im-
plied into every contract of employment between the company  and an
individual  worker  the  following  term:  As  part  payment  for  the
worker's  labor, the  company  promised  that in  the  event  it wished  to
terminate  the  manufacture  of steel  in the  plant, it  would convey  the
plant to the union in trust for the present  workers (along with recently
laid-off and retired workers).  The company further impliedly promised
to condition the conveyance  so that if the union as trustee attempted to
sell the plant or convert it to a use that would substantially  reduce the
economic benefit it generated for the town, the town would become the
owner in fee simple. I would make this implied promise  on the part  of
the  company  non-waivable,  so  as to  achieve  all three  objectives  dis-
cussed above.
Such terms are not now included in standard collective bargaining
agreements because transaction costs, and particularly imperfect  infor-
mation,  block  the  parties  from  reaching  the  agreement  that  would
make  all  as  well  off as  possible.  Further,  employers  like  U.S.  Steel
would find it impossible to pass along the full cost of this term, even if
it were  possible for them  to calculate it accurately.  It would therefore
probably  work a distributive benefit for workers at the expense  of em-
ployers.  Finally, a basic reason why workers have not in the past bar-
gained  for  and  won  the  kind  of property  interest  in  manufacturing
enterprises that this term would represent seems to have been that they
have miscalculated  their true interests.  They have underestimated  the
long-term  value of worker control,  and also  the risks  of capital flight
and other forms of economic dislocation. They have overestimated the
stability  of basic  arrangements  between  labor and  management,  and
also overestimated  the benefits of a relatively  quiet life, with plenty of
material goods  and no responsibility.
Maybe all these judgments about efficiency,  distribution and false
28.  United  Steel  Workers,  Local  1330  v.  United  States  Steel  Corp.,  492  F.  Supp.  1
(1980),  aff-d, 631  F.2d  1264 (6th  Cir. 1980).
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consciousness  are  wrong.  I  certainly  can't  claim  anything  like  the
knowledge  that would  allow  me to  assert  them with confidence.  The
point of my example  is not to convince you of their truth.  Rather, I am
arguing that these are the kinds of  judgments you would need to make
to decide intelligently.  It seems  to me on balance likely - more than
that I couldn't say - that a compulsory term of the type I've described
would do more  good than bad.  Therefore,  if I  had  been the  district
court judge in the case, I would have imposed it, with some trepidation
and a great  deal of curiosity about  what would happen  next.
B.  The Pervasiveness of Paternalism
Where would you go, if you were the decision maker, for a ration-
ale for imposing a nondisclaimable  duty of this kind?  At first glance, it
seems that our whole system of law is alien to the idea that the state can
or should  impose  duties  in  order to make  people  do things  "in  their
own best interests."  In the dispute about whether or not it should be a
crime to  ride  a motorcycle  without a  helmet, for example,  both  sides
generally  agree that paternalist  intervention  is highly  exceptional  and
bears a special kind ofjustificatory burden.  In this section I'll list in the
most cursory way all kinds of legal institutions other than compulsory
terms that seem to me best understood as paternalist, and then mention
the sources available to judges who have to define a content for pater-
nalist  obligation.
1.  Types of  Paternalist  Intervention - Robert Clark, in an article
called  The Soundness of Financial  Intermediaries, 29  looked at  the rea-
sons for the complex  of statutes  governing  banks, investment  compa-
nies  and  other  capital-aggregating  institutions.  The  various
explanations  others  offered  for  this body of regulations  included  un-
equal bargaining power and efficiency.  But Clark came quickly to the
conclusion that none of them was altogether plausible.  Since the tenor
of my argument for paternalism may seem a little cracked, I'll begin by
quoting Clark  at length.
That  some public suppliers of capital  literally  could not compre-
hend government-sponsored  ratings of financial intermediaries, so
that no expenditure of resources would enable them to understand,
seems to be more properly  characterized  as a  reflection of human
finitude,  not of information  costs.  Even  though all persons have
finite  abilities,  it is  hard to  imagine that many  people  could not
understand some feasible but simple rating systems.  It seems more
29.  Clark,  The Soundness of Financial  Intermediaries,  86  YALE  L.J.  1 (1976).
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likely that some public suppliers of capital will deliberately ignore
the ratings,  apparently  finding other uses  of their time more pro-
ductive.  If we nevertheless  feel a  desire to  protect them from the
consequences of this choice, it would appear to reflect a belief that
their preferences  are wrong in  some sense  ....
The fourth reason for governmental protection of public sup-
pliers  of  capital  against  very  risky  financial  intermediaries  is,
therefore,  that  people  need  to  be  protected  against  themselves.
Human  finitude  and normative  error  are the  major  sorts  of per-
sonal imperfections:  human beings have limited capacities  to un-
derstand, to reason, and to predict, and they do not always  know
or choose  the  risks  that under  some  moral  theory  they  ought  to
prefer.  That people have limited capacities is undeniable.  But the
proposition  that  a  person's  actual  preferences  for  risk-taking
should not be dispositive  as a  normative  matter is not always ac-
cepted.  Solely for purposes of reference,  I will  call this view  the
thesis of human fallibility.  According  to this thesis, human beings
are by nature prone  to something identified as  sin, valuational er-
ror,  non-adaptive  behavior,  false  consciousness,  or  "objectively"
wrong preferences  ....
•  * *  [S]ince fallibilistic theories  strike many persons as an in-
sult to human dignity, inevitably there is pressure to disguise these
theories when they  do  underpin  regulation.  One  seeks  the  com-
forts of projection by attributing the limitations and imperfections
that cause misfortune  to abstract markets  and not  to people.
Protective legislation concerning financial intermediaries thus
may be viewed as an example of fundamentally paternalistic legis-
lation masquerading  as  a response to market  imperfections.3"
Much  the  same can  be  said of the  rest of our  securities  law.  The
problem it addressed was not that companies issuing stock were forcing
investors into bad deals, but that there were characteristic  mistakes in-
vestors  made.  We  can talk  about  these  mistakes  in  the  language  of
transaction costs - imperfect information and the like - but everyone
knew that what was really at work was greed, gullibility, incurable opti-
mism, the gambler's  itch, the allure of something  for nothing, all fol-
lowed  by  addiction  to  the  ticker,  the  secret  diversion  of the  family's
savings,  the  mortgaging  of  a  small  business,  and  then,  when  things
turned down, increasing margin requirements, a desperate  scramble to
stay  in the game just a  little longer.  . . ruin and  a  swan dive  from a
high window.  What was going on in this fantasy drama of capitalism
was not extortion.  At worst, widows and orphans trust blindly in ap-
30.  Id  at  18-20.
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parently upright advisors who turn out to be secret addicts themselves.
It is a story of folly, not of duress.  People  are idiots.
This example mainly concerns adult white males who unquestion-
ably possess "capacity  to contract."  Most  of them are  college  gradu-
ates,  hereditary  members  of the  middle  class.  At  the  other extreme,
paternalism is so obvious it is barely visible:  there is a constitutive ex-
ception  in the  law of freedom  of contract for people who lack "capac-
ity."  Today  that  includes  children  and  the  insane  (once  it  included
women and blacks and seamen as well).  The contracts of children and
the insane  are unenforceable  because,  supposedly,  they  are incapable
of voluntary  choice.  But why do  we  refuse to  enforce  an agreement
made by a person who lacks the capacity for voluntary choice, and why
does the law  sometimes  make such a  contract merely  voidable  rather
than void?  The answer is that we void the contract in order to protect
the infant or the lunatic from injury that he might invite in his state of
undeveloped  or false consciousness.  When  the contract  is for  "neces-
saries,"  when it's a contract we want him to make, we enforce  it.  Like-
wise when it's clearly  to his advantage,  and it's the other party who is
pleading  his  incapacity.  The  law of incapacity,  with  its complicated
subrules about unjust enrichment, reliance and fraud, creates a class of
people judges  are supposed to save from  themselves.
The analogy between infants and the insane on the one hand, and
the  adult forbidden  to make a contract  on the other, was plain to late
nineteenth  century  conservative judges, who  used it with ironic  relish
against  the  reformers. When the  Illinois court  struck down maximum
hours legislation  for  women,  it put the  decision partly  on the  ground
that women had been fully emancipated, and that to treat them as inca-
pable  of deciding  how  many  hours  a  day  they  wanted  to  work  was
consigning them  again to the status of children.3  Courts called mini-
mum hours laws  for men  "demeaning,"  on the same ground.
Most  paternalist  interventions  fall somewhere  between  incapaci-
tating children  and  forbidding  intelligent  adults to pick  the  terms  of
their  investments.  Take  the  equitable  doctrine  of undue  influence.
Here there is neither fraud nor duress, but a kind of subversion of the
mind of the weaker party so that he no longer "really"  acts for himself,
though  he's  an  adult  and  not  insane.  Often  it's  "the  situation"  that
supposedly vitiates the will, as in the cases involving mothers agreeing
during  post-partum  depression  to give their children up for adoption.
Somewhat  analogous  is the  doctrine  that it  is up  to  the court,  rather
than to the parties themselves, to decide when a fiduciary  relation exists
31.  Ritchie  v. People,  155  IUl.  98, 40 N.E. 454 (1895).
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between  them.  This means  that  the court  can  invoke  the  fiduciary's
obligation to make a substantively  fair bargain with the beneficiary  to
invalidate  a deal  the parties  thought was at arm's length  (the crooked
nursing home developer gets a naive sexagenarian to invest his life sav-
ings in  a building worth half what he paid  for it).
Courts using the doctrine  of unconscionability  like to put their de-
cisions  on grounds of unequal bargaining  power  (in spite of the com-
ment to section 2-302  of the  U.C.C.).  But it's often  obvious  that they
are concerned not with power  but with naivete, or with lack of ability
to  make  intelligent  calculations  about  what  one  can  afford  on  one's
budget. People  make mistakes about how much  pleasure  they will get
out of a product - a deep freeze - and about how likely it is that they
will be able to find five other people to whom to  sell deep freezes in a
pyramid  scheme.
It's wrong, it seems to me, to treat a decision striking down a con-
tract  of this  kind  as  closely  analogous  to  a  decision  holding  an  em-
ployee's  release  of an  insurance  claim  void  for  duress  because  the
employer threatened to fire  the insured  if he didn't go along with the
insurer.  It is true  that the  goal of the  cases I'm calling  paternalist  is
often  to  prevent  the  impoverishment  of the  protected  class,  and that
helping  them hurts those who have  been exploiting them. The crucial
difference  is that  in  the  "power"  cases  all  you need  to  do is  give  the
beneficiary  some  weapons  and  she'll  fend  for  herself, whereas  in  the
false consciousness cases the decision maker has to take the beneficiary
under his wing and  tell him  what he can and cannot do.
There  are  a  good  number  of consideration  cases  that  have  this
same  quality.  There  is  the  contract  for  "conjuring"  which  the  court
won't enforce on the ground that conjuring has no "real"  value, or the
widow's  promise to pay her late husband's now unenforceable  debt to
"save  his honor."  It  may be that judicial hostility to  output, require-
ments and exclusive  dealing contracts  also had  a paternalist  element,
rather  than  merely  reflecting  ignorance  of  "commercial  context."
Where the court allows  such agreements,  it will sometimes be possible
for one party to take advantage  of a price shift to ruin the other party.
To prevent shocking results, the court will have to read into the agree-
ment  an  altruistic  duty not  to  "speculate"  against  the other party  by
increasing requirements  under a fixed price contract and then reselling
on  a rising market.  Given a  choice between  the paternalism  of such a
compulsory  "good faith"  term,  and  the paternalism  of not letting the
parties bind  themselves at  all, the latter might have  seemed  safer.
In the above cases, the  courts  refuse to  enforce an agreement  be-
cause one party has made a mistake about his true interests that threat-
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ens to impoverish him.  But sometimes we won't enforce the agreement
because we believe it will hurt one or both of the parties to perform it.
These are the cases about gambling contracts, prostitution, agreements
not to marry, agreements  to be a slave.  The superficial  way to explain
such cases is  to say  that  we  want to "deter"  the  conduct  involved  by
refusing -enforcement.  But  why  do  we  want  to  deter  the  conduct?
Sometimes  there  may  be  a  sense that  it's  wrong in  itself, an  offense
quite  apart from the interests of the parties.  But much of the time the
decision  maker  quite  consciously  tries  to  help  people  by  preventing
them from doing bad things to themselves.
Another  paternalist  institution  is  legal  formality.  The  decision
maker  declares  that  in  order  to  make  an enforceable  agreement  the
parties must go through  some ritual that will specially  signal their in-
tention.  In other words, he  declares that he will not enforce contracts
in certain cases even though he is convinced that the parties did agree,
and  that they fully  intended the agreement  to be legally  binding.  He
will enforce the agreement  only if, along with intention, they can pro-
duce  a peppercorn paid as consideration, or a writing, or a formal ex-
pression of acceptance,  and the whole  thing must  meet  a standard  of
definiteness.
It  is customary  to  say that the  formality  "performs  a cautionary
function"  (along  with an  evidentiary  and, sometimes,  a  "channeling"
function).  The theory of the cautionary function is that people  tend to
be hasty, to commit themselves  without really thinking things through,
in the heat of the moment.  By disallowing informal agreements we are
acting in the long-run best interests of the people whose wishes we are
presently disregarding.  This is paternalism.  Ironically, it is also pater-
nalism to disregard  the formalities, as courts often do, when particular
parties seem unable  to deal with them competently.
In a justly famous article on the doctrine of cu/pa in contrahendo, 32
Kessler and Fine demonstrated that there are a goodly dozen little sub-
doctrines by which courts evade the requirements of form, and protect
an innocent party too dumb to realize  he hadn't done what he  needed
to do to get a binding  obligation.  Since  the  article was written, there
has been an explosion of promissory estoppel doctrine, which functions
in the  same way.  Rather than disallowing  contracts not in the party's
best interest, the paternalist court compels the contract she should have
made.  There  is  an analogy  to  compulsory  contracts  for public utility
service, or compulsory contracts of common carriers, but only an anal-
32.  Kessler  & Fine,  Cu/pa in  Contrahendo, Bargaining  in  Good Faith, and Freedom of
Contract. A  Comparative  Study,  77 HARV.  L. REv.  401  (1964).
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ogy.  In  those  cases,  the  concern  is  that the  carrier  or the  utility has
monopoly power which it may exercise  unfairly. Here, the party trying
to bind the promisor can't make  a plausible claim that  she  lacked the
power to obtain  an  agreement.  Either  it didn't  occur  to her that  she
needed  one, or she bungled the attempt.  The Wisconsin court  made a
franchisor  reimburse  a  potential  franchisee  for  reliance  expended  in
preparation  for  a  deal  that  never  quite  came  off, even  though  the
franchisor never intended to be bound, committed no fraud, and used a
carrot  rather than a  stick to keep the plaintiff on the string.
2.  The Sources of Law for Paternalist  Intervention - Anti-pater-
nalist rhetoric emphasizes that the beneficiary's  "true" interests are un-
knowable.  One strand asserts that this is just a matter of logic - that
no person can know another's  true interest (this might be called meta-
physical anti-paternalism).  Another argues that "value judgments" are
"subjective,"  and therefore  uncertain, or "political."  The suggestion is
that decision makers  will inevitably  act  arbitrarily,  and that  arbitrari-
ness could easily turn to tyranny, or at least to the obnoxious prejudice
of ruling  class judges  deciding  what's  best  for  the  lowly  masses,  or
what's  best  for  specific  historically  oppressed  groups  that  have  had
plenty  of that, thank you  very much.
There are two distinct aspects to this attack.  One objection is that
we  are creating a duty  from one party to the other  whose content the
obligor will find hard to predict.  This is a nuisance, perhaps an expen-
sive nuisance that will discourage all kinds of desirable activity.  A sec-
ond objection is that a state official is claiming the power to invent and
then impose the obligation, without any determinate standard.  To put
these claims in perspective,  it is important that the legal system  recog-
nizes a whole range of fiduciary relationships such as trustee and bene-
ficiary  or  guardian  and  ward,  each  of  which  involves  one  party  in
complex calculations of the best interests  of the other.  Courts have de-
fined,  over time,  specific  rules and  a  set of general  maxims  that give
content to each  relationship.
Neither the trust nor the institution of custody  is a paternalist in-
tervention  in  the  law of agreements.33  But  the  guardian  and  trustee
provide the models against which the decision maker measures the be-
33.  The settlor of a trust voluntarily conveys the trust property to the trustee, who  agrees
in a general way that he will perform as a fiduciary.  The court will have  to decide,  repeat-
edly, just what degree of altruism this entails, but squarely within the context of freedom of
contract.  There is  paternalist intervention  in our sense only when the court forbids the par-
ties to modify fiduciary duties if they want to call the instrument a trust, or holds that agree-
ments  between  trustee  and  beneficiary  that  benefit  the  trustee  will  be  scrutinized  to
determine their  substantive  fairness  in a  way unheard of outside the fiduciary context.  In
[VOL.  41MOTIVES  IN  CONTRACT  AND  TORT  LAW
havior of the contractual party on whom he imposes a paternalist duty.
Thus  the  condominium  management  company  may  be  declared  a
fiduciary in relation to the condominium owners, and the resulting du-
ties are nondisclaimable.  The intervention  is  not  standardless  in the
sense suggested by anti-paternalist  rhetoric, any more than we  are ut-
terly ignorant  of the kind of mistake the buyer makes when she agrees
to pay twice  its value  for an  encyclopedia  she doesn't really want.
There is a  second set of operations that provide content for pater-
nalist intervention.  In the case of compulsory terms, courts often use as
a reference the term they would have interpolated had the parties made
no provision at all for the situation that has arisen.  We wouldn't have a
working  law of contract  if the  parties  couldn't rely  on the  courts  to
interpret  their  agreements.  But  the  filling-in  function  constantly  in-
volves the decision maker  in substantive  choices about just how  much
duty one party owes another. These choices can't be made by reference
to the intent of the parties since, by hypothesis, we don't know the in-
tent of the parties.  The  decision maker will have to refer to some con-
ception of the morality of the particular situation. And there is no clear
line between what the parties  "would  have decided had they  adverted
to this issue,"  "what  reasonable  people would  have decided  had they
adverted to this issue,"  and  "what the parties should have decided had
they adverted to this issue."
Again, these rules or standards of construction  are not paternalist
interventions  in our sense,  since the decision maker  applies them  only
when he  is unsure  what the  parties intended.  At  least in theory  he is
not overruling their  choices to  make  them better off, but operating  in
genuine  ignorance  of their  choices.  But the  substantive judgment  he
makes in such a case is just a less obtrusive version of the judgment he
makes when he decides to intervene more forcefully,  say by making a
term  he  invented  earlier  as  a  "fill-in"  into  a  nondisclaimable  duty.
Further, there  is no bright line between  mere filling-in and imposing a
compulsory  term.  There  is  a  single judgment  - about  what  people
ought to do  in their true  best  interests  in the circumstances  - and  a
series of finely graded  steps between  offering that judgment and mak-
ing it an offer the parties can't  refuse.
The  decision maker who sets out to define paternalist  duties thus
has two rich bodies of common law  experience to work with.  There is
the  elaborated tradition of fiduciary  law, and the elaborated  tradition
of contract  interpretation  to meet  cases  of mistake, impossibility,  fail-
the case of guardian  and ward it is only in the most tenuous  sense that the  relationship can
be seen as  based on agreement  at all.
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ure of condition, obscurity as to remedy, the definition of performance,
and so on.  There  is no objective  way to  fix  the content  of paternalist
intervention, if by "objective"  we mean a method of  judgment  without
judgment.  But there are plenty of sources of law, and the overall direc-
tion of the law is no more that of self-reliance than it is that of making
everyone  the beneficiary  of everyone  else's fiduciary  concern.
C.  Ad Hoc Paternalism
In the milieu of our decision maker, almost  everyone  is a princi-
pled anti-paternalist, at least by their own account. In this section, I will
argue  against principled  anti-paternalism,  and  in  favor  of an ad  hoc
approach.  The  basis of such an approach  is  acceptance  of contradic-
tory, or at least unprincipled  reactions to particular  instances of inter-
vention that overrule people's choices in their own interests. Sometimes
these seem not just good interventions,  but necessary  ones - it would
violate  a  moral  duty  to  neglect  them.  But  sometimes  they seem  like
naked aggression  against the human  dignity of the supposed  benefici-
ary.  To be an ad hoc paternalist  is to admit that one has no powerful,
overarching test that will allow one anything more than intuitive confi-
dence  (either before  or after one  acts)  that one  is on  the right side of
this line.  This is not to say that we act at random.  Indeed, our first task
is to get a  sense of what it is like  to act paternalistically.
1.  The Phenomenology of  Paternalism  - We can distinguish in a
preliminary  way between two variants of paternalism.  The first, which
one  might  call the  strong  version,  arises from  two circumstances  in a
relationship  between the  actor and the beneficiary.  The actor feels he
has  intuitive  access  to  the  other's  feelings  and perceptions  about  the
world,  and that he participates  directly in the suffering and the happi-
ness of the other. In other words, the basis of strong paternalism is lived
intersubjectivity.  The  actor  is  not  in  the  position  of "supposing"  or
"hypothesizing"  that  the other  feels  in  a  particular  way  - it's much
more  immediate than that.  It feels  like unity.
In this condition of unity, the actor comes to believe that the other
is  suffering from  some form of false consciousness that will cause him
to do something that will hurt him, physically  or financially or morally
or in some other way. The actor's  sense that the other's consciousness is
false is an intuition of error - that the clue to what the other is  about
to do is "having  it wrong."  The basis of this kind of intuition is one's
own experience  of being  mistaken, and  of having  other people  sense
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one's mistake.34
It  is  almost  never  possible  to  verify  the  intuition  in a  positivist
sense, and this has great significance.  But it is also important that intui-
tive certainties are real knowledge.  To my mind they are more real and
more reliable than knowledge  of the other built up by formulating and
testing  hypotheses  and  models  (though  that  is  a  form  of knowledge,
too).
The actor will certainly  try hard  to persuade  the other out  of his
false  consciousness,  and sometimes persuasion  works.  Or it may turn
out  that  it  is  the  other  who  persuades  the  actor  that  the  actor  was
wrong, thereby removing  any motive  for paternalist action.  But some-
times it doesn't happen that way:  at the end of the discussion, the actor
still feels that the other is mistaken, and is about to do something not in
his best interests.  Or perhaps  there is a  limited time  or no time at all
for  persuasion,  and  the  actor  has  either  to  act  paternalistically  right
away or not at all.
The actor has to decide whether to act to prevent the injury he sees
coming.  In the  strong kind of paternalism,  he doesn't see this  issue in
terms of, say, "reduction  in total utility" through the other's threatened
behavior,  but in terms  of anticipated  pain  for the actor himself.  The
impulse to "save"  the other is the  impulse that caused parents, putting
on the  brakes  before  the  era  of safety  belts  and  armored  kiddie  car
seats, to  reach  across to  keep  their  inattentive children  from hurtling
into the windshield. If they hurt themselves, you are hurt - that's the
basic experience.  Nonetheless, there are strong reasons for not acting.
The first is that your intuition that they suffer from false conscious-
ness may be  wrong.  You may be mistaken in just the way you thought
they were - it's all backwards, so to speak.  This is the relatively "cog-
nitive"  version  of mistake.  The  pea  was  really  under  the  left-hand
rather than the  right-hand cup,  so  if you'd let them  bet the  way they
wanted to, we'd all be millionaires  now.
Another possibility is that their conduct was based not on the mis-
take  you'd  wrongly  intuited,  but on  a  larger  plan  you hadn't under-
stood.  They knew  all along  what you  thought  they didn't  know, but
34.  If there is unity between the actor and the other, why doesn't he just change the false
into true consciousness?  At least  as a matter of describing  the experience  of intersubjectiv-
ity, the answer is  that the unity  is in a  context of disunity, or of real otherness, so that the
actor can have  an intuition of the other's mistake but no power to think the other's thoughts
for him.  It's just like the experience of the  simultaneous unity and duality of the  self:  I can
recognize  that I'm  hungry, or want  a cigarette,  or want a  particular  student to  fall  in love
with me, even that I'm in danger of slipping into a characteristic  state of blabby, confidence-
betraying false chumminess with a particular person.  But recognizing what's going on in me
doesn't  necessarily  give  me  power to change  my inner state.
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because they had intentions you didn't grasp, their knowledge was per-
fectly compatible  with what they were  doing.  You thought the  devel-
oper  tricked  the  condominium  buyer  into  accepting  a  "sweetheart"
contract  with  a  management  company.  In  fact,  this  contract,  which
eliminated just about all legal power of the condo owners to meddle in
one another's lives, was one of the greatest attractions of this particular
development.  If you're wrong in one or both of these ways, your inter-
vention will probably make things  worse  rather than  better.  If it will
make  things much  worse  if you're  wrong,  and  only a  little  better  if
you're  right, maybe  intervention  is too risky.
There  is also the  possibility that  it would be  best for the other to
make the  mistake  and  suffer  the  consequences.  It may  be  a  develop-
mentally  desirable  mistake,  with consequences  limited  enough so  the
other will survive  to do better the next time.  It may be more than that
- it may be a mistake the other has to make  if the other is to survive
without the  actor's constant paternalistic  intervention to bail him out.
In every case, the actor has to be aware of the possibility that interven-
tion is breeding more intervention - perpetuating dependence  and in-
competence just  as  the apostles  of self-reliance  are  always  saying  it
does.  Sometimes  the  actor  must  take  the  chance  that  the  other  will
destroy himself, in the hopes that if he doesn't he will emerge at a new
level of autonomy.
If the actor decides to act, the experience will be complex and con-
tradictory.  On the  one hand,  the  action  affirms  intersubjective  unity
with  the  other.  One  acts  out of the  sense  that one  knows  the other's
mind,  motivated by  the fact  that  one  suffers the  other's  pain.  Some-
times these  forms of knowledge are immediate and so intense that one
feels no choice  in the matter, any more than one  does when acting out
of the  instinct of sef-preservation.  But even  if it's a matter of reflec-
tion,  paternalist  action, when  it works,  has  a strong positive  connota-
tion.  Care is something we need; the ability to give  care coercively  but
benefically is one of the qualities we admire most intensely, whether in
parents dealing with young children, in children dealing with aged par-
ents,  or in  political  leaders  dealing  with  the  base  impulses  and mis-
guided  beliefs  of their  constituents.  When  you  feel  you have  done  it
right, you will  feel fulfillment.
But there is a bad side to it as well, even when it works.  The pater-
nalist intervention is aggressive:  it involves frustrating the other's pro-
ject  by  force  (or  by fraud,  in  the  case  of withholding  information  in
order  to control  the  other's  behavior  or spare  the  other pain). Along
with frustration, the other is likely to feel rage against unjust treatment.
From her point of view,  the actor has come along not only with  force,
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but with the self-righteous claim that the force is altruistic so she has no
basis for objecting.  Paternalist action is inherently risky because  it will
make someone  you are  intersubjectively  one  with furious  at you, and
they may be right.
If they are  right, you  will  suffer twice:  you  will  suffer with  them
the pain of the frustration of a valid project, and you will suffer on your
own  behalf the hurt  of their  anger  at  you,  along  with guilt that  you
have done them not just an injury, but an injustice.  Even if it turns out
that they were indeed suffering from false consciousness  and that your
intervention  spared  them  a serious evil, they  may not  forgive you  for
taking things  into  your own hands.  When you intervene  in someone
else's life, they may turn against you though you were in the right to do
as you did.  While we admire and honor some people in some roles for
their successful paternalism, we quite rightly scorn and condemn other
people  for "playing God,"  for not minding their own business,  for de-
grading and infantilizing  those they  are trying to help,  and for acting
out of selfish  motives behind  a  facade of concern  for others.
Now just a word about "weak"  paternalism.  It's like strong pater-
nalism except that it's based on the notion of being responsible  for the
other person, and therefore under an obligation  to look out for her in-
terests.  Weak is to strong paternalism as the legally compelled altruism
of tort  law is  to the true  altruism that causes  us to  put on the brakes
rather than run down a pedestrian guilty of contributory negligence.  In
weak paternalism, the decision maker constructs a verbal model that is
supposed to mimic the  real thing, and then imposes sanctions  on those
who fail to act accordingly.  This is not to denigrate it; it's often the best
we can do and we often want people to act as though they experienced
strong paternalist  urges even  when in  fact  they  are  indifferent  to  the
welfare  of the other.  But weak  is derivative from strong, and for pres-
ent purposes needs  no separate  analysis.  Our decision maker, at  least
for the moment,  acts under the impulsion of the  spirit rather than  the
letter.
In both the strong and the weak cases, paternalism  as I've defined
it - overruling a person's choice in their own best interest - is a vari-
ant of the larger  phenomenon  of intervening  in people's  lives  in their
best interests.  The focus on "overruling,"  which suggests the definitive
exercise  of superior  force,  and  on  "choice,"  which  suggests  that  the
other has a well-formed  project  that is obliterated,  is misleading.  The
same issues will arise for the actor in cases where his opportunity is just
to influence  the other, rather than flatly controlling him, and where the
other has no developed,  unequivocal  intention  about  what to do.
For example, suppose that you have a friend, a fellow academic in
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middle  life.  Dean  Kelly  calls  from  the  University  of Maryland  Law
School and  asks  who you'd recommend  as  Sobeloff lecturer,  and you
think of him.  He won't want to do it.  If you asked him whether to give
his name, you're quite sure he'd say no.  He'd  hate writing the lectures
(they have  been expanded to  three because  the  1982  performance  was
so charming).  But  you think  that  if he  doesn't  confront  his  writer's
block,  he may  never  do the  terrific  work you're  sure he's capable  of.
He wants  to do that work - he is  miserable in his blockedness.
You  know  he  has  trouble  saying  "no"  to  authority  figures  like
Kelly, even when he's sure he ought to.  You say to yourself that you'll
be playing  God with his life by  mentioning  his name,  and that you'll
also be playing God with his life if you let him tell you not to give his
name.  You go  ahead.  It could  come  out either way:  he  does the lec-
tures, the  Oxford  University  Press bids against  NBC-TV  for exclusive
rights, and your friend begins  a new life as a productive  scholar; or at
the  end  of the second  lecture he  realizes  he has nothing  to say in the
third, and cancels  it (he returns  the whole  fee).  He never even tries to
write  anything  again.
I  don't  think  you  could defend  yourself in  my  example  by pro-
testing, first, that all you did was give Kelly a piece of information that
you believed to be true, and, second, that your friend had a free choice
whether or not to accept his offer.  The  issue isn't whether you've used
a lot of force to  overrule your friend's choice,  but whether  you should
have contrived  to defeat his project of failing as an academic,  relying
on your intuition that at some "higher"  level he wanted to break out of
his impasse and succeed.  If you do that kind of thing, you have to take
responsibility for the consequences,  even though from the point of view
of ideas like "overruling"  and "choice,"  you did nothing at all.  Indeed,
it may be that you  are responsible when all you've done  is give advice
on request.  If you know the other attaches  special weight to your view,
so that  a given  plan proposed by you will be accepted  when the same
plan proposed by another would be rejected, then you are in a position
that  is on the same continuum  with  the case  of overruling  choice.
2.  Critique of Principled  Anti-Paternalism 35  - The  principled
anti-paternalist  admits  readily that  one sometimes  has to overrule an-
other's  choice  in his best  interest,  but argues that those  cases  are  ex-
plained  by  incapacity,  or  perhaps  by  another  similar  principled
exception  to the  general  idea that people  are autonomous.  (Likewise,
35.  1 found  Luban, Paternalism  ,  the Legal Profession,  1981  Wis.  L.  REV.  454,  and
Davis, Critical Jurisprudence: An Essay on  the Legal Theory of Robert Burt's Taking Care of
Strangers,  1981  Wis.  L. REV.  419  very helpful  here.
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the principled paternalist will argue that there are some cases  in which
people should be allowed  to choose on their own - the two positions
are indistinguishable for the purposes of my argument here.)  The plau-
sibility of principled  anti-paternalism  is therefore  linked to the  ability
to dismiss or explain away cases in which one wants to act paternalisti-
cally  but can't  rationalize the  action  in terms of incapacity.  My basic
argument is that when one collects  the cases of paternalist intervention
that can't be plausibly  explained  by a  notion like  capacity, it  becomes
clear  that  we  can't  be  any  more  than  ad  hoc  in  our  opposition  to
intervention.
The idea of incapacity will sometimes help in explaining the actor's
decision to intervene.  Sometimes one feels that the other has really and
truly lost  selfhood,  become  a walking  automoton  or disintegrated.  so
that someone has simply to take care of them, make decisions for them,
control their lives.  As the actor, you have to worry that you will make
bad custodial decisions, but not that you will be criticized for interven-
ing at all.  But  those are extreme  cases, and the difficulties  with pater-
nalism arise in situations where you have occasion to act without being
able  to  appeal  to any  such  blanket  permission  as is  afforded  by  the
other being just crazy.
Suppose that you are spending  the weekend  at the house of an old
woman - perhaps  but not necessarily  your mother,  perhaps but  not
necessarily someone you love deeply - who is in the terminal stages of
cancer.  She has an attack of breathlessness.  Gasping, she tells the peo-
ple present that she  doesn't want to go  to the hospital,  but to stay put
and  die  "with  dignity"  in her  own  bed.  The others  are simply  para-
lyzed  by  this demand,  and  by  the  tone  of building  hysterical  fear  in
which  she  expresses  it (you think; you  may  be  wrong).  You  want  to
take the  woman to  the hospital.  You  tell her you are going to  do so,
whether or not she agrees. She looks you carefully in the eye, and then,
without  any  positive  indication  of assent,  begins  giving  instructions
about  what she wants taken along with her in the car.  She goes to the
hospital, but is back at home in a day or two, and some weeks later she
does die with dignity in her own  bed.
After it was over, you might tell the story this way: the old woman
had thought  about  that moment  a  lot  in advance,  and  she was  much
less upset  by her breathlessness  than any of those around  her.  I felt  a
cold band of panic around my chest.  I was on the phone to the ambu-
lance service while the others were trying gently to persuade  her.  Then
they started yelling at each other.  She looked at us with contempt and
resignation  as her death worked  its infantilizing  effect  on us.  I  inter-
vened forcefully.  In the  car, she was  silent, already  in the grip of the
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humiliation  and fear  she knew  she would  feel in the emergency  room
and then in her private room after they hooked her up to the machines.
She came home a few days  later, but her spirit was sort of broken (not
completely) and she didn't really trust us that much any more.  She let
us have our way with her death.
The problem with the notion of capacity in a setting like this one is
not that it's positively wrong -just  that it doesn't help.  The strategy is
to  divide  the  decision  into  two  parts,  hoping  that will make  it easier
than if the question whether to act is treated as a single whole. First, we
try to decide  whether the other possesses a trait or quality called "abil-
ity to determine  her own best interests."  If she  does,  we  accede  to her
wishes even if in that particular case we are convinced that her action is
not in her best interests.  If it were truly easier to decide the presence or
absence  of the quality  of capacity than  to decide  on  balance  whether
we  should  intervene,  treating that question  all together, then  capacity
would be useful.  But the question of capacity  is hopelessly intertwined
with the question of what the other wants to do in this particular case.
First, there  is  no  such  "thing"  as  capacity,  and  there  can  be  no
such  thing  as  its  "absence"  either.  We  ask the  question  of capacity
already oriented  to the further question whether we will have to let the
person  do something  injurious to herself.  There  is no other reason to
ask the  question. Now, if you  ask me to answer  the  question  without
knowing what the potentially injurious thing is, it seems to me I should
refuse.  I don't believe  that capacity exists except  as capacity-to-make-
this-decision.  But  as  soon  as  I  am deciding  the  issue of capacity-to-
make-this-decision,  I find myself considering all the factors, testing my
intuition  of the  other's  false  consciousness, the  severity  of the  conse-
quences,  the  possibility  that  I  want  to  render  the  other  dependent
through paternalism, just as I would if I frankly admitted at the begin-
ning that it's just a big mess, with no principled way to find your way
through.
I come back to ad hoc paternalism,  by which  I mean that in fear
and  trembling  you  approach  each  case  determined  to  act if that's the
best  thing to  do,  recognizing  that influencing  another's  choice  - an-
other's  life - in the wrong direction, or so as to reinforce  their condi-
tion of dependence,  is a crime against them.  Of course, I haven'tproved
the impossibility of a principled anti-paternalist  stance.  I think I've un-
dermined  the idea that we can decide  when to act and when  not to act
through a notion like:  "Do not overrule the choice of a person who has
the capacity to choose on their own,"  but that doesn't prove there aren't
other principles,  or that someone  won't soon discover  other principles
even if none are currently extant.  My  strategy is not one of proof, but
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of offering  a lot of material to  make it plausible that principled  anti-
paternalism  is  a  shallow  view.  This  seems  a good  point  at which  to
bring  all that material together.
First of all, it is impossible for a decision maker operating within a
regime  of freedom  of contract  to  adopt  a stance  of neutrality  in  the
conflict between paternalist and anti-paternalist tendencies.  The pater-
nalist notion that contracts shouldn't be enforced if one party lacks ca-
pacity is constitutive of the institution of freedom of contract. We don't
have a system based on voluntariness without it. In other words, for the
decision maker to do his job of applying the background  regime, even
supposing he has no desire to change the rules of free contract, he will
have to decide whether any given case falls within the constitutive  ex-
ception  that  exempts  agreements  from  enforcement  on  paternalist
grounds, or within the part of the doctrine that insists people have the
right to  make any  contract  they want  to.  If it turns  out  the  decision
maker can't be either a principled anti-paternalist or a principled pater-
nalist, he will have to be an ad hoc paternalist, just in order to carry out
his job of filling gaps, resolving ambiguities and settling conflicts about
the rules of the free  contract  regime.
In the discussion above, I tried to offer a picture in which the stan-
dard anti-paternalist principled approach leaves one hanging without a
clear resolution.  At the same time, I tried to show that paternalism  is a
more pervasive issue in private life than people will generally admit.  It
is really just a special case of the more general issue of when one ought
and when one ought not to influence other people's lives.  It is common
to recognize  that there are no simple solutions to this larger issue.  The
discussion was therefore  supposed to widen one's perception of the per-
vasiveness of the problem of paternalism while at the same time reduc-
ing one's confidence  that normal principled  approaches  can solve it.
Earlier, I  argued that paternalist interventions are pervasive  in the
fields of contract and tort, though the rules in question are not usually
characterized  as  such.  The  goal  was  to  multiply  examples  that  one
would have to reject or rationalize in order to maintain the anti-pater-
nalist stance:  does one really want to do away with the rules of promis-
sory  estoppel  that  have  gradually  de-formalized  contract  formation
rules?  At the same time, I meant to weaken your resistance to the pa-
ternalist  motive  by pointing  out that the  idea of acting  coercively  in
another's  interest  is  familiar  through  institutions  like  custody  and
trusteeship.
The single most important piece  in the quilt of arguments in favor
of ad hoc paternalism is the pervasiveness  of compulsory  terms, in con-
tract, in tort and  in statutory  schemes.  These make up a large part of
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our whole  legal  order.  So  long  as  one can  see them  as  responsive  to
unequal  bargaining  power, they  don't  raise  any issue  of paternalism.
But unequal bargaining  power is of little use in understanding why we
like them.  They may redistribute income in a desirable direction.  But
given the peculiarity  of the  conditions  that must obtain if they are  to
have  this effect,  and given the hopeless fluidity of the efficiency  argu-
ments on their behalf, it seems clear that a large part of the burden of
justifying  them falls  on the  general notion of paternalism.  The princi-
pled anti-paternalist will have to give an account  of each nondisclaim-
able duty in terms of incapacity, or of some other principled exception,
or restore freedom  of contract.
My  hope  is  that  the  accumulating  weight  of the  examples  will
drive the principled anti-paternalist  at last into the camp of the ad hoc.
Paternalism everywhere, coming out of the woodwork, suggests that the
satisfying clarity of one's initial anti-paternalist  reaction is made possi-
ble only by excluding most of the problem from consideration.  Princi-
pled  anti-paternalism  is a  defense  mechanism.  One way  to deal with
the pain and fear of having  to make an ad hoc paternalist  decision -
one way to deny the pain and fear - is to claim that you "had"  to do
what  you did  because  principle  (say,  the  principle  of incapacity)  re-
quired it.  That the principle doesn't really work is less important than
that it anesthetizes.
There  are some  cases we can't seem to decide the way we want so
long  as  we adhere  to our principled  anti-paternalism,  even given the
manipulability of the notion of capacity.  We decide these cases pater-
nalistically, to our credit, but then bury them under other rubrics, such
as protection  from  "unequal  bargaining  power,"  so  we won't  have  to
confront  their challenge to our supposed consistency.  The truth of the
matter is that what we need when we make decisions affecting the well-
being of other people  is correct  intuition about their needs and an atti-
tude of respect  for their autonomy.  Nothing  else will help.  And even
intuition and respect may do no good at all.  There isn't any guarantee
that you'll get it right, but when it's wrong you're  still responsible.
3.  Paternalism  in Public vs. Private Lfe - When issues of pater-
nalism arise in the context of "private life,"  the actor is likely to know
the other, even to know the other well, and to have a claim to intuitive
understanding  based on common experience.  But  the decision  maker
whose  dilemmas  we have  been  examining  throughout  this  essay  is  a
state official  deciding  cases  for people  in  the abstract,  people  situated
each in his or her particular way in a society divided by class, race, and
sex.  One  might concede that in the private context of intimate knowl-
[VOL.  41MOTIVES  IN  CONTRACT  AND  TORT  LAW
edge of the  other, ad hoc paternalism is unavoidable,  but still favor a
rule against  it in this more complicated  situation.
It is no more than a partial response to point out that so long as it
is built into  free contract through the requirement  of capacity, and  so
long  as  the  concept  of capacity  has the  incoherent  quality  I  sketched
just a moment  ago, there can be no  "rule"  against paternalism.  Even
without a rule, we could be less paternalist in public than in private life.
Even if there are no coherent conceptual boundaries  we can invoke,  it
may make sense to move along the continuum in response to the situa-
tion of our particular decision maker.
Nor  is it an adequate response to reject the public/private distinc-
tion as incoherent.  It is true that there is no difference in kind between
the gradated  coercions  exercised  by our  decision  maker  and  the gra-
dated coercions the actor exercises in my example of the woman dying
of cancer.  If the actor simply picks her up and takes her to the hospital,
he will be acting a good deal more forcefully  than our decision  maker
can manage even in very extreme cases.  State action is not intrinsically
more violent than private.  But what makes it seem at least conceivable
that the state official should be more chary of paternalism than the pri-
vate actor is that the state official acts on people he doesn't know, which
is just a euphemistic way of saying that he acts on people who belong to
class, racial and sexual groups different from his own.  It is quite likely,
moreover, that these groups have a history of oppressive subordination
to his  own.
The basis of paternalism is intersubjective  unity of the actor with
the  other;  it  is  identification  and  intimate  knowledge.  But the  most
fundamental  characteristic  of social  life  in our  form  of capitalism  is
social pluralism, which is a euphemism for social segregation and con-
sequent ignorance and fear of one group for another.  In the context of
segregation, ignorance  and fear, the risks of paternalist intervention are
multiplied far beyond what  they are in private  life.
Since private life takes place  in a context  of social segregation,  if
the  actor  is  a  white  middle  class person  acting  paternalistically,  the
other is also likely to be a white  middle class person.  But in his public
role, the decision maker will act out of his ignorance, bred of that same
personal life lived in segregation, in a context where the others may not
be of his group and may have reason to fear and possibly hate him.  It
is less likely that his intuition of false consciousness will be correct, less
likely that his intuition of the consequences of his action will be correct,
and less likely that the others will forgive him his aggression  if his in-
tervention fails, or even if it succeeds.  It is this rather than any abstract
conceptual  distinction  between  state  and  civil  society  that  makes  it
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plausible for our decision maker to hold back in his government  office
when he would push forward  at home.
The farther apart  they are culturally, the more likely it  is that the
actor will perceive  "mistakes"  or false consciousness  on the part of the
others that  they won't recognize  as such no matter how much data he
lays  on them,  because  they  involve  basic  premises  about  the  world,
truth, and  the good.  Paternalist intervention  based on  a  strong intui-
tion that the supposed  beneficiary  is wrong  on this level - say, in be-
lieving  that the  way to mourn  her husband  is to  throw herself on his
funeral  pyre - has the unfortunate property  of being simultaneously
the most imperatively required  (when  it is required)  and the most im-
peratively forbidden  (when it's wrong or officious).  In other words, as
we move from the personal, private level into the area of relations be-
tween  large  groups  that  are  parts  of a  single  society,  the  stakes  get
higher - both for action and for inaction.
It  is  that  the  risks  escalate  on both sides that  for  me  ultimately
undermines the case for anti-paternalism  in public  life.  This is a diffi-
cult point;  I want to put it tentatively.  It seems to me that the decision
maker setting the groundrules  as a state actor in a society such as ours,
riven by group  divisions that are divisions  of consciousness,  is  one of
the few people of whom we can demand that he represent our collective
commitment  to the transcendence  of pluralism in  the name  of truth.
Of course, he also has to represent the  ideal of pluralism  in a way
almost never demanded of decision makers in more homogenous situa-
tions.  But tolerance is only half the story.  The other half is that life in
our form of capitalism conspires  to drive its constituent  groups so far
from each  other that they can't  communicate  very  well.  It  creates  a
situation  in which  the working class,  the middle class and the welfare
class, for example, inhabit incommensurable moral domains, and treat
each other as Victorian  missionaries treated  South  Sea islanders, or as
Junkers treated German peasants, or as the Japanese treated early visi-
tors from the West.
A decision  maker who will not take the risk of imposing housing
codes and then enforcing them through tenant remedies - just on the
grounds that people are wrong to submit to these conditions - because
he  doesn't feel confident about  what the poor "really  want,"  has let a
constituent group slip outside his capacity for intimate intuitive knowl-
edge.  Since refusing  to act paternalistically  involves him in applying
state  force  to  execute  the law  of contracts  or torts  against  those  who
would  have been  the  beneficiaries  of paternalism,  he can't claim  he's
practicing  benign neglect.  What he's doing, if he tries to be  a system-
atic.anti-paternalist  in public life, is denying his knowledge  of the rela-
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tive incapacity  of groups, of their characteristic mistakes.  He is acting
to deepen their incapacity by treating them as entitled to their mistakes,
and then bringing to bear the apparatus of the state to evict them from
their subcode apartments, exclude them under the law of trespass from
power over the means of production they created through their labor,
and leave  them to beg for crumbs when accidents  they didn't provide
for befall them after all.
In  short, the  decision  maker  should be  damned  if he  doesn't  as
well as damned if he does.  Let's face it:  he's almost certainly a middle
or  upper  middle  class  person, or  a  person  who identifies  with  those
classes in his heart.  If he is concerned about failures of intuition, about
the limits of empathy,  he has two alternatives  he should try before de-
claring himself a public life anti-paternalist and passing by on the other
side.  The first is to investigate the  consciousness  of those he isn't sup-
posed to mess with. This means breaking down the barriers of segrega-
tion by knowing others, rather than just making  rules for them.
The second is to go beyond exploration to the task of helping mo-
bilize the groups on whose part one  may have to act paternalistically.
So long as one is a decision maker playing God with the lives of people
of other races and classes  and sexes, the  dilemmas of ad hoc paternal-
ism are inescapable.  The  only way to  reduce the risk of making mis-
takes for which one is responsible no matter how good one's intentions
is  to  deal  with  people  who  are  not  at  a great  distance,  who  are not
strangers.  If the others in whose interest you have to act are mobilized,
it's more likely that you will  have some  intuitive knowledge  of them,
because  they will have the means of group expression.  It's more likely
that they'll be able to tell you what to do and correct you when you do
it  wrong,  so  that  you  don't  make  mistakes  on  their behalf.  And  if
they're  mobilized,  there's  more  chance  they  will  be  able  to  dispense
with your services. That is the true paternal goal:  that the other should
surpass you both in knowledge  and in power, and share both.
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APPENDIX  A
Strict Liability vs. Negligence in Compulsory Terms
As a matter of fact (rather than of logic), a very  large number of
the  regimes  of compulsory  terms  in our  social  context  are concerned
either with the taking of precautions to avoid injury, or with the alloca-
tion of losses from the miscarriage of the contract activity, or with both.
Compulsory terms figure heavily in the general law about risk, both its
control  through  investment  and  its  allocation  (as  between  those  on
whom  losses  fall  initially  and  various  possible  reimbursing  parties).
Regimes that deal with risk have a set of effects  that will not be present
- at  least  not  quite  in the same  way - when  the compulsory  term
relates  to some  form of fully intentional behavior.
One way  to get a handle on this  subcategory of effects is  by com-
paring caveat  emptor  with a compulsory  negligence  regime, and then
with a compulsory strict liability  regime. The two crucial variables are
investment  in safety and allocation of the losses that occur in spite of
safety  precautions.  It  is  probably  easiest  to  understand  this  abstract
topic through the example of products liability, but the analysis applies
as well in cases like that of the insurance tort of refusal to settle a valid
claim, the insurance tort of refusal to settle a third-party claim against
the  insured  (where  the  third party  subsequently  wins  a judgment  for
more than the limits of the policy), the liability of employers for sexual
harassment of employees  by other employees,  the tort of medical mal-
practice  (understood  to include  the problem of non-negligent  injuries
arising out  of medical  treatment), and  so on indefinitely.  A  court re-
cently  had  to  decide  whether  a  landlord's  nondisclaimable  implied
warranty of habitability made him strictly liable for failure to provide
heat,  when  he  had  not  only  adequately  maintained  the  apartment
building  furnace, but  done everything  in his power to repair a  break-
down  as quickly  as possible  after it occurred.
Under caveat emptor, still supposing  that there are no transaction
costs  and everyone  is perfectly  informed  about risks,  buyers will bar-
gain to individualized  contracts with sellers  respecting risks  associated
with the commodity in question.  They will ask for and pay for specific
investments  in  safety (e.g.,  design modification,  factory  procedures  to
catch defective  items) whenever  the particular  investment  in safety  is
worth more to them than it will cost the seller. They will also be willing
to pay something for insurance  through the sale contract against vari-
ous kinds of injuries associated with use of the commodity.  Sellers may
or may not be willing to provide investment in safety and/or insurance
at prices buyers are willing to pay.  If no bargains about safety or insur-
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ance  are struck,  we  can  conclude  that the  services  were  not worth  to
consumers  what  it would have cost  to provide them.
The bargains struck or not struck will reflect the buyers'  risk pref-
erences.  If buyers were  aware of a risk, say of 10%, that the commodity
would cause an injury worth $100,  and that injury could be prevented
by  a precaution  that  would cost  only  $5, they  might  or might not  be
willing to pay the $5 to get the seller to take the precaution. They might
prefer  $5 in  hand  to  elimination  of a  10% chance  of losing  $100.  If
that's the  case, then they  are "risk preferers."  If buyers are willing to
pay $12  in advance to avoid a  10% chance of losing $100, they are "risk
averse."  The issue of risk preference  arises both with respect to invest-
ments in safety, which reduce the risk of accidents, and to payments for
insurance  against  whatever  accidents  occur  in  spite  of precautions.
Risk preferers will not insure at even money; the risk averse will  gladly
pay more  in premiums  than they  expect to  save in  losses.
There is another reason why a particular buyer - even a risk neu-
tral buyer - might be unwilling to invest $5 to eliminate a  10% chance
of a  $100  loss.  The buyer might  feel that he  could  achieve  the same
benefits on his own at less cost.  For example, he might calculate that a
product that was  dangerous  to most people, because  most people  are
ignorant  and  careless,  was  not  dangerous  to  him,  because  he  was
knowledgeable  and careful and would use it safely.  Or he might plan
to modify the product himself for less than $5. Or he might prefer not
to buy insurance from the seller because he could get his own personal
injury  and  lost wages  insurance  for less than it  would cost  to buy  it
from the seller.  Or he might be confident that, if injured, he would be
compensated  from other sources  (family, social insurance, charity) and
have  no interest  on gambling  on a  windfall gain from injury.
Under caveat emptor,  supposing  no transaction  costs, the general
outcome is that buyers buy what they want - no one makes them pay
for protection they don't want.  A nondisclaimable  negligence duty im-
posed  on the  seller changes  this  situation quite  drastically  (supposing
that it's enforceable).  Under  such a regime,  a buyer can recover dam-
ages from the seller if the seller fails to meet a standard of "reasonable-
ness"  defined by a judge and jury.  Suppose, to simplify things, that the
content  of the reasonableness  standard turns  out to  be something like
the Hand formula. Judges and juries find negligence liability when they
think the seller could have reduced expected accident costs by X dollars
by taking  a precaution  that would have cost  less than X dollars.  Ex-
pected  accident costs  are the jury's estimate of the value of the losses
(most of which are in such categories  as pain and suffering and short-
19821MARYLAND  LAW  REVIEW
ened  life  expectancy)  discounted  by  the  improbability  of  their
occurrence.
If  the risk preferences  and the risk valuations of buyers and sellers
have  corresponded  in the past to  those of judges and juries under the
nondisclaimable negligence  regime, there will be no change at all in the
market after imposition of the term.  Buyers will have been buying just
the  precautions  that the  state now  requires them  to buy. But suppose
that the whole  reason  for  imposing the  duty is that  seller and  buyers
have  been  waiving  negligence  liability  in the sales  contract,  and that
buyers have  been grabbing  up products  that, according  to judges  and
juries,  could be made much safer for very small  investments in safety.
We now have a situation in which the compulsory term requires buyers
to pay for something they don't want - the tax analogy is apposite -
and  the  outcome  will  be  different  than  it  was  under  freedom  of
contract.
Under such a regime, the seller will go ahead and take precautions
that cost less than the  accident  losses they prevent,  and thereby  avoid
liability  for those losses.  But he will not  invest in safety where the ex-
pected  reduction in his liabilities for negligence  is less than the cost of
the precautions.  There he  will do only what buyers pay him  to do -
i.e., for precautions that cost more than they save the seller, and whose
neglect  is therefore  not  negligence,  the parties  still operate  as though
under caveat  emptor.  Moreover,  the new  negligence  regime  does not
require  buyers  to  pay  for  insurance  against  non-negligently  caused
injuries.
The sellers will attempt to pass along the cost of added precautions
to buyers  by raising  their prices.  The outcome  will vary  according to
the  scheme  laid out  above:  everything  depends  on the  shapes  of the
supply  and  demand  curves,  and on  the  competitive  structure  of the
market.  There will probably be some increase  in price, though proba-
bly buyers will get an increase  in precautions  for a smaller increase  in
the price than would have occurred had they bargained voluntarily for
them.  There  will  probably  be  some  reduction  in  volume,  as  buyers
leave  the market or buy less, and sellers cut  back  output  or go out of
business altogether.  But it all depends  on the particulars.
Note that there are at least four groups of buyers affected:  (1)  there
are  those whose risk preferences  and valuations  have been  overruled,
who end up paying for precautions they don't want; (2)  there are, possi-
bly, buyers  who wouldn't pay the  full costs of the precautions but are
delighted  to get them  at a  reduced price  because  of incomplete  pass-
along;  (3)  there are  those  who  have  the same  risk preferences  as  the
state  but  figured  that  they could  avoid  accident  losses  more  cheaply
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through  their own precautions  than through the  seller's;  and  (4)  there
are  those  who  are  priced  out  of the market  and  purchase  their next
most favored good rather than this one.  A paternalist  may justify forc-
ing the first group to be more provident and the last group to go else-
where  if  they  won't  pay  for  protection.  It  may  be  desirable  for
distributive reasons  to help out  the second group.  But the third group
then appears to be a necessary casualty of the effort to act on behalf of
the other three.
Now move to a strict liability  regime.  Buyers  get, along  with the
product,  a  nondisclaimable  duty  to pay  for  all  losses  "caused"  by  a
"defect."  Sellers  will continue  to take  precautions  that cost  less than
the  liability  they  prevent  from  happening, just as  under  the  nondis-
claimable negligence regime.  But if we assume that buyers were previ-
ously paying  nothing at all for insurance against non-negligent  injury
from product defects, we will have a new set of changes in the product
market.  The first thing to remember is that the imposition of strict lia-
bility will not cause  the seller to increase  his investment  in safety pre-
cautions,  unless  (as  is  very  likely)  the  earlier  nondisclaimable
negligence  regime  wasn't  working right.  If it  was working  right,  the
seller had already  invested  up  to the  point  where  further  precautions
cost  more than  they  saved  in  losses.  Under  strict  liability,  it will  be
cheaper for him to let the injured party sue him, and pay the judgment,
where the  only way to prevent  the  accident  would be to  increase  pre-
cautions beyond where  they are under negligence.  (That is, since pre-
cautions  beyond  the  negligence  level  cost  more  than  the  losses  they
prevent,  it won't  make  sense  for  the  seller  to  take  them,  even  under
strict  liability.)
Since the seller now has to compensate the buyer for non-negligent
injuries,  the  buyer  is  getting  insurance  along  with  the  product.  The
analysis of the consequences should by now be familiar.  The insurance
is worth less to buyers than it costs sellers.  Sellers will try to pass along
the cost;  they will probably  only succeed  to  some extent,  though how
much  is  indeterminate.  Buyers  get  the  insurance,  probably,  for  less
than it costs.  Some buyers leave  the market;  some  sellers lose  volume
or go out of business.  From a paternalist point of view, we have "cor-
rected" buyers'  preferences with respect to insurance against non-negli-
gent  injury,  just  as  we  earlier  corrected  their  preferences  about
negligently manufactured  products.  Once again, those who  refused  to
buy insurance not because  they were  "risk  preferers"  but because  they
could get insurance  cheaper elsewhere,  or accurately  believed they ran
less risk of injury than the average buyer, are forced  to buy something
they  don't  either  want  or  need.  There  will  be  distributive  conse-
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quences,  possibly  but  not  necessarily  including  enriching  part of the
buyer group at the expense of other buyers and sellers.MOTIVES  IN  CONTRACT  AND  TORT  LAW
APPENDIX  B
Graphical  Presentation  of Distributive  Effects of Compulsory Terms
1.  The  Case in  "hich  Imposing the  Term  Enriches the Buyer
Group at the Expense of Sellers (Figure  1)  - This  case  comes  about
because marginal buyers of the commodity have no interest in the term,
while infra-marginal buyers value it very highly  relative to what it will
cost them  at the  new equilibrium.
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Figure  I
d is the  demand curve  without the compulsory term.
d* is the demand  curve  after imposition of the compulsory  term.
s  is the  industry supply curve  for the commodity.
s*  is the supply curve for the commodity  with the term.
AB  (=FE=CD) is  the  cost  (per unit  of commodity)  of providing  the
term.
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CDEF is the  total  cost of providing  the  term at  the new  equilibrium
price and quantity  represented  by point E.
GH  is  smaller than AB,  so no  buyer  would voluntarily  purchase  the
term - it is worth  less to  all of them than it costs sellers.
However,  it is worth something to buyers.  At quantity  OJ, its value is
GHEK - the  area  between d and d*.  When the decision maker
imposes the term,  the  buyers  who stay  in the market  receive this
benefit (GHEK) at a cost of MDEL, equal to the price increase of
MD times the  quantity OJ.
In the  diagram, GHEK  is greater than MDEL, so those buyers  still in
the market have gotten the term for less than they would have paid
for  it, and are therefore  better  off.
Those sellers still in the market have shouldered the cost of the term -
CDEF - but have  been able to raise price  only by MD,  so they
are providing the  term  at  a loss  of CMLF.
Furthermore, sellers have lost volume - in the amount NJ - and cor-
responding producers'  surplus FLP, making a total loss of CMPF.
Buyers have lost consumers'  surplus on this reduction in quantity to the
extent of LKP.
The overall changes in surplus for all buyers are a loss of DQPM and a
gain of GHEQ.  If this  represents  a net  gain, the  decision  maker
must decide  whether it is worth the loss of CMPF  to sellers.
The decision maker must also decide whether or not to treat buyers and
sellers as homogeneous  classes.  It may be that he can  distinguish
the winners from the losers among them, and that this will be rele-
vant in deciding whether the  imposition of the term  is on balance
desirable as  a redistributive move.
2.  The  Case in  hich the  Compulsory Term Redistributes  from
Buyers to Sellers (Figure  2) - What makes this perverse effect  possible
is that after imposition of the term there is not only a rise  in price  but
also  a  rise  in  quantity.  For this  to  be  true,  there  must  be  marginal
buyers  who would all along have paid more  for the term  than it costs
sellers,  supposing  that sellers are  providing it  to everyone.  Sellers, we
suppose, failed to provide the term to this group either because  it was
more  expensive  to provide  in  small  quantities  than  it will  now  be  to
provide it to everyone (see text, at p. 611, n. 19) or because of one of the
transaction cost  effects  discussed  in  Part IV A above.
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Figure  2
d is the demand curve without  the compulsory  term.
d* is the demand  curve with the term.
s  is the supply curve  without the term.
s* is the supply  curve with the term.
AB (=FE=CD) is the cost  (per unit of commodity) of the term.
CDEF  is the  total  cost of providing  the  term at the new  equilibrium
price and quantity  represented  by point  E.
GHEK represents a gain  in consumer  surplus for buyers as  a result of
imposition of the term.
LDKM  represents  the  loss  of consumer  surplus  that  follows  the  in-
crease  in price from OL to OD.
Because  LDKM  is  larger  than  GHEK,  buyers  as  a  group  have  lost
through the imposition  of the term.
Sellers have increased  their output from ON to OP.  Even after paying
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out the  full cost  of the term (CDEF), they have  increased  produ-
cers'  surplus from  ALM to ACF, for a net gain of LCFM.
The imposition  of the  term has  therefore  reduced  the  welfare  of the
buyer group  and increased  that of the  sellers.  As  in the  case  of
Figure 1, it may be possible to assess the  distributive effects  more
precisely by distinguishing  winners and losers within each group.